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Abstract 
This thesis conducts empirical analysis on the determinants of migration and remittance sending 
decisions in Kenya and the impact on the expenditure patterns of households using cross-sectional 
household survey data. The first empirical chapter explores the factors that influence the 
subsequent migration decisions of Kenyan siblings using binary logit models. The findings reveal 
that preceding sibling migrants have a strong negative effect on the probability of migration for 
other siblings. Evidence in support of migration as a joint household level decision is obtained as 
preceding sibling and non-sibling migrants are found to exhibit similar effects. Conditional on 
migrating, siblings are shown to utilize existing sibling networks by moving to the same internal or 
external destination as preceding migrants. Discrete failure time models are also employed so as to 
account for any neglected heterogeneity at the household level. Controlling for neglected 
heterogeneity, the overall effect of preceding sibling migrants is found to be statistically 
insignificant. However, non-sibling migrants are found to decrease the probability of migrating. The 
second empirical chapter examines the remittance behaviour of multiple compared to sole sibling 
migrants, and the motivations of Kenyan siblings in sending remittances to their household of 
origin. No evidence of selection bias in the decision to remit is detected when a Heckman selection 
model is estimated. Using probit and OLS models, the presence of other siblings is found to 
decrease the probability of remitting but to have no effect on the amount of remittances sent. The 
amount of remittances sent by other siblings is also found to have no statistically significant effect 
on the remittances sent by a sibling using IV regression methods. In the third empirical chapter, the 
expenditure patterns of Kenyan households are investigated according to whether the household is 
a migrant or non-migrant household, and whether a migrant household is in receipt of remittances 
or not using an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) approach. The analysis reveals that remitters 
who are spouses and siblings of the household have higher bargaining power towards the allocation 
of remittances to physical investments and durable goods, respectively. The expenditure patterns 
also show that remittances are not pooled together with general income when allocating the 
household budget towards durable goods and physical investments. In addition, the findings reveal 
that the reported uses of remittances by Kenyan households contrast with their actual uses. In the 
fourth chapter, the uses of remittances for the acquisition of physical investments and durable 
goods are analysed in more detail using IV and bivariate probit models. Remittances are found to 
be exogenous for the durable goods category but endogenous for physical investments. The 
evidence obtained is supportive of remittances being used by households to purchase these 
categories of commodities.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The current thesis conducts empirical analysis on the factors that determine the migration and 
remittance sending behaviour of Kenyan siblings using cross-sectional household survey data. The 
uses of remittances and their impact on the expenditure patterns of Kenyan households are also 
investigated. 
Globally, in 2013 there were 136 million international migrants in developed regions and 96 
million in developing ones (United Nations 2013). Approximately 60% and 86% of the 
international migrants in developed and developing regions, respectively, originated from a 
developing country. Bilateral migration data from the World Bank indicate that in 2010, about 31 
million Africans were living in countries other than the ones in which they were born (Ratha et al. 
2011). However, it is acknowledged that these official migration figures are significantly 
underestimated because there are major gaps in the reported data. Officially recorded remittances 
to developing countries were estimated at USD 414 billion in 2013, an increase of about 6.3% over 
the previous year (Ratha et al. 2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, the volume of remittances has 
increased steadily over the years, doubling in the most recent decade compared to the previous one, 
and surpassing private equity investments. Remittances have been more stable than foreign direct 
investment, private debt and equity flows in Sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta et al. 2009, Singh et al. 2011, 
and see Figure 1.1). In 2013 remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa were equivalent to 2.02 per cent of 
GDP, slightly more than the 1.8 per cent average for all developing regions (Ratha et al. 2011). 
Surveys of migrants, remittance recipients and other secondary sources suggest that informal 
remittance flows, which are not included in official estimates, could be equivalent to or exceed 
official figures for Sub-Saharan Africa (Page and Plaza 2006). The scale of global migrant and 
remittance flows exemplifies the importance of understanding the determinants of migration and 
remittances, and the mechanisms through which they potentially contribute to development.  
Despite acknowledgements that it can be difficult to separate the effect of remittances from the 
overall effect of migration in empirical studies (McKenzie and Sasin 2007), it is argued that the 
primary economic benefits of migration accrue through the receipt of remittances (World Bank 
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2006, Ratha et al. 2011). At the macro-level, remittances are a vital source of finance for developing 
countries. Unlike other private capital flows, remittances tend to be counter-cyclical and act as a 
cushion or source of insurance against macroeconomic shocks in the receiving countries (Chami et 
al. 2009). For example, remittances increased during the financial crises in Mexico, Indonesia and 
Thailand (Ratha 2007). Remittances also tend to increase with natural disasters and political crises 
(Yang and Choi 2007, Yang 2008, Mohapatra et al. 2012). Remittance flows, therefore, behave 
differently from most other flows which tend to be pro-cyclical (Ratha 2003, Frankel 2011), mainly 
because they are predominantly sent between members of the same household and hence not 
driven by profit-seeking motives to the same extent as private capital flows (Ratha et al. 2011). 
Remittances are also not susceptible to the changing priorities and economic situation of official aid 
donors (World Bank 2006). They can also improve sovereign creditworthiness by increasing the 
level and stability of foreign exchange receipts (Ratha 2007). In addition, remittances can enhance 
economic growth by increasing consumption, improving human and physical capital investment 
levels, and contributing towards stabilizing consumption and output at both the household and 
macroeconomic level (Chami et al. 2009, Mohapatra et al. 2012).  
Figure 1.1: Remittances and other resource flows to Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (May 2014) database. 
However, some negative macro-level effects have been associated with the inflow of 
remittances. For example, remittances could reduce growth by causing the real exchange rate to 
appreciate thus reducing trade competitiveness (World Bank 2006, Acosta et al. 2011, and Gupta et 
al. 2009). The receipt of remittances may also reduce the supply of labour, though the evidence for 
this is not very convincing, especially for African countries (Azam and Gubert 2006). Clemens and 
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McKenzie (2014) illustrate how difficult it can be to detect the actual effect of remittances on 
economic growth. For example, changes in the measurement of remittances may account for a large 
proportion of the increase in recorded remittances, rather than changes in real financial flows. Also, 
cross-country panel regressions may have insufficient power to identify the true effect of 
remittances on growth. In addition, the growth in remittance inflows predominantly arises from the 
growth in the migrant stock. Thus, remittance receiving countries incur an opportunity cost which, 
if netted out, leaves remittances having a lesser impact on macroeconomic growth. 
At the micro level, remittances have the potential to reduce poverty, raise household 
investment and increase access to health and education services (Ratha et al. 2011). Empirical 
studies generally reveal that remittances have reduced the share of people living in poverty in 
developing countries. The body of evidence compiled from 71 developing countries by researchers 
at the World Bank suggests that, on average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international 
migrants in a country’s population will lead to a 2.1 per cent decline in the share of people living in 
poverty (i.e., living on less than USD 1 per person per day) (Adams and Page 2005). The same 
research indicates that a 10 per cent increase in per capita formal international remittances will 
produce a 3.5 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty. Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 
(2010), exploiting a sample of 33 African countries for the period 1990 to 2005, find that a 10 per 
cent increase in formal international remittances as a share of GDP not only led to a 2.9 per cent 
decrease in the share of people living in poverty but also to declines in the depth and severity of 
poverty.1 Similar findings of the positive developmental roles of migration and remittances echo 
across many quantitative and qualitative studies in the literature.  
Overall, there exists a large body of literature indicating that migration and remittances have a 
positive impact on the living standards of people in developing countries. Yet, country-specific 
policy frameworks related to migration and remittances remain relatively weak, especially for 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. A majority of central banks in Sub-Saharan Africa cite the need for 
better statistics and more studies on migration and remittances in order to improve the efficiency 
                                                          
1 The study corrects for the possible endogeneity of international remittances by using lags of the level of international 
remittances received as instrumental variables.  
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and delivery of remittances (Irving et al. 2010). There remain gaps in the understanding of the 
factors that drive migration and remittance flows as well as the impact that migration and 
remittances have at the household level. Therefore, there are a number of countries for which 
sound empirically based evidence is absent. More country specific empirical evidence is required so 
that policymakers are not confined to generalizing policies related to migration and remittances 
based on findings drawn from research conducted in other contexts. Furthermore, factors that 
influence migration and remittance trends tend to evolve over time. It is therefore imperative for 
scholars to conduct research that is both up-to-date and relevant to the context in which they 
intend to inform and influence policy. The objective of this thesis is to achieve this for the case of 
Kenya. 
Kenya is a particularly compelling context to undertake empirical research on migration and 
remittances as the few studies that have conducted such research hitherto are quite dated and 
largely restricted to internal migration (e.g., Hoddinott 1994 and 1992, Knowles and Anker 1981, 
Johnson and Whitelaw 1974) though there are some relatively recent studies as well (e.g., Simiyu 
2013). At the same time, the migration of Kenyans has increased over the past two decades. Recent 
evidence suggests that Kenyans living abroad represent 1.1% of the national population (World 
Bank 2011), with many profitably engaged in the socio-economic sectors of their host countries 
(Kinuthia and Akinyoade 2012). In addition, external remittances are the fourth-largest source of 
foreign exchange for the Kenyan economy after revenue from tea, horticulture and tourism (Bett 
2013). And while revenue from tea and coffee exports has diminished in the past five years, the 
inflow of remittances has continued to increase. On average, Kenya receives 60 per cent of 
remittances to East Africa and 10 per cent of remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa (Ngugi 2011). 
The Kenyan government largely recognizes the importance of migration. This is reflected by 
the incorporation of a diaspora policy in Kenya Vision 2030 - a national long-term development 
blue-print whose objective is to transform Kenya into a newly industrialising middle-income 
country by 2030. The objective of the diaspora policy is to provide the necessary legal and 
institutional framework for Kenyans living abroad to participate in the development of the country. 
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However, the dearth of evidence-based studies could decelerate the Kenyan government’s progress 
in achieving its targets of harnessing the developmental potential of migration and remittances. 
Therefore, empirical studies can potentially complement government efforts to achieve these 
targets by enhancing the understanding of migration and remittance drivers in Kenya and flagging 
critical issues.  
The current thesis conducts empirical analysis with the objective of enhancing the 
understanding of factors that determine migration and remittance sending decisions in Kenya in 
light of the aforementioned factors. In addition and importantly, the impact that remittances have 
on the expenditure patterns of Kenyan households is also examined. The thesis is organized into 
eight chapters. The next chapter provides an overview of the prevailing migration trends in Kenya, 
highlighting notable variations in these trends according to gender and type of migration. The 
patterns of remittance flows within Kenya and from external destinations are also the subject of 
discussion.  
The data used to conduct the empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis are then discussed in 
chapter 3. The source, scope and coverage of these data, as well as the sampling framework and the 
survey design are reviewed. We also explain why the data are suitable for the current thesis and flag 
some of their limitations.  
Chapter 4 conducts empirical analysis to investigate the determinants of Kenyan subsequent 
sibling migration decisions. Specifically, we determine what effect the presence of a preceding 
sibling migrant has on the probability of migration for other siblings. As per the new economics of 
labour migration (Stark and Bloom 1985), the migration of siblings is viewed from the perspective 
of the household. We thus interpret sibling migration as primarily motivated by the household 
desire to maximise expected net returns to migrating with networks facilitating subsequent 
migration, and/or the household need to minimize risk through diversifying income sources. We 
also investigate whether there are any gender differentials in the decisions of sibling migration and 
if migration motivations vary according to the type of migration (i.e., internal or external). 
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Chapter 5 examines the remittance behaviour of Kenyan multiple compared to sole sibling 
migrants, and the motivations of siblings in sending remittances to their household of origin. 
Empirical analysis are undertaken to ascertain whether the probability of remitting and the amount 
of remittances sent are influenced by the presence of other sibling migrants. 
In chapter 6, we investigate the expenditure patterns of Kenyan households according to 
whether the household is a migrant or non-migrant household, and whether a migrant household is 
in receipt of remittances or not. The relative bargaining powers of remitters are investigated by 
determining whether different types of remitters (i.e., spouse, sibling or another relative of the 
household) exert differential impacts on the household allocation of remittances to budget shares. 
An investigation is also undertaken to ascertain whether Kenyan migrant households pool their 
remittance and general income together when allocating it to expenditure. Finally, an analysis 
comparing what Kenyan households report to have spent using the remittances they received to 
what they actually apportion their general income to expenditure is conducted. The analysis 
determines whether the reported uses of remittances are analogous to the actual uses.  
We then narrow down the analysis of the uses of remittances by households to physical 
investments and durable goods in chapter 7. An investigation is undertaken to determine whether 
remittances should be treated endogenously within this framework. The analysis conducted 
addresses some of the shortcomings encountered in chapter 6 and enables a clarification of the uses 
of remittances for the acquisition of durable goods and physical investments. 
Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the overall contribution of the research and suggests policy 
recommendations that emanate from it. The limitations of the research are also discussed in this 
chapter and an agenda for future research on the themes examined in this research proposed. 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
2 A Background of Migration and Remittance Patterns in Kenya 
 
2.1 Migration patterns  
 
2.1.1 Internal migration patterns  
 
Historically, internal migration in Kenya has been dominated by rural-to-rural and rural-to-
urban migration. Two main factors have propelled rural-to-rural migration. Firstly, soon after the 
attainment of independence in 1963, resettlement programs promoted the migration of indigenous 
Kenyans to areas of the country formerly reserved for white settlement during the colonial era. The 
large flows of migrants associated with resettlement programmes were largely one-off and 
terminated following the exodus of white-settler farmers in the years after independence. A second 
factor that has driven rural-to-rural migration has been the search for agricultural employment 
within the commercial farming sector. There is evidence suggesting that since 1963 migration flows 
for the purposes of working on large commercial farms have stagnated (see Knowles and Anker 
1977).  
The third and most prevalent type of internal migration in Kenya is rural-to-urban migration 
for the purpose of obtaining non-agricultural employment in the urban sector (Knowles and Anker 
op. cit.). Rural-to-urban migrants tend to be younger and more educated than rural-to-rural migrants. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates migrant education levels by province. It reveals that the proportion of migrants 
who never attained any education is highest in the largely rural North Eastern province at 54% and 
lowest in Nairobi province at 5%. The proportion of migrants with secondary and university 
education is highest for Nairobi province. Given that the current demographic profile in Kenya 
reflects a younger and better educated population, the current scale of rural-to-urban migration is 
projected to continue (Black and King 2004). Rural-to-urban migration is generally perpetuated by 
regional economic disparities (NCPD 2011). Agesa and Kim (2001) report that rural-to-urban 
migration is so prevalent in Kenya that migrants now comprise about 70% of the urban labour 
force. 
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Nairobi, Coast and Rift Valley were provinces of net in-migration for the period 1979-1999 
(see Figure 2.2). These regions tend to be highly attractive for migrants due to the presence there of 
formal and informal industrial sectors. Conversely, over the same time period, Central, Eastern, 
Nyanza and Western were provinces of net out-migration (see Figure 2.3) due to their lack of 
economic activity. Other factors that drive rural-to-urban migration include high rural 
unemployment rates, particularly among the youth (IMF 2010), inequality at the community level, 
adverse climate conditions such as droughts and unpredictable rainfall, high population growth, and 
political instability (Ghai 2004). 
Figure 2.1: Provincial distribution of migrants by education level  
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). 
Figure 2.2: In-migration trends by region (1979-1999) 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). 
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Figure 2.3: Out-migration trends by region (1979-1999) 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). 
2.1.2 External migration patterns  
 
In the aftermath of independence in 1963, a few Kenyans travelled abroad, mainly to the UK, 
in search of further education and training. These migrants returned to Kenya to fill high-level 
government and private sector jobs that became vacant with the replacement of a colonial 
administrative structure. Between 1963 and 1978, the first post-independence government under 
President Jomo Kenyatta funded many young Kenyans to receive higher education abroad with job 
guarantees upon return. The UK was a popular destination due to strong colonial ties and a similar 
education system as well as countries as diverse as the US and the Soviet Union. By the 1970s, India 
also emerged as a popular destination for Kenyans who could not independently finance their 
higher education in the US, the Soviet Union or the UK. Since then, the diversification of work and 
study destinations has continued with the US and Canada assuming greater popularity (Okoth 
2003).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, President Daniel Arap Moi introduced free universal primary 
education. However, by the 2000s higher education institutions could not meet the resultant 
demand and many Kenyans migrated abroad in pursuit of education. At the same time, the 
economy started to stagnate owing to government mismanagement and the failure of structural 
adjustment programs resulting in high levels of unemployment and under-employment. This led to 
widespread poverty that resulted in over half of the population living below the poverty line of 
USD 1 per day (Kagochi and Kiambigi 2012). General elections were characterised by politically 
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motivated ethnic violence. Driven by the need for political and economic freedom, many highly 
qualified Kenyans migrated to Western Europe and to countries such as South Africa, Botswana, 
Uganda, Australia, Canada, and the US. Kenyans also began taking low-skilled jobs such as bus 
drivers, domestic servants, cruise ship attendants, and security guards in the Gulf States of Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. The recruitment of Kenyan secondary and high school teachers to fill 
shortages in locations such as the Comoros Islands, Seychelles, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo 
also became a feature of the migration flows in the 1990s (Okoth 2003). 
Presently, external migration continues in Kenya and mainly consists of cross border flows 
within the East-African sub-region and movements to countries in the OECD region, and is largely 
driven by the search for economic and educational opportunities (Black and King 2004). Figure 2.4 
shows the trajectory from 1960 to 2000 in the stock of Kenyan migrants in the top five host 
countries in 2000. It reveals a huge increase of Kenyans resident in the UK and sharp declines in 
the number in Uganda and Tanzania. In 2010, the UK, Tanzania, the US, Uganda, Canada, 
Australia, Germany, India, the Netherlands and Switzerland were the top 10 destination countries 
for migrants (World Bank 2011).  
Figure 2.4: Stocks of Kenyan born migrants in top five host countries  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics from the Global Bilateral Migration World Bank database accessed in 
May 2014 (see Özden et al. 2011). 
One of the main concerns among policymakers has been the migration of large numbers of 
highly skilled workers from Kenya (Clemens 2007). According to Clemens (op. cit.), about 51% of 
Kenyan physicians and 8% of nurses were resident in OECD countries in 2000 (mainly the UK, the 
US, and Canada). The migration of skilled labour is also reflected by the fact that among the 
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255,000 Kenyans residing in OECD countries in 2010/11, 42% were highly educated (OECD-
UNDESA 2013). In addition, a large number of Kenyans living in OECD countries in 2009 were in 
employment thus reflecting economic-driven migration motives. 
Cross-border migration is also common within the East Africa sub-region as migrants search 
for better job and educational opportunities, and engage in trade (Black and King 2004, Masinjila 
2009, Bell and Muhidin 2009). According to the United Nations Development Programme (2013), 
the number of qualified people in Kenya far exceeds the number of graduate-level jobs available 
and school leavers increasingly find themselves either unemployed or under-employed thus 
perpetuating the migration flows to other regions within Kenya and abroad. For example, in recent 
years Tanzania experienced a rise in employment opportunities owing to an increase in foreign 
direct investment and privatization. Given the local Tanzanian workforce lacks the skills required to 
take advantage of these opportunities, many Kenyans have migrated into the country to exploit 
these opportunities. Kenyan experts and entrepreneurs are also increasingly migrating to Rwanda 
and Burundi where the demand for skilled labour is high given buoyant economic growth and 
where the business sector is less competitive (Kanyangoga 2010). 
The re-introduction of free primary education in 2003 has also perpetuated external migration 
due to the resultant increased demand for higher education. Kenyans often view the level of formal 
education as one of the most important factors determining economic success in life (Berg-
Schlosser 1984). Thus, external migration in Kenya has been linked with the pursuit of higher 
education abroad owing to limited access to indigenous institutions of higher education (Okoth 
2003). In 2012 about 13,573 Kenyan students were enrolled in universities abroad, mainly in the 
US, the UK, Australia, India and Germany (UNESCO 2014).  
Table 2.1 provides statistics for the profile of Kenyan external migrants for the years 2000 and 
2005. The statistics indicate that there are no large differences between the numbers of male and 
female Kenyans living abroad. Also, the majority of Kenyans residing abroad are between the ages 
of 25 and 64. In addition, individuals with relatively high education levels comprise a higher 
proportion of migrants in OECD destinations.  
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Table 2.1: People born in Kenya living abroad 
 2000 2005 
 All destinations OECD 
destinations 
OECD 
destinations 
Population 15+ M F All M F All M F All 
Emigrant population (thousands) 127 138 265 100 99 199 114 117 231 
Recent emigrants (thousands)       11 10 21 19 20 39 
15-24 (%) 15 17 16 11 11 11 11 11 11 
25-64 (%) 79 77 78 84 83 84 83 81 82 
65+ (%) 5.7 6.4 6.1 5 5.5 5.2 6.7 8.1 7.4 
Low-educated (%) 35 45 40 24 30 27 16 27 22 
Highly educated (%) 36 26 30 43 34 39 53 40 47 
Total emigration rates (%) 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Emigration rates of the highly educated (%) 13 21 16 13 21 15 14 20 16 
Source: OECD migration statistics. 
2.1.3 Gender differentials in migration patterns 
 
Some of the determinants of migration in Kenya have been shown to differ by gender. Bigsten 
(1996) shows that while employment-related reasons are the major drivers of male migration, 
marriage is the dominant reason for females. In general, the literature suggests that in Kenya the 
delineation of labour is determined largely by custom and tradition. For example, males have 
traditionally engaged in formal labour-market activities and earned an income away from the home 
(Neitzert 1994 p. 403). There are marked variations in the responsibilities of women according to 
whether the household is located in an urban or a rural location (Agesa and Kim 2001). In rural 
areas where the majority of the female population in Kenya lives, women traditionally provide 80% 
of the labour necessary for household production (Henn 1983 p. 1045). However, in urban areas, 
household production usually involves much less labour (Kiteme 1992). Hence, the migration of 
rural women tends to be more restricted than that of urban women. In addition, some studies have 
documented that males receive larger monetary gains as a result of migration compared to women 
and consequently have greater incentives to migrate to urban areas (Agesa and Agesa 1999).  
The reasons why rural men migrate to urban areas in far larger numbers than women also 
appear to have historical foundations. Before Kenya’s independence in 1963, the colonial regime 
barred women from migrating to urban areas thus helping to ossify a pattern of migration that is 
pervasive in Kenya today. In the few instances where women migrated to urban centres during the 
colonial period, it was often to engage in informal trade as formal labour markets in the urban areas 
favoured men (Macharia 1997). Furthermore, in general, rural men have more education than 
women and because many formal sector urban jobs demand more education, men migrate in 
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disproportionately greater numbers than women (Agesa and Agesa op. cit.). Other factors that may 
explain gender differentials in migration patterns include the cultural expectation that men are the 
breadwinners and therefore expected to migrate to cater for the needs of the family. However, this 
may vary by tribe or ethnic group. For example, among the Luo, several generations of men have 
spent the bulk of their working lives as migrants while women were largely involved in household 
production (Francis 2002). On the other hand, Kikuyu women are more engaged in urban trade 
(Robertson 1996). The variation in migration patterns by gender has implications for the type of 
networks available to male and female migrants. Agesa and Agesa (op. cit.) argued that one of the 
main reasons why approximately 87 per cent of all women resided in rural areas as compared to 
about 54 per cent of men, even though women accounted for well over half of the country's 
population (about 56 per cent) 1, could be ascribed to gender differences in rural-to-urban 
migration. However, recent trends indicate that females, like males, are increasingly migrating both 
internally and externally in search of employment opportunities, education, and to join their 
relatives or spouse. The 2009 Kenya Housing and Population Census reflects similar migration 
trends for males and females, though the number of male migrants still surpasses those of female 
migrants.2 
Figure 2.5 depicts the stock of male and female Kenyan born migrants residing in the top five 
host countries in 2000. It reveals that they are only minor differences by gender in the number of 
Kenyan migrants residing in these countries. Over the past few decades, the gender imbalance in 
migration participation has largely been reversed by political independence, female educational 
attainment, the acquisition of skills that have made women more competitive in migrant 
destinations, and the increased availability of migrant social networks that can be utilized by women 
(Macharia 2003). 
                                                          
1 However, recent statistics reveal that the male to female ratio is almost even now. World Bank estimates indicate that in 
2012 women accounted for about 50.1 per cent of the Kenyan population.  
2 For example, the proportion of internal migrants who were male and female household heads respectively at the 
provincial level were as follows: Nairobi (33% and 29%), Central (42% and 41%), Coast (39% and 39%), Eastern (50% 
and 50%), North Eastern (68% and 72%), Nyanza (48% and 41%), Rift Valley (47% and 47%), and Western (56% and 
51%). The proportion of internal migrants who were children of the household head were as follows: Nairobi (25% and 
10%), Central (23% and 11%), Coast (24% and 9%), Eastern (17% and 9%), North Eastern (14% and 6%), Nyanza (18% 
and 10%), Rift Valley (20% and 10%), and Western (15% and 8%).  
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Figure 2.5: Stock of Kenyan male vs. female migrants in top five host countries (2000)  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on statistics from the Global Bilateral Migration World Bank database accessed in 
May 2014 (see Özden et al. 2011). 
Overall, migration plays an important role in Kenya’s labour market (Black et al. 2006) and is 
often used to diversify the income sources of the poorer households (Crush et al. 2006). 
Households in Kenya, particularly those in rural areas, have also been shown to engage in migration 
in an effort to mitigate risk, especially as the lack of economic activity in rural areas inhibits 
households from diversifying income sources without migration (Bigsten 1996, Oniang'o 1995). 
Rural poverty has also increased due to a decrease in the ownership of farming and grazing land 
(IMF 2010). Thus, the rapid rate of urbanization experienced by Kenya in recent years has been 
primarily fuelled by rural-to-urban migration. External migration has also been subject to a steady 
increase as Kenyans migrate abroad in search of better employment and education opportunities. 
Studies such as Ackello-Ogutu (1997), Lucas (2007) and Masinjila (2009) suggest that these 
different types of migration have a positive impact on the well-being of Kenyan households.  
2.2 Remittance patterns  
 
A 2006 World Bank report estimates that remittances reduced the number of people living in 
absolute poverty (defined here as less than USD 1 per day) in Kenya by about two per cent. 
External remittances are reported to be the fourth-largest source of foreign currency for Kenya 
after revenue from tea, horticulture and tourism (see, e.g., Bett 2013). The International 
Organization for Migration reports that while revenue to the government from traditional exports 
such as tea and coffee has diminished in the past five years, remittance inflows continue to increase. 
World Bank estimates suggest that Kenya was the third largest recipient of remittances in Sub-
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Saharan Africa in 2010, with only Nigeria and Sudan having larger remittance inflows. Inward 
remittance flows into Kenya are estimated to have been about USD 1.8 billion, exceeding net 
official development assistance (ODA) and net foreign direct investment (FDI), which were at 
USD 1.4 billion and USD 0.1 billion respectively. Kenya was also among the top ten remittance 
recipient countries in percentage of GDP, with remittances equalling 5.4% of its GDP.  
Figure 2.6 reveals the progressive increase in the amount of formal remittance inflows into 
Kenya from abroad over the past decade. It is important however to bear in mind that the true size 
of remittances is larger than that portrayed by the formal estimates as remittances are also 
transmitted through informal channels (World Bank 2011, Kiiru 2010).  
Internal remittances have also attracted more attention in Kenya in recent years. The 
introduction of the M-PESA mobile money service in 2007 led to profound changes in the types of 
domestic remittance channels used by Kenyans (Jack and Suri 2011, Mas and Radcliffe 2011). Due 
to low transmission costs and easy accessibility of M-PESA agents, 47% of Kenyans were using M-
PESA to send internal remittances by 2008. By the end of 2009, 65% of Kenyan households were 
using M-PESA (Jack and Suri op. cit.). Its rapid growth is illustrated in Figure 2.7 which shows that 
by August 2010, M-PESA had registered about 12.6 million customers and 20,000 agents country-
wide. Amounts equivalent to 40% of Kenya’s GDP transactions are transmitted daily through M-
PESA (Safaricom 2014).  
The use of mobile phones to transfer money enabled the transmission of smaller amounts of 
money with higher frequency and therefore resulted in higher cumulative amounts. A 2010 World 
Bank-Central Bank of Kenya survey reported that 14% of Kenyan adults regularly receive 
remittances. The survey estimates that each adult receives an average of USD 735 from abroad per 
year. Two-thirds of remittance senders in this survey also reported sending remittances via mobile 
phones rather than conventional methods. A quarter of respondents who receive remittances in the 
survey revealed that they rely on them to cover at least some of their daily expenses such as food, 
clothing, housing, utilities, and medicine.  
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Figure 2.6: Annual remittance inflows into Kenya 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data obtained from the World Bank annual remittances database (May 2014) 
Figure 2.7: M-PESA agents and customers 
 
Source: World Bank Kenya Economic Update (2010). 
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3 Data Description 
 
The data used in this thesis are obtained from the 2009 Migration and Remittances Household 
Survey in Kenya and were collected between 24 October and 22 December 2009. The survey is a 
single-round, cross-sectional survey capturing information about households with internal, external, 
and no migrants. It was conducted as part of the Africa Migration Project, which is a project jointly 
undertaken by the African Development Bank and the World Bank to improve understanding of 
migration and remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 The University of Nairobi was the primary 
investigator for the survey. 
3.1 Scope and coverage 
 
A total of 1,942 households in 17 districts2 were surveyed in the eight provinces of Kenya. The 
main respondent to the survey was the head of the household, or his/her representative. Of the 
households that were surveyed, 49% were urban based and 51% in rural areas. The largest 
proportion of households were non-migrant (35%), followed by external (30%), internal (29%), and 
both internal and external (6%). At the individual level, information was obtained on a total of 
8,343 non-migrants and 2,245 migrants. A local survey firm in Kenya conducted the fieldwork, 
which involved collecting the data, validating and inputting the responses, and then compiling 
datasets subsequently provided in STATA format.   
The survey contains seven sections or modules. Section 1 is the household roster and collected 
data on all the members currently resident in the household. This included information related to 
their age, gender, relationship to the household head, marital status, education, work situation, the 
tribe, and religious affiliation of the household head. Section 2 elicited information on the housing 
situation and general housing conditions. This included the tenure status, type of dwelling, 
construction material, number of rooms, sanitation, and the availability of electricity and water. In 
                                                          
1 Similar surveys were undertaken in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. 
2 These districts are Kiambu, Kisii, Machakos, Nakuru, Nairobi, Rachuonyo, Thika, Garissa, Lugari, Malindi, Embu, 
Siaya, Kilifi, Kakamega, Migori, Vihiga, and Mombasa. 
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section 3, information relating to the household’s assets and expenditure was collected. The 
household respondents reported the assets owned and the amount of money (in Kenyan shillings) 
spent on various expenditure items in the previous six months (or past one week for food and 
transport expenditure).3 Information on the use of financial services by the household was collected 
under section 4. This comprised data concerning bank account ownership, ATM usage and debit 
card ownership, and the use of mobile banking. In section 5, questions relating to internal and 
international migration and remittances from former household members (namely migrants) were 
asked. The data collected under this section included information on age, current location and 
living situation, highest education qualifications before departure, work situation before departure, 
and the current work situation of the migrant. The amount of cash and in-kind remittances sent by 
each migrant in the past 12 months (in Kenyan shillings), frequency and channels of transfer, and 
uses of cash remittances by the recipient household were also recorded. The household also 
indicated any activities it undertook that were enabled by the migrant (specifically whether the 
household opened a bank account, set up a business, or constructed a building for commercial 
purposes following the migration of a member). In addition, information relating to any cash 
transfers by the household to the migrant in the past 12 months was also recorded, including the 
amount of money sent (in Kenyan shillings), the frequency of transfers and the channel of 
transmission, and how the migrant spent the money. In section 6, remittance information similar to 
that of section 5 was collected in relation to non-household members.4 Finally, section 7 recorded 
information on return migrants.5 This included their previous migration destination, when they 
returned, reasons for return, and information relating to remittances they used to send to the 
household (specifically channels of transfer, uses of cash remittances, and types of in-kind 
remittances sent). Figure 3.1 in the appendix provides the full questionnaire used in the survey. 
The following are some key definitions used in the survey: 
                                                          
3 A list of assets and expenditure items was provided and households indicated the assets owned and how much they 
spent, if anything, on each expenditure item. 
4 Non-household members are individuals who sent remittances over the past 12 months but have never been part of the 
household (e.g., friends and other relatives). 
5 Return migrants refer to all members of the household who used to live outside of the household for at least three 
months during the last five years, and have since returned to the household. 
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Household: A household is a person or group of persons who reside in the same homestead/ 
compound but not necessarily in the same dwelling unit, have similar cooking and eating 
arrangements and are answerable to the same household head.  
Head of household: This is the most responsible/respectable member of the household who 
makes key decisions on behalf of the household on a day-to-day basis and whose authority is 
recognised by all members of the household.6  
Household members: These are people currently living in the household and having common 
cooking and eating arrangements.  
Migrant: This refers to any person who used to live in the household, but has lived outside the 
household in another place either within the country or in another country for more than six 
months. Nevertheless, it could be argued that this definition has some limitations which may 
potentially affect some of the empirical results obtained in chapter 4. For example, individuals who 
were part of the household in the past may not necessarily qualify as migrants in the conventional 
sense if, for example, they do not maintain links with any current household members. Therefore, it 
may be inappropriate to regard such individuals as representing a potential migrant network. 
However, the dataset does not contain any information that would enable us to distinguish whether 
a former household member is currently connected to the household or not. Thus, the definitions 
of ‘migrant’ and ‘migrant network’ employed in the current thesis do not discriminate on the basis 
of a current connection to the household of origin. The implications of these limitations are 
discussed in chapter 4 (see section 4.5.1). 
Cash remittances: Both external (cross-border) and internal (within-country) transfers of cash by 
migrants (or non-household members) to the household. 
In-kind remittances: Both external and internal transfers of in-kind resources by migrants (or 
non-household members) to the household. 
                                                          
6 This is often the father or the mother within the household, but could be a child or any other responsible adult member 
of the household, depending on the status of the household.  
20 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Sampling frame and survey design 
 
Plaza et al. (2011) provide a detailed description of the sampling frame and the survey design. A 
two-stage sampling procedure was used. The 1999 Kenya Housing and Population Census was used 
to map survey areas. In addition, to account for population growth and migration as well as changes 
in administrative units (e.g., boundary changes and new districts) that had occurred since the 1999 
census, the 2005 Kenya Integrated Budget Survey, the 2006 Financial Services Deepening Survey, 
and the locations of remittance service providers were also used in designing the sampling frame. 
A major challenge was to ensure that households with international migrants were adequately 
captured. Officers from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, village elders, and administrative 
officers were consulted to help map out clusters with higher concentrations of international 
migrants resulting in 17 districts and 92 clusters in the districts being selected. As such, the survey is 
not nationally representative. Even in relatively high migration areas, there were not enough 
households with migrants for the sample to be drawn randomly therefore migrant households were 
over-sampled. The final selection of households to interview entailed relisting households in each 
cluster to identify external, internal, and non-migrant households. Each of these three groups of 
households were treated as an independent sub-frame and random sampling was used to select 
households within each group.  
3.2 Suitability of survey for the thesis  
 
A World Bank review of 70 African household surveys conducted between 1990 and 2006 
reveals that most of the surveys fail to capture adequate data on migration and remittances (Plaza et 
al. 2011). In particular, migration and remittances data are generally spread across various sections 
of the surveys and are rarely linked together. For example, for the cases of Cameroon 2004, 
Gambia 1992, Guinea 1994, Mali 1994, Rwanda 1998, and Uganda 1993, migration modules are 
found in a separate section and thus have limited information compared to that of non-migrants 
obtained from questions in the main module. In other cases the topic of migration is appended to 
other modules such as literacy (Burkina Faso 1998), education (Ivory Coast 1998), and employment 
(Senegal 1991). Some of the studies also collect information on the migration history of the 
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household head only, rather than on all members of the household. Other studies limit inquiries to 
migratory movements during the preceding one year. In addition, many of the surveys do not 
distinguish between remittances and gifts (or other transfers) received by the households. The main 
advantage of the 2009 Kenya Africa Migration Project survey is that it was specifically targeted on 
migration and remittances in order to fill the gaps in knowledge highlighted above. The survey 
provides a rich and unique source of information on which to conduct empirical analysis on 
migration and remittances, thus its suitability for research use in this thesis.  
A long-standing issue in the remittance literature is the challenge of capturing the amount of 
remittances that flow informally, given the acknowledgement that they are quite substantial in 
amount. It is important to capture informal remittances if the role of remittances as a source of 
development finance is to be fully understood. A large part of the constraint on migration research 
particularly in Africa is a lack of adequate data. For example, due to the scarcity of data on internal 
remittances most of the studies that have investigated the impact of remittances sent by Kenyan 
migrants have been limited to external remittances (e.g., Azam and Gubert 2006, Gupta et al. 2009, 
Kiiru 2010). It is also difficult for countries to keep track of migrant flows as much of the 
movement within Africa is unregulated. Few African countries have a well-articulated policy on 
international migration and are often unable to enforce their own migration laws and regulations 
(Lucas 2006). Thus, the use of household survey data, as in the current chapter, has been suggested 
as an approach that better enables remittances transmitted both formally and informally to be 
captured.  
As far as the author knows, there is no other recent survey with a specific focus on internal 
and external migration and remittance flows in Kenya. The Africa Migration Project survey 
therefore presents a good opportunity to explore a set of research questions related to migration 
and remittance flows in Kenya using a recent and extensive survey. In addition, there are no 
existing studies that have employed the dataset used in the current thesis to conduct empirical 
analysis in the manner undertaken here. 
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However there are some limitations. One of the weaknesses relating to the survey concerns 
the respondent who is the head of the household, or any other member who is able to provide 
most, if not all, of the information about the household members at the time of the interview. An 
obvious shortcoming here is that such responses are potentially subject to recall bias. This raises a 
question on the accuracy of some of the information provided in the survey. However, psychology 
studies show that people are likely to remember events that arouse emotions better than others 
(Kensinger and Corkin 2004, Cahill and McGaugh 1998). The migration of a child of the household 
head and their attainments at the time of migration are likely to fall into this category. Hence, recall 
bias may not be a major problem in the current analysis. A more serious issue may be a lack of 
accurate information, particularly in relation to migrants. For example, the respondent may be 
misinformed about the current employment and/or living situation of the migrant. 
Another shortcoming of the survey is that it does not contain information on the income 
levels of household members and migrants. As such, in the empirical analysis, proxies are 
constructed to provide economic welfare measures. In addition, due to the sampling strategy 
employed, as noted earlier and re-emphasized here, the survey is not representative of the national 
level.  
An additional cause for concern is that in response to the question regarding their current 
work situation, 33% of non-migrants identify themselves as students. This seems to be relatively 
high, though it may be a reflection of the large proportion of the Kenyan population under 157, as 
well as the high primary and secondary school net enrolment rates of approximately 98% (UNICEF 
2009). In the case of migrants, 16% are identified as students. We retain students in the sample 
because for many Kenyans, acquiring education is seen as a gateway to securing a more permanent 
status in the host countries. This is made possible by policies in many host countries that permit 
students to convert their student status into a work or residence permit if they find a job within a 
certain timeframe of completing their studies (Naujoks 2009). 
                                                          
7 This is supported by the data as 35% of non-migrants in the sample are aged 15 or below. 
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Lastly, the manner in which the survey was conducted does not enable us to differentiate 
between temporary and permanent migrants as there is no information on this type of migration.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 3.1: Copy of Kenya Migration Household Survey 
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4 The Determinants of the Subsequent Migration of Kenyan 
Siblings 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The current chapter uses the World Bank Migration and Remittances survey (2009), as 
described in the previous chapter, to empirically investigate the factors that motivate the 
subsequent migration decisions of siblings.8 Subsequent sibling migration is a prevalent 
characteristic of the sample data in this case with 42% of those households with sibling migrants 
having more than one sibling migrant (see Table 4.1). Moreover, there is a high concentration of 
siblings in the sample with 44% and 67% of non-migrants and migrants, respectively, being siblings. 
Examining the migration behaviour of siblings enables us to understand how decisions to migrate 
are made within the Kenyan family context. In particular, we regard sibling migration as a strategy 
pursued by siblings as part of their livelihood and that of the household of origin and thus 
influenced by intra-household decision making processes regarding the allocation of the labour of 
adult children. The current research is thus intended to provide a better understanding of how 
individual and household factors interact to influence the migration decisions of Kenyan siblings. 
The research also contributes in explaining the key drivers of migration in Kenya using a relatively 
recent dataset. 
Table 4.1: Households with sibling migrants 
No. of sibling migrants No. of households 
1 435 
2 191 
> 3 128 
Total 754 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations from the World Bank Migration and Remittances Survey (2009). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Subsequent sibling migration refers to the migration of a sibling after the preceding migration of a sibling from the same 
household.  
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4.1.1 Research questions 
 
The main research objective of this chapter is to investigate whether sibling migration is 
primarily motivated by the desire to maximise expected net returns to migrating with networks 
facilitating subsequent migration, and/or if the household’s need to minimize income risk through 
diversifying income sources, as articulated in the new economics of labour migration (NELM), 
dominates.  
The investigation undertaken in this chapter is two-pronged. Firstly, the aforementioned 
migration motives are differentiated through conducting empirical analysis to determine the effect 
of the presence of a preceding sibling migrant on the probability of subsequent sibling migration. 
The study also explores whether these migration motives vary by sibling gender and the type of 
migration9 undertaken. In addition, we investigate whether the effect of the presence of a preceding 
migrant on the probability of migration differs according to the relationship of the migrant to the 
sibling. Specifically, we differentiate between the effects exerted by preceding sibling and preceding 
non-sibling migrants. Secondly, the research examines the impact of the migration of a preceding 
sibling on the probability of exiting the state of non-migration by any other siblings present in the 
household using discrete failure time analysis. In a similar vein to the migration probability analysis, 
we determine whether the effects on the probability of exiting the non-migration state vary 
according to the type of migration undertaken and according to the relationship of the preceding 
migrant to the sibling. The discrete failure time analysis has the advantage that it allows any 
unobservable variables at the household level to be accounted for.  
4.1.2 Research contribution 
 
The study of sibling migration behaviour is important because it provides new insights into the 
migration decisions of individuals belonging to the same origin household. The exclusive focus on 
siblings in this chapter enables a more effective interrogation of migration decisions exploiting a 
smaller and more uniform sub-sample. 
                                                          
9 In the current context, we simply distinguish between internal and external migration. 
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Despite the vast literature on migration, to the author’s knowledge, Palloni et al. (2001), Bras 
and Neven (2007) and Kesztenbaum (2008) represent the few studies that have analysed 
subsequent sibling migration in a similar spirit to the current analysis. The latter two studies are on 
European sibling migration, while the former is on Mexico-US migration. Thus, the contexts of 
past studies are different with respect to the one undertaken here. The current chapter therefore 
contributes towards filling the gap in the literature on sibling migration within an exclusively 
African context by analysing the determinants of, and time to, sibling migration for the case of 
Kenya.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 4.2 discusses the main theories of migration in the 
literature, provides a review of the empirical evidence on sibling migration, and highlights a 
conceptual framework for subsequent sibling migration. The data used and the key variables 
proposed for the analysis, including summary statistics, are described in section 4.3. Section 4.4 
presents the econometric models, details the estimation procedures and discusses the potential 
endogeneity of the preceding sibling migrant variable. The empirical findings are presented and 
discussed in section 4.5. Finally, section 4.6 offers some concluding comments. 
4.2 Literature review 
 
In this section the dominant theories of migration found in the literature and relevant to the 
analysis undertaken in the current chapter are discussed. The findings of selective empirical studies 
that have focussed on the migration of siblings are also reviewed in the current section. At the end 
of the section, we discuss a conceptual framework for subsequent sibling migration that emanates 
from the theories and the extant empirical evidence in the literature. 
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4.2.1 Review of theory 
 
Three main theories dominate the migration literature: neo-classical cost-benefit theories, the 
new economics of labour migration (NELM) theory, and network theory. In addition, some 
concepts from the life cycle model10 also help to explain factors influencing migration. 
The models that used a cost-benefit framework were among the first to examine the individual 
decision-making processes of migration. Individual rational actors decide to migrate because a cost-
benefit calculation leads them to anticipate a positive net return from migration, where the net 
return is usually expressed in monetary terms. Thus, migration is viewed as an investment in which 
the income gain and other benefits that accrue from migration must exceed the associated costs for 
migration to occur (Sjaastad 1962, Borjas 1989). Harris and Todaro (1970) explain migration within 
the context of rural-urban wage differentials, which emphasizes the expected income gains to 
migrating. However, the basic theoretical considerations underlying the model can also be applied 
to external migration. A major criticism of cost-benefit models has been that they rely too heavily 
on the role of wage differentials and lack strong empirical support.  
Sjaastad (1962) formulated the human capital migration model, which treats migration as an 
individual investment decision that increases the productivity of human capital in the labour 
market. In this model, individuals make a rational cost-benefit analysis of the expected discounted 
gross returns of migration over future time periods, migrating only when these expected returns net 
of costs are positive. Migration costs include both non-monetary11 and monetary12 costs. The 
returns in each future period are estimated by taking the observed earnings corresponding to the 
individual's skills in the destination country and multiplying these by the probability of obtaining a 
job there to obtain expected earnings in the destination. These expected earnings are then 
subtracted from those expected in the origin country (conceptualised as observed earnings in the 
                                                          
10 The life cycle model views the beginning or end of certain stages of life, which typically occur at specific ages, to be 
important determinants of migration (Mincer 1978, Kan 1999). 
11 Non-monetary costs can be taken to include psychological costs due to differences in cultural, linguistic or political 
proximity factors. 
12 Monetary costs consist of travel costs and the earnings forgone while travelling, searching for and/or learning how to 
perform a new job. 
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origin multiplied by the probability of employment). The difference is summed over a time horizon, 
then discounted by a factor that reflects the greater utility of money earned in the present compared 
to the future. From this difference in integrated values, the estimated costs are subtracted to yield 
the expected net return to migration. 
The NELM approach was pioneered by Stark and Bloom (1985). It shifts the focus of the 
migration decision from the individual (as in neoclassical theory) to one of mutual decision making 
by viewing migration as a calculated strategy and placing emphasis on the family as the decision-
making unit (Stark 1991). Migration decisions are often made jointly by the migrant and the family 
in the form of a mutually beneficial self-enforcing contractual arrangement where the costs and 
returns of migration are shared. This arrangement is possible due to a different time profile of risks 
where first the migrant is supported until a job has been found, and then the household receives 
remittances. Risk sharing is an important feature of the NELM model (Stark and Levhari 1982, 
Stark 1984, Katz and Stark 1986, Lauby and Stark 1988, Taylor 1987, Stark 1991). Because the 
family is a small group within which to pool risk, diversification is achieved by the migration of one 
or more members into a sector where earnings are not perfectly correlated with those in the origin 
sector (Stark and Bloom 1985). Just as risk sharing explains migration by part of the family, it also 
explains non-migration by the remainder. Because skill-related attributes of individual family 
members influence the costs and benefits of migration for households as well as for the individual, 
human capital theory has been incorporated into NELM models. As such, the household’s decision 
is made in terms of interactions between individual and household variables such as household 
assets and the human capital levels of members. 
In contrast to the neoclassical model, which assumes that all markets are complete and well-
functioning, the NELM assumes that key markets besides the labour market (i.e., futures, capital, 
and insurance markets) are either imperfect, inaccessible or missing (Stark 1991). Migration is thus 
seen as a response to income risk and failures in insurance, credit and labour markets, which 
together constrain local income opportunities and inhibit risk-spreading. As households are 
assumed to depend on wages earned by family members, sending members abroad is a form of 
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unemployment insurance. If employment conditions in foreign and local labour markets are 
imperfectly correlated, then migration provides a way of reducing the risk to family income and 
guarantees a reliable stream of income in the form of remittances used to support the family.  
The network theory of migration considers the factors that perpetuate rather than initiate 
migration. A dependence upon “network and kinship capital” is often a major characteristic of 
migrant behaviour and the first cohorts of migrants decrease the costs of subsequent migration 
(Stark 1991). Migrant networks comprise sets of interpersonal relationships that connect migrants, 
former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship, 
friendship, and shared community origin. Network connections constitute a form of social capital 
that people can draw upon to gain access to foreign employment (Massey et al. 1994) but also 
potentially employment elsewhere within the country of origin.  
There exists a connection between neoclassical and network theory in that migrant networks 
increase the likelihood of migration by lowering the costs and risks of movement and thus 
increasing the expected net returns to migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997). A proposition of 
network theory is that controlling for a person's individual migrant experience, the probability of 
international migration should be greater for individuals who are related to someone who has prior 
international experience, or for individuals connected to someone who is actually living abroad. 
Moreover, the likelihood of movement should increase with the closeness of the relationship 
(Massey et al. 1994).13 
Finally, the life cycle model has shown that life-course events such as the beginning of a new 
job or retirement (Mincer 1978, Kan 1999) or the start or end of educational stages (Sjaastad 1962) 
can influence the decision to migrate or stay. Young adults have also been shown to move in order 
to leave the parental home or form relationships such as cohabitation or marriage (Mulder and 
Wagner 1993).  
                                                          
13 In other words, having a brother in Germany, for example, is more likely to induce a Kenyan to migrate there than 
having a cousin, a neighbour, or a friend in that country. 
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4.2.2 Review of empirical evidence 
 
Only a few empirical studies in the migration literature have examined the phenomenon of 
subsequent sibling migration to the author’s knowledge. The author is not aware of any studies that 
have analysed subsequent sibling migration in an African context, as proposed in this chapter. The 
current study, therefore, makes an important contribution to this particular literature. 
Palloni et al. (2001) analyse the risk of migrating from Mexico to the US for sibling pairs. They 
employ a multistate hazards model which enables control for unobserved heterogeneity in the 
hazard of migration. The various sibling migration states are: (i) neither sibling migrated, (ii) the 
older sibling migrated, (iii) the younger sibling migrated, and (iv) both siblings migrated. They use 
panel data from the Mexican Migrant Project undertaken in 1982-83, and then in successive years 
from 1987 to 1995. Their findings reveal that having an older sibling who migrated to the US triples 
the probability of younger siblings migrating to the US. The existence of a sibling migrant increases 
the speed of transition to international migration, reduces the age of first departure and lowers the 
percentage of siblings who never migrate. Their study differs from the current one in that their aim 
is to demonstrate the validity of network theory by comparing it with other theories that predict the 
same outcomes, namely human capital theory, neoclassical income maximization and NELM risk 
diversification. 
Stecklov et al. (2010) focus on the causes of international migration using data from the Albania 
2005 Living Standards Measurement Study. They analyse the timing of the first migration of 
siblings between 1990 and 2004 and employ discrete-time hazard models using a logistic regression. 
They specify the baseline hazard model using dummy variables for each year at risk. To control for 
the endogeneity of network variables, the study does not include migration from the most recent 
year. Their findings reveal that women are less likely than men to migrate and that the gender 
migration gap is larger for temporary compared to permanent migration. Also, both male and 
female migration is found to be strongly influenced by the availability of family networks of the 
same gender. As a robustness check, the study controls for unobserved heterogeneity by estimating 
a random-effects logistic model. They find their results to be robust to the control for unobserved 
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heterogeneity. The analysis in this thesis employs similar empirical methods to those of Stecklov et 
al. (op. cit.). However, their focus is on external migration and their emphasis on siblings appears to 
have been undertaken for convenience rather than as a central part of their analysis. In addition, 
they conflate family migrant networks, whereas in the analysis conducted for this thesis a 
distinction is made between sibling and non-sibling networks. In addition, and a more obvious 
point, Albania and Kenya provide very different and distinct settings for migration analysis. 
Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003) compare the impact of family migrant networks on the 
migration of siblings to the US and within Mexico using data from the 1999 Mexican Migration 
Project. Their analysis is conducted using the never married children of the household head aged 
between 17 and 25. Each migrant is matched to one or more non-migrants according to the age at 
the time of the survey and the community of origin. They exploit logistic regression models and 
also take into account the potential serial correlation between observations of individuals of the 
same age and from the same community. Their findings reveal that family migrant networks within 
Mexico increase the odds ratio of internal migration by 46%, on average and ceteris paribus. Female 
migrant networks are found to positively affect the internal migration of both men and women 
while male migrant networks are found not to affect the odds ratio of internal migration for either 
men or women. For migration to the US, having family members in the US increases the odds ratio 
of migration by over a factor of two compared to those having no migrant networks. Male migrant 
networks are found to be more important than female migrant networks for predicting 
international migration. Individuals with male migrant networks are approximately twice as likely to 
migrate internationally compared to those without access to such networks. On the other hand, the 
presence of female migrants was not found to significantly increase the odds ratio of international 
migration.  
Kesztenbaum (2008) exploits data from the TRA survey14 which reconstitutes families in 19th 
century France and uses military registers to study the migration pattern of male siblings according 
to their birth position. Using failure time analysis with a parametric Weibull hazard model, birth 
                                                          
14 The 3000 families survey was launched in the early 1980s. It is based on the systematic reconstitution of the trajectories 
and the descendants of all individuals whose last name begins with the letters T, R, and A. 
46 
 
 
 
rank is found to have no effect on the migration decisions of brothers. The study also finds that the 
migration of a brother has an overall positive influence on the migration of the remaining brothers. 
The study proceeds to make a distinction between network effects and a risk diversification strategy 
by comparing the destinations of successive migrants. In particular, the study investigates whether 
male siblings move to the same destination or to a different destination from brothers that migrated 
before them. There is no evidence found of the use of networks as the migration is not to the same 
destination. Rather, because the migrant destinations are different their evidence is suggestive of 
risk diversification. However, the authors are cautious in interpreting their findings because their 
estimates are not corrected for any unobserved heterogeneity at the family level. The study 
acknowledges that any correlation observed between the migrations of brothers could be due to a 
causal effect or to specific characteristics that are shared within the same family. Although the 
empirical methodology of this study is broadly comparable with the current chapter of this thesis, 
there are some major differences. Firstly, the datasets and time periods are evidently quite distinct 
and different in nature. Secondly, as acknowledged by Kesztenbaum (2008), the absence of sisters 
from the sample is an important omission. In addition, the study restricts the analysis to internal 
migration only. 
Bras and Neven (2007) analyse the extent to which the presence and activities of siblings 
influence the chances of women migrating internally from the rural areas of Belgium (Pays de 
Herve) and the Netherlands (Zeeland) during the second half of the nineteenth and the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Using longitudinal data obtained from historical population 
registers, they exploit failure time analysis in applying a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate 
the risk of a first migration. Their findings reveal that moves made previously by sisters increased 
the migration prospects of women encouraging them to move to the same destinations as their 
sisters. For Pays de Herve, the greater the number of brothers who had migrated previously to rural 
and urban destinations, the more likely were women to migrate too. However, the influence of a 
brother’s migration experience was less location-specific than that of a sister’s previous movement. 
For Zeeland, the previous migration of brothers did not affect female migration risk. However, the 
greater the number of brothers who had formerly migrated to rural locations, the smaller were a 
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woman’s chances of migrating to a city. Their econometric analysis finds no evidence of 
unobserved heterogeneity at the family level. This study differs from the analysis to be undertaken 
in this thesis given its emphasis on the internal migration behaviour of female siblings. In addition, 
and again fairly self-evidently, the time periods and datasets are different. 
Randell and VanWey (2014) employ a discrete time hazard model and sibling data from a 
survey of 1,000 households in the Altamira and Santarem urban areas of Brazil collected in 2010 
and 2009, respectively, to estimate the effect of sibling and parent networks on migration. The 
authors find that sibling networks are significant in determining out-migration in Altamira. In 
particular, individuals with a sibling living outside of the municipality are almost three times as likely 
to migrate in any given year as those whose siblings live within the municipality. Also, individuals 
born outside the state (this is used as a proxy for extra-local networks)15 are found to be more likely 
to migrate compared to those born outside the city. However, parental networks (proxied by having 
at least one parent born outside the city) are not found to have any significant effect in determining 
migration. On the contrary, in the case of Santarem, individuals with siblings living outside of the 
municipality are found to be no more likely to migrate than those without such siblings. Extra-local 
networks are not found to have a positive effect on migration as individuals born within the city are 
found to be more likely to migrate than those born elsewhere. Finally, in contrast to the case for 
Altamira, parental networks are shown to have a positive effect on migration in Santarem as 
individuals with at least one parent born outside the city are found to be more likely to migrate. 
Table 4.2 provides a summary of the studies discussed above. Overall, the literature review 
reveals that they are but a handful of studies that have investigated sibling migration and none has 
done so using data for an African country. Among these studies, most have found a positive 
network effect on the probability of migrating. The exception is Kesztenbaum (2008) who reports a 
negative effect on the migration of subsequent siblings to the same destination as preceding sibling 
migrants. Thus, the current chapter is unique both in the research questions it seeks to address, the 
dataset it uses, and the context to which it is applied. However, while the absence of studies for a 
                                                          
15  Extra-local networks refer to ties that link a potential migrant to friends and family in other parts of Brazil. 
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similar context to the current one allows us to make a unique contribution to the literature, it also 
presents something of a limitation given we are unable to undertake a comparison with any existing 
studies for Africa. 
Table 4.2: Summary of studies on sibling migration  
Paper Data source & 
time period 
 
Data type Estimation 
methods 
Network variables & effects 
Palloni et al. (2001) Mexican Migration 
Project (1982-1995) 
Panel data Multistate hazards 
model (single risk) 
Older sibling in the US (positive effect) 
Younger sibling in the US (positive effect but lower 
than the older sibling effect). 
 
Stecklov et al. (2010) 2005 Albania Living 
Standards 
Measurement Study 
(1990 - 2004) 
Cross-sectional 
retrospective data 
Discrete time hazard 
models (single risk) 
Household male migrants (1.284 to 1.395) 
Household female  migrants (1.193 to 1.323) 
Share of male migrants from community (1.005 to 
1.006) 
Share of female migrants from community (0.993 to 
0.985) 
Migrant family friends pre-1990 (insignificant) 
Migrant relatives pre-1990 (1.211 to 1.245) 
 
Curran and Rivero-
Fuentes (2003) 
1999 Mexican 
Migration Project 
(1982-1997) 
Panel data Logit model with 
fixed effects (single 
risk) 
No. of family migrants within Mexico (1.456) 
No. of family migrants in the US (2.408 to 2.333)  
Female family migrants within Mexico (1.841 to 1.807) 
Male family migrants within Mexico (insignificant) 
Female family migrants in the US (insignificant) 
Male family migrants in the US (2.21 to 2.52) 
 
Bras and Neven 
(2007) 
Longitudinal data 
from population 
registers (19th and 
20th century) 
Panel data Cox proportional 
hazards model (single 
risk) 
No. of sister migrants in rural areas (2.1 to 2.18 ) 
No. of sister migrants in urban areas (1.71 to 3.94) 
No. of brother migrants in rural areas (0.25 to 1.79 ) 
No. of brother migrants in urban areas (1.63 to 1.66) 
 
Kesztenbaum (2008) TRA survey (19th 
century France) 
Panel data Weibull proportional 
hazards model (single 
risk) 
Presence of male siblings (positive overall effect; 
negative effect of migrating to same destination; 
positive effect of migrating to a different destination) 
 
Randell and VanWey 
(2014) 
Altamira and 
Santarem household 
survey (2010 and 
2009) 
Retrospective data Discrete time hazard 
model (single risk) 
Sibling networks (positive effect for Altamira, 
insignificant for Santarem) 
Non-sibling networks (positive effect for Altamira, 
negative effect for Santarem) 
Parental networks (insignificant for Altamira, positive 
effect for Santarem) 
 
4.2.3 A conceptual framework for subsequent sibling migration 
 
As per the NELM, we view the decision by Kenyan siblings to migrate as a decision made at 
household level. Various empirical studies have reported evidence revealing that migration 
represents a household-utility maximizing strategy (Rempel and Lodbell 1978, Stark and Levhari 
1982, Hoddinott 1994). For a household to afford sending a migrant, the expected returns to 
migrating must exceed the costs of migration borne by the household. Thus, unsurprisingly, the 
poorest households are unlikely to send migrants since they cannot afford to finance the cost of 
migration, especially external migration which tends to be more costly (Stark and Taylor 1991). 
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The expected returns to the migration of a household member primarily accrue to the 
household in the form of subsequent migrant remittances. In sending a migrant, the household 
bears several costs. For example, the household may contribute financially towards transportation 
costs, visa fees (in the case of external migration) and any costs associated with the migrant settling 
down in the destination. The household also incurs psychological costs due to the migrant’s 
physical separation from the household of origin. In addition, since non-migrant members 
contribute towards household production, the household incurs costs related to the loss of labour. 
To maximize the expected returns to migration, we expect households to send members with 
the highest expected wage differential. Because both internal and external migration are generally 
characterised by positive selection in Kenya,16 migrants with the highest wage differentials tend to 
be those who are more skilled and with higher levels of education. Thus, households will send 
those members with higher levels of human capital as they have a better chance of getting a job in 
the destination and are more likely to obtain higher wages if they secure a job. At the same time, by 
sending members with higher levels of education, the household is likely to face a lower cost of 
migration as these members are in a better position to handle the administrative processes of 
migration (e.g., visa applications in the case of external migration) and are likely to assimilate more 
easily in the destination. Expected wages in the destination may also be a function of labour market 
experience which is often a function of an individual’s age. In addition, in the Kenyan cultural 
context, older siblings are usually responsible for the welfare of the household and obliged to 
contribute towards household utility more than younger siblings. Thus, it can be expected that 
older siblings will be more likely to migrate.  
We anticipate the preceding migration of a sibling to occur only when there is a positive overall 
effect on the expected utility of the household as a result of their migration. That is, migration will 
occur if the increase in household utility induced by the potential income gain from the migration 
outweighs the decrease in utility that results from the cost of migrating. The costs associated with 
subsequent sibling migration include the loss of additional labour, as well as the psychological and 
                                                          
16 The positive selection of migrants in Kenya is reflected in the observables of those who tend to migrate as noted in 
chapter 2. 
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financial costs associated with migration. Psychological costs and costs of losing additional labour 
are cumulative, while financial costs can be regarded as one-off. Given the presence of a preceding 
sibling migrant, the subsequent migrant should fully utilise the network by migrating to the same 
destination as the preceding migrant. Migration to the same destination lowers financial costs 
substantially as the preceding migrant can, for example, provide information on housing, or even 
accommodate the sibling, as well as provide administrative information concerning the migration 
process. In addition, the knowledge that the subsequent migrant is located in the same destination 
as the preceding one may lower the psychological costs incurred by the household. On the other 
hand, we expect that subsequent sibling migrants are unlikely to migrate to a different destination 
than the preceding migrant since, if this did occur, the subsequent migrant would not fully utilise 
the network and lower the costs of migrating to the household.  
It is important to note that the type and nature of migration has implications for the relative 
magnitude of costs and benefits incurred. For example, the financial and non-financial costs of 
internal migration may be substantially lower. This is because internal migrants may be in a position 
to visit the household on a regular basis thus lowering the psychological costs, and/or enabling 
them to contribute to household production.  
4.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
The unit of observation for the empirical analysis is the individual (either migrant or non-
migrant) aged more than 15 years and who is a child of the household head (namely, siblings). The 
age limit we impose is based on the assumption that prior to the age of 15 individuals are unlikely 
to make an independent decision to migrate (i.e., they are more likely to migrate as dependents and 
so their decisions are influenced by their parents or other adults). In addition, as the focus is on 
subsequent sibling migration, we restrict the analysis to those who are in households that have at 
least two siblings.17 
                                                          
17 This is obviously because there is no empirical identification of sibling effects for those households with just one 
sibling. 
51 
 
 
 
The subsequent discussion relates to the variables used in the empirical analysis. The choice of 
variable is determined by their relevance in capturing the research questions of interest using the 
theory discussed in section 4.2 above. In addition, the choice of variable is also governed by their 
availability in the dataset used for this analysis. The variables that are used in the probability of 
migration analysis and their summary statistics are first discussed. We then discuss the construction 
of the dataset for the failure time analysis and also present the summary statistics for the variables 
employed for that analysis.  
4.3.1 Variables for modelling migration 
 
4.3.1.1 Predicting household expenditure 
 
In estimating migration models, it is commonly recognized that there is likely to be a reverse 
causality running between the levels of income (or poverty) and migration. That is, does migration 
determine one’s living standards or do living standards determine migration. This issue is clearly 
apposite for this chapter but particularly challenging given the cross-sectional nature of the data 
available.  
A household welfare metric is expected to be an important determinant of migration as 
emphasized in the migration theory. However, our data do not enable us to infer anything about 
asset ownership and other household status variables at the time of migration. Therefore, we 
cannot use these directly in the empirical analysis. The income levels of households are also absent 
from the survey. We therefore use expenditure levels as a measure of household welfare. 
Development economists generally agree that expenditure is a more accurate predictor of 
household welfare as, in contrast to income, it is less prone to shocks (Deaton and Zaidi 2002) and 
volatility. However, we do not know what the expenditure levels of those households with migrants 
were at the time of migration given such retrospective information is not available in this dataset. 
An obvious problem we have is that for households with migrants, the expenditure figures reported 
need to be adjusted for the value of any remittances received. An attempt to adjust for remittances 
through deducting the value of remittances received from total expenditure yielded a large number 
of negative values for the migrant households. These negative outcomes are not surprising given 
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that remittances represent income and not expenditure, and are thus not directly comparable. 
Further, it is possible that other earnings may adjust in response to the migration of a member (e.g., 
some family members may stop participating in the labour market or reduce their hours of work or 
vice versa).  
In order to try and resolve this problem, we impute household expenditure per capita18 at the 
time of migration for those individuals who migrated. In the literature, Adams et al. (2008) use 
predicted household expenditure per capita to analyse the impact of remittances on poverty and 
inequality using data from the 2005/06 Ghana Living Standards Survey. To control for selection 
bias in the expenditure estimates, Adams et al. (op. cit.) employ a two-stage multinomial logit model 
with instrumental variables.19 In the first stage, they estimate the receipt of remittances by 
household status (i.e., receiving internal, external, or no remittances). Equations for the level of 
annual per capita household expenditure (including remittances) are estimated in the second stage 
for each household group and selection control terms obtained from the first stage are included 
here. The predicted expenditure is then estimated from the second stage equations and used to 
obtain counterfactual expenditure estimates for the different household categories. 
In order to obtain predicted expenditure for the current analysis, the approach adopted is 
different from that of Adams et al. (op. cit.). First, using OLS we estimate the coefficients for a log of 
household per capita expenditure model using individuals belonging to households that do not have 
any migrants. We then fit these coefficients to all individuals and predict the log of household per 
capita expenditure for individuals belonging to both migrant and non-migrant households. 
However, the migrant characteristics used for prediction purposes are adjusted back to the 
realizations that prevailed at the time of their migration. Thus, we predict what the per capita 
household expenditure for migrants would have been at the time of migration, using predictors that 
                                                          
18 Expenditure per capita is obtained by dividing the total expenditure by the total number of household members. We 
are unable to adjust the per capita measure for children as we do not have this information for migrants at the time of 
their migration. We refrain from inferring the number of children as it is very likely that such inferences will not be 
precise. This would thus add a measurement error bias to any estimated coefficients for the expenditure variable.  
19 The instruments are obtained from partitioning the data into ethno-religious groups. The resulting instrumental 
variables used are: (i) external remittances received as a per cent of household income in the ethno-religious group and (ii) 
external migrants as a per cent of the population of the ethno-religious group. 
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are measured at the time of migration (see discussion below). As already discussed, a potential 
econometric problem encountered when predicting household expenditure this way is that of 
selection bias. A potential solution to this is to use a Heckman selection model in a manner broadly 
akin to the method employed by Adams et al. (op. cit.) discussed above.  
Past research has found that migration networks are important in migration decisions and the 
receipt of remittances (e.g., Woodruff and Zenteno 2007, Munshi 2003). However, it is quite 
difficult to obtain suitable identifying variables in the current dataset. Unlike Adams et al. (op.cit.), 
our application requires the measurement of expenditure per capita at the individual and not the 
household level. Adams et al. (op.cit.) compare the welfare of remittance versus non-remittance 
receiving households by computing counterfactual expenditures using variables measured in the 
year of the survey. However, because we require a measure of expenditure at the time of migration 
for each migrant, in the current analysis we rely on backtracking the variables used to predict the 
per capita expenditure. It is difficult for us to construct the network variables employed by Adams 
et al. (op.cit.) because it would require tracing them back to the time of migration for each migrant 
and there is inadequate information available in the dataset to permit this. We are thus unable to 
address the potential selection bias in a meaningful or persuasive way in the current analysis. 
Therefore, the approach adopted exploits an uncorrected OLS procedure under the assumption of 
no selection bias. An additional assumption that is required in our application in using the OLS 
model to predict expenditure is that the relationship between the explanatory variables and 
expenditure has not changed over time. That is, the estimated parameters of the per capita 
expenditure function are assumed to be stable over the entire time period governing the migration 
episodes we model. 
It is hypothesized in the log expenditure model that households with heads who are more 
educated will have higher per capita expenditure due to their greater earnings capacity. Male-headed 
households are expected to have higher per capita expenditure levels compared to female-headed 
ones as the latter are generally poorer in Kenya (see International Monetary Fund 2010). Household 
size is likely to exert a negative effect with the age of the household head expected to have a non-
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linear effect. The proportion of elderly people in the household is envisaged to have a negative 
effect due to the high poverty levels prevalent among elderly people in Kenya (see, e.g., Kakwani et 
al. 2006). The effect for the proportion of children is expected to be non-linear because of 
economies of scale in consumption. The expenditure levels are also expected to vary by region (i.e., 
Nairobi, Central, Eastern, North-eastern, Coast, Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western) and by 
urban/rural location due, among other things, to regional differences in the cost of living. In 
addition, we also introduce a set of interaction terms where the urban/rural and region of location 
binary variables are interacted with the aforementioned variables. The realizations of all the 
variables, with the exception of the gender and education level of the head and the urban/rural and 
regional dummy variables, are inferred for migrants through tracing their outcomes back to reflect 
their status at the time of migration. 
The prediction of per capita household expenditures in this way obviously has some 
shortcomings. The size of the household and the numbers of children and elderly people may not 
be accurate if some members died between the time of migration and the time the survey was 
conducted, so a degree of measurement error is potentially introduced. The household head may 
have changed between the time a migrant left the household and the time the survey was 
conducted. The regional and urban/rural location variables may not accurately reflect the location 
of the household at the time a migrant left if the household of origin subsequently moved to a new 
location. The education variables for the head of household may have some degree of error as well, 
though it seems innocuous to assume that the head acquired no further education after the 
migration of a child aged more than 15 years.  
As noted above, the log of per capita expenditure regression model is conducted at the 
individual level, and for all individuals (i.e., both siblings and non-siblings). It is necessary to 
conduct the analysis at the individual, and not the household, level because for most households 
with more than one migrant, migrants left at different times implying that household expenditure is 
different for each migrant depending on when they left. The summary statistics for the variables 
used in the per capita expenditure model are reported in the Appendix (see Table A4.1). The first, 
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second and third columns of the table report summary statistics for the pooled sample, and for 
non-migrants and migrants, respectively. The fourth column reports t-tests/z-scores for the 
differences in means/proportions between migrants and non-migrants. The table reveals that non-
migrant households are more likely to be headed by males and to have younger heads. Migrant 
households have a larger household size. Household heads in migrant households are more likely to 
have no education and to have post-secondary and university education. On the other hand, non-
migrant household heads are more likely to have primary and secondary education. The proportion 
of elderly people is larger and the proportion of children is smaller for migrant households.  
The OLS regression estimates for the per capita expenditure model are presented in the 
Appendix (see Table A4.2). Specification (I) does not include any interactive terms and is provided 
as a benchmark permitting a more meaningful interpretation of the results. All the statistically 
significant coefficients in this specification have the expected signs. Specification (II) contains the 
interactive variables and is used to predict the log of per capita expenditure for all individuals. The 
model is very well determined with an R-squared of 0.545. In the empirical analysis, to distinguish 
between the differing expenditures of households, the predicted expenditure per capita variable is 
decomposed into five splines based on log expenditure quintiles. Splines one and five represent 
20% of households with the lowest and highest welfare respectively. 
As already highlighted, there are shortcomings that are associated with predicting expenditure 
in the manner just discussed. We accept that the predicted expenditure variable is unlikely to be a 
precise measure of household welfare. To check whether this variable at least provides an 
acceptable measure of household welfare, we compare the Gini coefficient computed from the 
predicted expenditure variable to that provided by the World Bank. The latest World Bank Gini 
coefficient estimates for Kenya are for 2005 and provide an estimate of 0.48 (see World Bank 
2014). The Gini coefficient based on our estimate of predicted expenditure is 0.62 and appears high 
relative to the World Bank estimate. This may be because our sample of individuals is not 
representative of Kenya. In addition, the World Bank estimate is based on income not 
consumption expenditure. However, the fact that we use splines to delineate the expenditure of 
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households reduces concerns about whether the approach used over-predicts or under-predicts 
provided the household rankings within quintiles are correct. 
4.3.1.2 Other explanatory variables 
 
The other variables that are central to the empirical analysis are now discussed. The household 
characteristics that are incorporated in the model include those capturing whether the household is 
located in an urban or a rural settlement and a set of regional dummy variables. We also include 
dummy variables capturing the religious affiliation of the household head (i.e., Muslim, Catholic or 
Protestant). The proportion of adults, defined as the proportion of individuals in the household 
aged between 16 and 59 years, is used as a proxy for the availability of labour for household 
production. A variable capturing whether or not the household had a bank account at the time the 
migrant moved, or currently for non-migrants, is constructed. The ownership of a bank account is 
used to proxy for access to financial markets which is a key determinant of migration in the NELM 
model. It is possible that this variable is endogenous if individuals open bank accounts in 
anticipation of migrating. We address the potential endogeneity problem by lagging the bank 
account variable by two years. Another household level variable used is the total number of siblings 
which is adjusted to the number prevailing at the time of migration.  
The individual characteristics include the age, birth rank20 and gender of the sibling. A set of 
human capital variables comprising the education level and the employment status of the sibling are 
also included. We also incorporate the following life cycle model variables: whether or not the 
sibling is a female in the early stage of adulthood21 and whether or not the sibling is a young adult 
who just completed the last year of high school.22  
                                                          
20 In the current analysis, the oldest sibling is allocated the highest rank. The birth rank variable is constructed using the 
ages of individuals. In sections 1 and 5 of the survey (see figure 3.1 of chapter 3) the respondent is asked to provide the 
ages of all current and former household members respectively. Using this information, we rank the ages of siblings in 
descending order with the oldest sibling assigned the highest birth rank value. 
21 This variable takes a value of one for women aged 20 to 30, and zero otherwise. Brockerhoff and Eu (1993) show that 
peak reproductive ages are between 20 and 29 in Kenya, and rural-to-urban migration is highest for women in this age 
group. 
22 We assign the value of one to this variable for siblings who are 18 or 19 years old, and whose highest schooling level 
currently (or at the time of migration) is secondary education. 
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The realizations for all these variables are backtracked to the time of migration for the sub-
sample of migrants. The backtracking of variables is done by adjusting the variables so that they are 
representative of the situation prevailing at the time of migration for migrants. Some of the 
questions in the survey are asked about the current situation of the migrant. For example, in section 
5 of the survey (see figure 3.1 of chapter 3) the respondent is asked to provide the age of the 
migrant (Q5.3) and how long the person has been a migrant (Q5.9). From this, we can calculate the 
age of the individual at the time they migrated from the household. The ages of current household 
members are provided in section 1 of the survey (Q1.4). Because we know the length of migration, 
we compute the ages of current household members at the time of migration. However, variables 
such as the employment and education status of the migrant are not back-tracked as responses to 
questions relating to these are provided for the situation at the time of migration (see Q5.12 and 
Q5.15 of the survey).  
Lastly, a set of network variables are incorporated as follows: a dummy variable for the 
presence of a preceding non-sibling migrant and a dummy variable for the presence of a preceding 
sibling migrant. We also include variables that identify the gender and destination (i.e., internal or 
external) of preceding sibling migrants. We account for return migrants by determining whether a 
current returnee had not yet returned at the time of migration, in which case they would be counted 
as a preceding migrant for the current migrant. Dummy variables capturing the ethnicity of the 
household head (i.e., Kikuyu, Luhya, Kalenjin, Luo, or Kamba) are also included. 
After eliminating missing values for the variables discussed above, imposing the lower age 
threshold at 15 years of age, and restricting the sample to siblings from households with at least two 
siblings, the final sample consisting of usable data for all the relevant variables consists of 1,731 
siblings from 752 households. The first column of Table 4.3 reports selected summary statistics for 
the pooled sample. The second, third and fourth columns report summary statistics for non-
migrants, migrants, and t-tests/z-scores23 for the difference in means/proportions between 
                                                          
23 In all the summary statistics tables throughout this thesis, even though t-tests are also provided for multiple outcome 
variables, the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test is the more appropriate test. The chi-squared test-statistics are provided in 
the tables where relevant. 
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migrants and non-migrants, respectively. The first seven rows provide summary statistics for the 
various dependent variables used in the empirical analysis. We see that 43% of siblings in the 
sample are migrants. There are slightly more internal than external migrants. The statistics also 
reveal that the majority of migrants migrated to an internal or external destination where there is no 
other sibling migrant present.  
The table provides interesting contrasts between sibling migrants and non-migrants. Siblings 
from the poorest households are more likely to be non-migrants, while those from richer 
households are more likely to be migrants. We note that household bank account ownership is 
lower for migrants than non-migrants. Older siblings and those siblings belonging to households 
with a higher proportion of adults are more likely to be migrants. It is surprising that the total 
number of siblings in the household is lower for migrants than non-migrants as we expect the 
probability of migration to be higher in households with more siblings. Also, fewer migrants are 
from households located in urban areas compared to non-migrants.  
The variables for the individual characteristics reveal that siblings between 26 and 45 years and 
females in early adulthood are more likely to be migrants than non-migrants. There are fewer 
migrants than non-migrants who are young adults who just completed high school. Migrants are 
more likely to have higher levels of education. From the employment status variables, we observe 
that more siblings who were unemployed and employed migrated. On the other hand, students and 
self-employed siblings are less likely to be migrants. Finally, the network variables reveal that 
siblings with preceding non-sibling and sibling migrants are actually less likely to be migrants. 
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Table 4.3: Select summary statistics for migration probability analysis  
Variables       All Non-migrants  
(0) 
Migrants  
(1) 
t-test/z-scoreϮ  
Dependent variables:     
= 1 if sibling migrated; = 0 otherwise 0.43 (0.5)    
= 1 if sibling migrated internally; = 0 otherwise 0.23 (0.42)    
= 1 if sibling migrated externally; = 0 otherwise 0.20 (0.40)     
= 1 if migrated to same internal place as preceding 
sibling migrant; = 0 otherwise 
0.06 (0.24)    
= 1 if migrated to same external place as preceding 
sibling migrant; = 0 otherwise 
0.04 (0.20)    
= 1 if migrated to diff internal place from preceding 
sibling migrant; = 0 otherwise 
0.17 (0.38)    
= 1 if migrated to diff external place from preceding 
sibling migrant; = 0 otherwise 
0.16 (0.36)    
Household characteristic variables:     
Predicted log of per capita expenditure splines:     
Spline 1 9.69 (0.44) 9.7 (0.38) 9.67 (0.49) 1.56* 
Spline 2 0.23 (0.14) 0.24 (0.14) 0.23 (0.14) 0.98 
Spline 3 0.17 (0.16) 0.17 (0.16) 0.16 (0.16) 0.94 
Spline 4 0.14 (0.2) 0.14 (0.2) 0.13 (0.2) 1.54* 
Spline 5 0.17 (0.52) 0.13 (0.44) 0.2 (0.61) -2.77*** 
=1 if household has bank account; = 0 otherwise 0.54 (0.5) 0.56 (0.5) 0.51 (0.5) 2.05** 
Birth rank 2.12 (1.32) 1.95 (1.19) 2.35 (1.43) -6.43*** 
Proportion of adults  0.67 (0.2) 0.66 (0.2) 0.67 (0.2) -1.37* 
Total number of siblings  3.75 (1.81) 3.86 (1.97) 3.6 (1.56) 3.02*** 
= 1 if household in urban area; = 0 otherwise 0.46 (0.5) 0.49 (0.5) 0.41 (0.49) 3.60*** 
Individual characteristic variables:     
Age dummy variables:     
= 1 if aged 15 to 25; = 0 otherwise 0.69 (0.46) 0.74 (0.44) 0.62 (0.49) 5.09*** 
= 1 if aged 26 to 35; = 0 otherwise 0.25 (0.44) 0.22 (0.41) 0.3 (0.46) -4.10*** 
= 1 if aged 36 to 45; = 0 otherwise 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.19) 0.07 (0.25) -2.50*** 
= 1 if aged 46  plus; = 0 otherwise 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.1) -0.26 
χ2 test for age dummies    25.90*** 
= 1 if male; = 0 otherwise 0.57 (0.5) 0.56 (0.5) 0.58 (0.49) -0.78 
= 1 if female in early adulthood; = 0 otherwise 0.26 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42) 0.31 (0.46) -4.15*** 
= 1 if young adult just completed high school; = 0 
otherwise 
0.07 (0.26) 0.1 (0.3) 0.03 (0.18) 5.65*** 
Education dummy variables:     
= 1 if university education; = 0 otherwise 0.11 (0.32) 0.07 (0.25) 0.18 (0.38) -7.21*** 
= 1 if secondary education; = 0 otherwise 0.60 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) 0.66 (0.48) -4.16*** 
= 1 if primary education; = 0 otherwise 0.29 (0.45) 0.38 (0.48) 0.17 (0.37) 9.74*** 
χ2 test for education dummies    115.87*** 
Employment status dummy variables:       
= 1 if employed; = 0 otherwise 0.15 (0.36) 0.11 (0.31) 0.21 (0.41) -5.78*** 
= 1 if self-employed; = 0 otherwise 0.1 (0.3) 0.11 (0.32) 0.08 (0.27) 2.54*** 
= 1 if student; = 0 otherwise 0.42 (0.49) 0.48 (0.5) 0.33 (0.47) 6.42*** 
= 1 if unemployed; = 0 otherwise 0.33 (0.47) 0.29 (0.46) 0.38 (0.49) -3.89*** 
χ2 test for employment dummies    67.07*** 
Network variables:     
= 1 if non-sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise 0.18 (0.38) 0.25 (0.43) 0.08 (0.27) 8.70*** 
= 1 if sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise  0.42 (0.49) 0.49 (0.5) 0.33 (0.47) 6.76*** 
= 1 if male sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise  0.28 (0.45) 0.33 (0.47) 0.23 (0.42) 4.48*** 
= 1 if female sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise  0.22 (0.41) 0.26 (0.44) 0.16 (0.37) 4.73*** 
= 1 if internal sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise  0.24 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44) 0.21 (0.4) 2.66*** 
= 1 if external sibling migrant present; = 0 otherwise  0.22 (0.42) 0.28 (0.45) 0.15 (0.35) 6.86*** 
     
N 1731 980 751  
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Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test here is: H0: μ0 = μ1/H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
(iii) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between non-migrants and migrants for categorical variables. 
 
4.3.2 Discrete failure time analysis variables  
 
In order to conduct failure time analysis, we reorganize the dataset from the individual to spells 
at risk. The retrospective nature of the survey enables us to identify the timing of migration 
episodes. We create a variable measuring the year in which a migrant left the household using this 
information. Hence, a sibling is exposed to migration in discrete year intervals for each year from 
the time they turn 15 years until either the time they migrate or not. The time-varying covariates 
constructed include age, a dummy variable for year in which high school was completed, and a 
dummy variable for woman in early adulthood.  
The education dummy variables are also reconstructed and this requires making a number of 
assumptions. In order to clarify how this is done, we will use an example of an individual who 
migrated at 35 years and had university as the highest schooling level. The primary education level 
dummy always takes the value of zero for this individual because it is assumed that they would have 
completed their primary education by age 15. The secondary education dummy assumes a value of 
one from age 15 to 19 because it is assumed that they were in secondary schooling at this time. The 
university education dummy takes a value of one from age 20 onwards as we assume they 
commenced university around that time, and then carried the qualification throughout the rest of 
the period observed in the data. There are obvious limitations associated with constructing the 
education dummy variables in this way. For example, there could be cases where a sibling acquired 
a certain level of education after the generic age at which individuals in Kenya acquire such a level 
of education. For instance, some individuals return to secondary school in adulthood or acquire a 
university degree when a mature student. However, we are unable to correct for this possibility as 
the information available in the dataset is limited in this respect but note it is likely to be small in 
scale.  
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A dummy variable for the presence of a non-sibling migrant is also constructed. We are able to 
determine the time before and after departure since we know the time at which the non-sibling 
migrated from the household. The same procedure is used to create the dummy variable for the 
presence of a preceding sibling migrant, which is the variable of primary interest here. We also 
incorporate any current return migrants who had not yet returned. Despite using discrete time 
intervals, the variables capturing the presence of a preceding migrant do not suffer from interval 
censoring in the case where siblings migrate in the same year but one migrated prior to the other. 
This is because we take into account the actual time of migration in constructing these variables. 
Hence, siblings from the same household may be observed to migrate in the same year but the one 
who migrated later in a particular year will have the preceding migrant dummy variable equal to 
one, while the other sibling will have it equal to zero in the year of migration. 
The variables which did not require re-construction are the time invariant ones. These include 
gender, location of the household (urban/rural), regional dummy variables, ethnicity dummy 
variables, and dummy variables capturing the religion of the household head. Unfortunately, there 
are several variables used in the migration analysis above that cannot feature in the current analysis, 
as we are unable to recreate them on a temporal basis. For example, we only know the sibling 
employment status at the place of origin in 2009 for non-migrants, and in the year of migration for 
migrants. We are also unable to include variables measuring the income of the household or to 
predict it, as in the analysis above, given we do not have adequate information to do so for each 
time period.24  
Table 4.4 provides summary statistics for the set of variables used in the failure time analysis. A 
spell begins when the sibling turns 15. We exclude siblings with a spell length that is less than three 
years in order to ensure that there is some variation in the explanatory variables for each sibling.  
 
                                                          
24 We are unable to undertake a spells at risk analysis in this application unless variables are back tracked. The spells at risk 
analysis entails reconstructing the dataset into a panel rendering the back tracking unavoidable in this case. Moreover, the 
spells at risk analysis only employs a select set of variables in order to limit the amount of back tracking undertaken.  
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Table 4.4: Select summary statistics for failure time analysis 
Variables All Non-migrants 
(0) 
Migrants 
(1)  
t-test/z-scoreϮ 
Dependent variables:     
= 1 if migrated; = 0 otherwise 0.06 (0.24)    
= 1 if migrated internally; = 0 otherwise 0.03 (0.18)    
= 1 if migrated externally; = 0 otherwise 0.03 (0.17)    
Explanatory variables:     
Age dummy variables:     
= 1 if aged 15 to 25; = 0 otherwise 0.71 (0.45) 0.71 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) -0.63 
= 1 if aged 26 to 35; = 0 otherwise 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.06 
= 1 if aged 36 to 45; = 0 otherwise 0.04 (0.2) 0.04 (0.2) 0.04 (0.2) 0.13 
= 1 if aged 46  plus; = 0 otherwise 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.1) 2.14** 
χ2 test for age dummies    4.67 
= 1 if male; = 0 otherwise 0.6 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.6 (0.49) -1.98** 
= 1 if female in early adulthood; = 0 otherwise 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.44) 0.27 (0.44) -1.60* 
= 1 if young adult just completed high school; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.14 (0.35) 0.17 (0.38) 0.11 (0.32) 9.71*** 
Education dummy variables:     
= 1 if university education; = 0 otherwise 0.09 (0.28) 0.05 (0.22) 0.12 (0.32) -13.30*** 
= 1 if secondary education; = 0 otherwise 0.71 (0.46) 0.64 (0.48) 0.77 (0.42) -15.38*** 
= 1 if primary education; = 0 otherwise 0.24 (0.42) 0.32 (0.47) 0.16 (0.36) 21.42*** 
Network variables:     
= 1 if preceding non-sibling migrant present; = 
0 otherwise 
0.09 (0.28) 0.14 (0.35) 0.04 (0.19) 19.68*** 
= 1 if preceding sibling migrant present; = 0 
otherwise 
0.26 (0.44) 0.33 (0.47) 0.19 (0.39) 19.05*** 
= 1 if preceding male sibling migrant present; = 
0 otherwise 
0.17 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.13 (0.33) 13.33*** 
= 1 if preceding female sibling migrant present; 
= 0 otherwise 
0.12 (0.32) 0.16 (0.36)  0.08 (0.27) 12.90*** 
= 1 if preceding internal sibling migrant present 
; = 0 otherwise 
0.13 (0.34) 0.16 (0.37) 0.1 (0.3) 9.32*** 
= 1 if preceding external sibling migrant 
present; = 0 otherwise 
0.15 (0.35) 0.2 (0.4) 0.09 (0.29) 17.61*** 
Spell length (years) 9.08 (6.48) 9.08 (6.91) 9.09 (6.05) -0.06 
     
Spells at risk 12150 5876 6274  
No. of households  700 232 468  
          
 Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test is: H0: μ0 = μ1/ H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
(iii) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between non-migrants and migrants for categorical variables.  
The sample consists of 12,150 spells at risk for 1,525 siblings25 and the average spell length is 
nine years. The first column provides the mean and standard deviation for the pooled sample and 
the second and third columns provide the same statistics respectively for non-migrants and 
migrants. The fourth reports the t-ratios/z-scores for mean/proportion differences between non-
                                                          
25 The number of siblings is 206 less than that for the migration probability analysis (see Table 4.3) because we exclude 
siblings with a spell length that is less than three years. 
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migrants and migrants. The summary statistics reveal similar patterns to those originally reported in 
Table 4.3 of section 4.3.1. 
4.4 Empirical methodology 
 
The main empirical methods employed in this chapter to model the migration determinants of 
siblings exploit univariate and multiple outcome probability models, and discrete failure time 
models.  
4.4.1 Univariate probability analysis for migration decision 
 
In the univariate probability analysis, the binary dependent variable   has two possible 
outcomes (  and ) so a qualitative response model is therefore an appropriate regression model. 
The simplest approach to estimating a binary outcome model is to use the Linear Probability Model 
(LPM). However, there are some limitations inherent in the LPM. For example, the disturbance 
terms are binomially distributed and not normal (though will be so if the sample size is sufficiently 
large), and are inherently heteroskedastic. In addition, the conditional expectation is not bounded 
between zero and one. A solution to these limitations is provided by either a probit or a logit 
model. Given the subsequent multiple outcome analysis conducted in the current chapter uses a 
multinomial logit model, we also opt for a logit model for the univariate analysis. The deterministic 
model incorporating the type of migration variables discussed previously is represented as follows 
(see Greene 2003):  
               
        
          
    (4.1) 
where                          
and where: 
   is the dependent variable and takes the value of 0 for a sibling who is a non-migrant and 1 for a 
migrant sibling. 
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   is a vector of variables capturing the characteristics of the household as listed in Table 4.3 for 
the  th individual. 
   is a vector of variables capturing the individual characteristics of the sibling as listed in Table 4.3. 
   is a vector of network-related variables as listed in Table 4.3, and also comprises a set of regional, 
ethnicity, and religious affiliation dummy variables. 
4.4.2 Multiple outcome probability analysis 
 
The multiple outcome analysis helps investigate the determinants of subsequent sibling 
migration by type of migration (i.e., internal versus external migration). To do this, the following 
multinomial logit (MNL) model is specified: 
               
        
           
 
   
     (4.2)  
where: 
        if a sibling does not migrate (= 0); migrates internally (= 1); or migrates externally (= 2). 
   is as defined in equation (4.1) above.  
Further, we also employ the MNL model to analyse the migration destinations of subsequent 
sibling migrants. The following categories of dependent variable are used:             if a 
sibling does not migrate (= 0); migrates to an internal destination with no siblings (= 1); migrates to 
an external destination with no siblings (= 2); migrates to an internal destination where there is a 
sibling (= 3); or migrates to an external destination where there is a sibling (= 4). In the case of 
internal migration, the data report the exact town or city within Kenya where a migrant resides. For 
external migration, we know the country where a migrant resides but not the town. The fact that we 
only know the destination of migrants at the country level for external migration may be 
problematic because we treat siblings who migrated to the same country as having migrated to the 
same destination. If they are located in different towns within the same country, it may be 
inappropriate to treat them as residing in the same location. Unfortunately we are unable to 
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distinguish by location given that the dataset does not contain the exact location within the country 
abroad (see Table A4.3 in the Appendix for a list of the internal and external migrant destinations). 
4.4.3 Discrete failure time analysis 
 
We also employ a logit model to undertake the duration analysis as this model is commonly 
used in discrete failure time analysis. We assume a single risk outcome, which is estimable using a 
univariate probability model. The use of the logit model exploits the empirical methods adopted 
above in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 and is also comparable with the techniques used by some studies 
in the existing literature (e.g., Stecklov et al. 2010). The dependent variable is a measure of migration 
risk at given time periods. It is denoted by      and equals one if the  
   sibling exits the state of 
non-migration at time period  , and zero otherwise. It represents the probability of sibling   
migrating in an infinitesimal small interval after period   conditional on having survived to period  .  
The discrete time logit model can be expressed as follows: 
               
              
      
                
      
    (4.3) 
     is a vector of the sibling and household characteristics (some of which do not vary by time) that 
may affect the migration risks of siblings (see Table 4.4). The vector      denotes the baseline 
hazard which is specified by a set of dummy variables in five year intervals. This flexible baseline 
hazard might capture individual level heterogeneity in this application. 
In the estimation of equation (4.3), a major concern is that there may be unobserved household 
level variables (i.e., neglected heterogeneity) that may influence the risk of migration (see Jenkins 
2005). If these effects are important but ignored in the modelling, the estimates obtained will be 
biased. To resolve this, we treat household effects as random and employ a random-effects logit 
model. In estimating such a model incorporating heterogeneity, we assume the error term follows a 
Gaussian distribution. The random-effects logit model can thus be expressed as follows: 
               
              
         
                 
         
   (4.4) 
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where    is an unobservable random variable that captures neglected heterogeneity at the 
household level.           
  , where   
   
 
   
  and   captures the correlation in the 
unobservables across the households. If    , this implies that the panel-level variance 
component is unimportant and that the random-effects logit estimates are not different from the 
pooled logit model specified in equation (4.3). The test for the statistical significance of   therefore 
provides a formal test for the presence of random effects (see Baltagi (2008) for further details). 
4.4.4 Potential endogeneity of the preceding sibling migrant decision  
 
A potential endogeneity problem arises if the unobservables that determine a sibling’s own 
migration decision and having a preceding sibling migrant are correlated. If this is the case, the 
estimates obtained from a regression model will be biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge 2010). For 
example, having a preceding sibling migrant is likely to be correlated with unobserved variables 
such as a pre-disposition to migrate, a risk-taking aptitude, certain intrinsic preferences, or other 
characteristics shared by members of the same family due, for instance, to a common upbringing, 
or parental experiences that influence the decisions of siblings to migrate (see, e.g., Manski 1993). 
In this case, a positive correlation between the unobservables for siblings in the same family will 
result in an upward bias in the estimated coefficient.  
Selection bias could also arise. For example, if individual ability is positively correlated with 
migrating, then higher ability siblings will migrate as preceding migrants. As such, there will be a 
negative correlation between a sibling’s unobserved ability and the presence of a preceding sibling 
migrant. Low ability siblings will be less likely to migrate and also more likely to have a preceding 
sibling migrant. This would result in a downward bias in the estimated coefficient on the preceding 
sibling migrant variable. This downward bias can be expected to be potent in the case where there 
exists a strong substitution effect in the migration of family members. However, the direction of 
bias could vary depending on whether low or high ability siblings are migrating.26 It is quite likely 
that unobserved ability would be correlated with observables like education, and so controlling for 
                                                          
26 For example, McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find that Mexico-US migration tends to be characterised by positive self-
selection in communities with low migrant networks due to high migration costs and negative self-selection in 
communities with high migrant networks. 
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education in the regression analysis should capture a large part of the unobserved ability.27 
Therefore, it is arguable that unobserved ability may not present as a significant problem for the 
interpretation of the regression estimates reported here. 
However, the putative endogeneity of preceding migration is an empirical question that is 
testable under certain conditions. A natural way of investigating the potential endogeneity problem 
would be to use an instrumental variables (IV) approach which entails obtaining an instrument(s) 
that is (are) correlated with the endogenous variable but uncorrelated with the error term in the 
migration equation (Wooldridge 2010). However, in the current application, as in other such 
applications, valid instruments are difficult to obtain using cross-sectional data.28 In the absence of 
relevant instruments, an alternative and tentative solution to the endogeneity problem would be to 
treat the unobservables as fixed or random effects within a discrete time framework. This is 
essentially what is anticipated in our failure time analysis outlined in the previous section. 
In spite of the foregoing econometric concerns, it remains the subject of debate whether the 
preceding sibling migrant variable is actually endogenous or not in a conceptual sense. Firstly, it 
seems plausible that households will re-optimize their strategy after the migration of a member thus 
weakening the correlation in unobservables in the separate migration decisions for siblings. In this 
case, it implies that what is estimated is the probability of migrating conditional on having a 
preceding sibling migrant. Re-optimization of the migration strategy is likely if there is a long 
enough time interval between separate migrations. Robustness checks are conducted to determine if 
the estimates we obtain are sensitive to the amount of time that passed since a preceding sibling 
migrant left the household.  
                                                          
27 The data reveal that more educated siblings are migrants. The correlation coefficients for being a migrant and having 
university, secondary and primary education are 0.16, 0.05, and -0.22, respectively.  
28 For example, the dataset employed does not contain any information on previous income shocks to the household that 
may have influenced the migration of preceding sibling migrants but not that of subsequent migrants. An attempt to use 
rainfall shocks and unemployment rates in the year prior to the migration of a preceding migrant as instrument variables 
proved futile as no statistically significant effects were registered on the probability of preceding sibling migration. A 
limitation encountered is that these variables could only be obtained at aggregated levels such as the enumeration area or 
the regional location.  
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Secondly, it is possible that the destination intentions of preceding sibling migrants are not 
always realized and they may ultimately migrate to an alternative destination, not by choice but by 
chance. If the destinations of preceding siblings are random, this implies that the unobservables 
relating to having a preceding sibling migrant in a certain destination are unlikely to be correlated 
with those of subsequent siblings as they would have been correlated only if the preceding sibling 
migrated to the destination of his/her choice. In this case, the preceding sibling variable would 
simply proxy for a ‘pure’ network effect in the migration decision of the subsequent migrant. It is 
possible that in the data there may be preceding siblings who, for example, intended or attempted 
to migrate to OECD countries but failed to do so and ended up migrating to another country in 
Africa instead. There is a vast literature on migration intentions showing that intentions are not 
always realised or are realised differently than first anticipated.29 This is especially true in the case of 
external migration where the realization of intentions is subject to additional constraints and 
immigration policies may prevent many people from realizing their original intentions (Avato 2009). 
Unintended destination outcomes are also a possibility in the case of migrants who move to an 
initial destination, and then relocate to another destination, especially owing to unfulfilled 
expectations (DaVanzo and Morrison 1981). In the case of Kenya, preceding sibling migrants could 
move to a certain country and face hostility, and/or unfavourable conditions there, causing them to 
relocate to an alternative destination. For example, there have been reports of xenophobic attacks 
against Kenyan investors in South Sudan (Otieno 2012). As such, preceding migrants who moved 
to South Sudan initially may relocate to other areas in Kenya, for example, where subsequent 
migrants then join them. In the current analysis, the absence of information on the actual 
destination intentions of migrants prevents us from testing this proposition.30  
Furthermore, it seems that endogeneity is a lesser concern in the case where the presence of a 
preceding sibling migrant decreases the migration probability of siblings. This is because while 
                                                          
29 For example, Beenstock (1996) notes that Israel is a default destination for many migrants from the formerly 
communist regimes who intended to migrate to the West but were inhibited from doing so by immigration controls, 
resulting in them settling in Israel instead. 
30 Unless we assume, for example, that all preceding migrants in Africa would have intended to migrate to OECD 
countries instead. However, this assumption seems untenable. 
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correlated unobservables may dictate that both siblings migrate, the family strategy overrides such 
unobservables so that these same unobservables do not influence the remaining siblings to migrate 
and they end up remaining at home. Hence, in the case of households using migration as a risk 
diversification strategy where a sibling migrates and the rest stay at home, it is possible that 
unobservables that drive the preceding sibling migrant are different from those that dictate that the 
rest of the siblings remain at home. This would act to at least attenuate but possibly render 
uncorrelated these unobservables. Thus, given difficulties in empirically testing the proposition of 
endogeneity, the regression estimates reported in the empirical analysis for this chapter are best 
interpreted as conditional on the presence of a preceding sibling migrant. However, the foregoing 
discussion emphasized that it is not implausible to argue that the perceived presence of such an 
endogeneity is more ‘imagined’ than ‘real’.  
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Univariate probability analysis  
 
Table 4.5 reports the results for the univariate logit model as specified in equation (4.1). In the 
first specification the preceding sibling migrant dummy variable is the variable of primary interest 
for our research question. In the second and third specifications respectively, the preceding sibling 
migrant dummy variable is split into male or female, and internal or external preceding sibling 
migrant. In all regression models, the standard errors are clustered at the household level in order 
to control for any unobserved family level effects influencing migration correlated across the same 
household. 
The findings in regard to networks in the first specification indicate that the presence of a 
preceding sibling migrant (compared to the absence of one) decreases the probability of migrating 
by 23 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. The sample average migration rate is 0.43. 
Thus, the effect of the presence of a preceding sibling migrant corresponds to a 53% decrease 
relative to the mean. In the second specification, we see that if the preceding sibling migrant is 
female (male), the probability of migrating decreases by 16 (19) percentage points, on average and 
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ceteris paribus. Again, these represent sizable decreases in the probability of migrating relative to the 
mean.  
Table 4.5: Binary logit model estimates (marginal/impact effects) 
Variables  Specification  
I 
Specification 
II 
Specification 
III 
Household characteristic variables:    
Predicted expenditure: spline 1 -0.0505 -0.0666* -0.0729** 
 (0.0355) (0.0343) (0.0350) 
Predicted expenditure: spline 2 0.0130 0.0462 0.0556 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.160) 
Predicted expenditure: spline 3 0.256 0.223 0.210 
 (0.160) (0.163) (0.163) 
Predicted expenditure: spline 4 -0.203* -0.214** -0.182* 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.110) 
Predicted expenditure: spline 5 0.118*** 0.124*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0390) (0.0407) 
= 1 if hh has bank account -0.0782*** -0.0757** -0.0654** 
 (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0299) 
Proportion of adults in household -0.160* -0.167** -0.148* 
 (0.0824) (0.0816) (0.0824) 
Total number of siblings -0.0416*** -0.0424*** -0.0399*** 
 (0.00967) (0.00962) (0.00956) 
= 1 if household located in urban area -0.0485 -0.0434 -0.0509* 
 (0.0298) (0.0310) (0.0305) 
 
Individual characteristic variables: 
   
= 1  if aged 26 to 35 -0.0104 -0.0137 -0.00910 
 (0.0294) (0.0298) (0.0293) 
= 1 if aged 36 to 45 0.0311 0.0284 0.0384 
 (0.0601) (0.0612) (0.0600) 
= 1 if aged 46+ 0.0132 -0.00931 0.0186 
 (0.0942) (0.0944) (0.0982) 
Birth rank 0.0527*** 0.0552*** 0.0513*** 
 (0.00980) (0.0101) (0.00989) 
= 1 if male 0.0863*** 0.0856*** 0.0826** 
 (0.0329) (0.0331) (0.0325) 
= 1if female in early adulthood 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 
 (0.0371) (0.0375) (0.0366) 
= 1 if just completed high school -0.182*** -0.177*** -0.185*** 
 (0.0489) (0.0490) (0.0468) 
= 1 if university 0.109*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0376) 
= 1 if primary -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0288) (0.0276) 
= 1 if employed 0.00133 0.00412 0.00939 
 (0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0373) 
= 1 if self-employed -0.0988* -0.101* -0.0966* 
 (0.0524) (0.0527) (0.0509) 
= 1 if student -0.104*** -0.103*** -0.0995*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0303) (0.0303) 
 
Network variables: 
   
=1 if prec non-sib mig present -0.301*** -0.297*** -0.302*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0431) (0.0429) 
=1 if prec sib mig present -0.234***   
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 (0.0250)   
=1 if int prec sib mig present   -0.164*** 
   (0.0316) 
=1 if ext prec sib mig present   -0.269*** 
   (0.0312) 
=1 if male prec sib mig present31  -0.193***  
  (0.0291)  
=1 if female prec sib mig present  -0.156***  
  (0.0346)  
    
Regional dummy variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Religion dummy variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R-squared 0.237 0.231 0.244 
N 1,731 1,731 1,731 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
A Wald test reveals that the effect of a male preceding sibling migrant is not statistically 
distinguishable from that of a female (chi2(1) = 0.42) in the second specification. The relationship 
between the gender of preceding and subsequent migrants is investigated further below.  
In the third specification in this table, we see that having an internal preceding migrant and 
having an external one decrease the probability of migrating by 16 and 27 percentage points 
respectively, on average and ceteris paribus. A Wald test reveals that the coefficients on the internal 
and external preceding sibling migrant variables are statistically different from each other at the 5% 
significance level (chi2(1) = 6.76). The effect of the presence of an external migrant corresponds to 
a 63% decrease relative to the mean, while that of an internal migrant corresponds to a 37% 
decrease. External sibling migrants therefore induce very large deterrence effects on the migration 
of subsequent siblings. The multiple outcome analysis presented below explores further the case of 
internal versus external migration. 
The finding of a strong negative effect for the preceding sibling migrant is inconsistent with 
network theory predictions. It also contradicts most of the studies in the literature to date which 
                                                          
31 The coefficients for the male and female (internal and external) preceding sibling variables do not necessary span across 
the coefficient for the preceding sibling migrant variable as the former are not mutually exclusive. That is, a sibling may 
have both a male and female (internal and external) preceding sibling migrant. 
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have found a positive network effect for current migrants. However, the contrast in our result 
could be explained by differing contexts. The absence of any previous studies in the literature on 
multiple sibling migration in an African setting implies we have no comparable benchmark against 
which to compare our results. 
The negative effect obtained here appears more consistent with the NELM proposition of 
households using migration as part of a diversification strategy in sending some siblings to other 
destinations, while retaining others at home to engage in work in either the local labour market or 
in other domestic activities. However, given our discussion earlier, some caution should be 
exercised when interpreting this particular effect as there is potential for a downward bias on the 
preceding sibling migrant coefficient owing to selection bias caused by unobserved individual 
ability. If, however, unobserved ability is correlated with observable education, this kind of bias may 
not be too severe as we do control for the education levels of siblings.32 
We conduct a number of robustness checks on the estimated sibling effects. Firstly, we vary the 
amount of time that has elapsed since the migration of a preceding sibling migrant. Thus, we alter 
the definition of a preceding sibling migrant according to whether the migrant moved (i) more than 
a year ago, (ii) more than two years ago, and (iii) more than three years ago. The strong and negative 
estimated coefficient on the preceding sibling migrant dummy variable remains invariant to the use 
of these three different criteria (see Table A4.4 of the Appendix). We also exclude siblings with an 
age gap of two or fewer years from the sample. The purpose of restricting the samples in this way is 
to reduce potential endogeneity bias due to a potential correlation in the unobservables between 
siblings. For instance, unobserved variables relating to the household migration strategy are likely to 
be strongly correlated in those cases where siblings are closer in age to one another. If, for example, 
a household determines who migrates and who stays at a fixed point in time, this strategy is likely to 
be enforceable for those siblings who are closer in age. For example, while the household may 
decide a specific migration strategy ex ante, by the time younger siblings are of migrating age, the 
household may have had to re-optimize its strategy thus implying a weaker correlation in any 
                                                          
32 In addition, this kind of selection bias is only plausible under the assumption that unobserved ability can be ranked 
within a family.  
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unobservables determining preceding sibling migration and subsequent migration. The regression 
estimates we obtain for these restricted samples are comparable to those reported for the original 
sample (see Table A4.5 of the Appendix). This set of findings mitigates our concern that the 
reported negative estimate corresponding to the preceding sibling migrant dummy variable is 
subject to a downward bias attributable to a correlation in unobservables.   
As a further robustness check, we vary the age threshold for siblings in the sample.33 The key 
results we obtain are invariant to the use of samples where the age threshold is 18 or 21 years (see 
Table A4.6  of the Appendix). In addition, given that there may be concerns with the inclusion of 
students as migrants (see chapter 3), we exclude all full-time students from the sample and re-
estimate the models above (see Table A4.7 of the Appendix). We again find that the key results are 
invariant to the exclusion of students. This therefore attenuates the concerns raised previously 
regarding the inclusion of students as migrants in our sample. 
It could be argued that the finding of a negative effect of preceding migrants on the probability 
of sibling migration many be driven by first-born children who are unlikely to have preceding 
sibling migrants.34 To test if there is empirical content to this notion, we construct a binary variable 
indicating whether or not a sibling is the first born and interact this with the preceding sibling 
dummy variable. Table A4.8 in the appendix reports the estimates obtained for this model. We see 
that, controlling for whether or not a sibling is the first born, the negative effect of a preceding 
sibling migrant appears robust. Moreover, the coefficient for the interaction term is statistically 
insignificant suggesting that the effect of preceding sibling migrants on the probability of migrating 
is statistically similar for both first born and the subsequent younger siblings. Therefore, it does not 
seem to be the case that the main negative result is being driven by a ‘first born effect’.  
We now turn to a discussion on other estimates in the binary logistic model. The presence of a 
non-sibling migrant (compared to not having one) decreases the probability of migrating by at least 
                                                          
33 It may be argued that if the migration age threshold is greater than 15, including siblings aged below the migration age 
threshold in the sample may induce a downward bias on the preceding sibling migrant coefficient.  
34 In the sample 6% of first born siblings have a preceding sibling migrant.  
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30 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. A Wald test is conducted to determine if the 
effect of a preceding non-sibling migrant is statistically different from that of a preceding sibling 
migrant.35 The estimated coefficients are not found to be statistically different from each other 
(chi2(1) = 2.14). This finding seems to support the NELM characterisation of migration as 
representing a decision made at the household level such that there is no distinction in the 
probability of migrating whether the preceding migrant is a sibling or not. As a robustness check, 
we exclude parents from the non-sibling migrant variable. The findings obtained are invariant to 
the exclusion of parents (see Table A4.9 of the Appendix). Thus the migration decisions of siblings 
appear to be joint decisions made by the household collectively, regardless of the type of 
relationship between household members.  
It could be argued that the strong negative effect of preceding migrants on the probability of 
sibling migration may be driven by the definition of a migrant (see discussion in section 3.1 of 
chapter 3). That is, some individuals who are classified as migrants may not have maintained any 
connection with the household from the time they left. However, this seems unlikely from a 
Kenyan cultural perspective as it would require former household members to completely 
disconnect from the origin household. In the Kenyan culture, there is a large dependence on 
kinship relationships and networks across extended family lines (for example, see Kilbride and 
Kilbride (1990)). The nature of relationships in Kenya is such that even in the case where the 
persons involved are not part of the same nuclear family or are not in continual contact with each 
other, support networks will be invoked when the need arises. On this basis, it is not inconceivable 
to classify all former household members as migrants in the current thesis.  
In addition, a robustness check to determine whether the definition of a migrant may be 
driving the findings is also undertaken. We restrict the sample to more recent migration by 
excluding any members who left the household longer than ten years ago. It seems reasonable to 
assume that individuals who left the household within the past ten years are more likely to retain 
existing connections with current members and thus provide more effective networks. Table A4.10 
                                                          
35 Only 4% of siblings (i.e., 69 siblings) in the sample have both preceding non-sibling and sibling migrants, and 14% (i.e., 
235 siblings) have only preceding non-sibling migrants with 38% (i.e. 664 siblings) having only preceding sibling migrants. 
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of the appendix reports the results obtained for this restricted sample. Again, we see that the 
negative effect of preceding migrants persists providing some assurance that the manner in which 
migrants are defined does not exert any detrimental effect on the key findings in this chapter.  
We now discuss the remaining results from Table 4.5. The estimates for the household 
characteristic variables reveal that being a sibling in a household in the top expenditure quintile 
(spline 5) exerts a positive effect on the probability of migrating, on average and ceteris paribus. This 
suggests that siblings from households who are most able to incur migration costs have a higher 
chance of migrating in Kenya.36 Siblings in households that have a bank account are less likely to 
migrate, which is consistent with predictions from the NELM literature where households send 
migrants in response to missing or incomplete financial markets. Surprisingly, both an increase in 
the proportion of adults and an increase in the total number of siblings in the household decrease 
the probability of migrating. These findings are unexpected as both variables reflect labour 
availability in the household and we would anticipate siblings from households with more labour to 
have higher chances of migrating.37  
For the individual characteristic variables, we see that older siblings are more likely to migrate 
than younger ones. In the Kenyan culture, older siblings assume responsibilities within the family 
from an early age and it seems natural that they would be given priority when it comes to a decision 
as to which siblings are to migrate. Both males and females in early adulthood are more likely to 
migrate. However, being a female in early adulthood has a stronger effect than being a male, with 
the estimated coefficients statistically different from each other at the 10% significance level. In 
comport with the life cycle model, women in Kenya have been shown to move mainly for 
marriage-related reasons (Bigsten 1996). Because most ethnic groups in Kenya are patrilocal, with 
women physically relocating to the household where their husband is resident upon marriage (Berg-
Schlosser 1984), the finding obtained is to be anticipated. The estimates obtained for young adults 
                                                          
36 The findings on the expenditure variables conform to the Kenyan migration context discussed in chapter 2 thus 
confirming that the rankings of the predicted expenditure variable are not misinformative. 
37 It is unclear what the explanations are for these negative findings. The way we construct the variables for migrants may 
play a role in this. Since we trace back these variables to their values at the time of migration, it is possible that they may 
not be entirely accurate for migrants as we lack full information on the numbers and ages of household members at this 
time. Thus, it is not inconceivable they are measured with error.  
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who have just completed high school are at variance with the life cycle model, which predicts that 
they should be more likely to migrate in search of further education or employment opportunities. 
However, in comport with predictions from the human capital model, having a university education 
has a positive effect on the probability of migrating, relative to secondary education, while primary 
education exerts a negative relative effect. This is consistent with our priors as more educated 
siblings are likely to incur lower migration costs than less educated ones, as they have a higher 
chance of obtaining jobs and earning more income in the destination. 
Being employed, relative to being unemployed, exerts no effect on the probability of migrating. 
This implies that there is no differential in the migration propensities of employed and unemployed 
individuals. This seems to be driven by the fact that employed individuals are likely to be more 
skilled while unemployed individuals are likely to migrate in search of employment because they 
have a lower opportunity cost of migrating. Being in self-employment or being a student (relative to 
being unemployed) have negative effects on the probability of migrating. The employment status 
dummy variables can be seen as proxies for the wages commanded by siblings at home. We expect 
that siblings with higher wages at home are more likely to migrate compared to those with lower 
wages as they potentially have more experience and are more skilled, though this is already 
controlled for by the inclusion in the specification of human capital variables. However, the type of 
migration may determine the extent to which this is valid. Hence, since the barriers to internal 
migration are lower, siblings with low schooling and/or skill levels at home may still be in a 
position to migrate. We explore this further in the multiple outcome probability model section 
below, where the analysis is differentiated across these types of migration. 
We also estimate some alternative models to ensure that our key results are robust to different 
specifications of the model. Firstly, as there may be some concerns about predicting (or simulating) 
expenditure in the manner undertaken here, we replace the predicted expenditure variable with the 
actual variables used to predict it (see Table A4.1 of the appendix for a list of these variables). The 
results obtained are reported in specification I of Table A4.11 in the appendix. Secondly, we check 
whether the back-tracking of variables has any effect on our main results. We estimate a model 
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which does not feature any back-tracked variables where current realizations of the variables are 
now used for both migrants and non-migrants. Specification II of Table A4.11 provides the results 
obtained. In both specifications, we see that the main findings reported of a strong negative effect 
of preceding migrants hold. Thus, the key results obtained in the empirical analysis are invariant to 
both use of predicted expenditures or its instruments as well as to whether back-tracking of 
variables is used or not. 
We now proceed to discuss findings obtained when the logit model is estimated for the male 
and female samples separately in order to examine whether there are gender differences in the 
probability of migrating. The impact effects are reported in Table 4.6 for only a sub-set of variables.  
Table 4.6: Binary logit model estimates by gender (marginal/impact effects) 
Variables Females (0) Males (1) t-test:             
H0: π0 = π1 
    
= 1  if prec non-sib mig present -0.222*** -0.354*** 1.78* 
 (0.0576) (0.0470)  
= 1 if male prec sib mig present -0.183*** -0.200*** 0.30 
 (0.0462) (0.0343)  
= 1 if female prec sib mig present -0.0923** -0.201*** 1.69* 
 (0.0468) (0.0442)  
    
Regional dummy variables Yes  Yes   
Religion dummy variables Yes  Yes   
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes  Yes   
Pseudo R-squared 0.200 0.274  
N 749 982  
       
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
 
We see that the presence of male or female preceding sibling migrants and the presence of non-
sibling migrants all have a deterrence effect on the migration of both male and female siblings. The 
likelihood ratio test value suggests the null hypothesis of common effects across gender is upheld38 
thus revealing that there is no empirical justification for separating the samples by gender. This 
seems to provide evidence that both males and females participate in the household income source 
                                                          
38 The chi-square test statistic for the likelihood ratio test is 39.74 and this is distributed with 36 degrees of freedom. The 
corresponding prob-value for this test is 0.307. 
78 
 
 
 
diversification strategy in an identical manner. This finding is unsurprising given that Kenyan men 
and women are increasingly participating in equal proportions in migration as discussed in chapter 
2. In the literature, Curran and Rivero-Fuentes (2003) also find that there are no statistically 
significant differences between male and female migration effects for the case of Mexico. 
The t-tests (see table) for the differences in the effects obtained reveal that male preceding 
sibling migrants do not induce any differential effect on the probability of migrating of male and 
female siblings. On the other hand, male subsequent sibling migration is deterred more in the case 
where non-sibling and female sibling preceding migrants are present. This may be driven by the 
different motivators of male and female sibling migration. As Kenyan society is mainly patrilocal 
women migrate for marriage purposes. Thus, it seems rational that the migration of female siblings 
is not deterred by preceding female sibling and non-sibling migration to the same extent as male 
sibling migration. However, the fact that the presence of preceding migrants still produces a 
negative effect on female migration, and particularly the fact that male preceding sibling migration 
deters female subsequent sibling migration by the same effect as it does male sibling migration, 
seems to point to the fact that females also participate in the household income source 
diversification strategy.  
4.5.2 Multiple outcome probability analysis 
 
In order to determine how the factors introduced above influence the type of migration, we 
estimate a multinomial logit model using three mutually exclusive categories as follows: not 
migrating (= 0); migrating internally (= 1) and migrating externally (= 2). The Small Hsiao test of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) suggests the IIA proposition is upheld by the data 
and therefore the use of the multinomial logit model for this analysis appears justified. The 
marginal and impact effects for these three categories are reported in Table 4.7. 
The results indicate that being employed relative to being unemployed decreases the probability 
of internal migration and increases the probability of external migration, on average and ceteris 
paribus. Because unemployed siblings are likely to be less skilled and/or experienced, they migrate 
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internally given the low barriers to internal migration. On the other hand, employed siblings are in a 
better position to overcome the barriers to external migration.  
Table 4.7: Migration type multinomial logit model (marginal/impact effects) 
Variables Not migrating  
(0) 
Migrating 
internally (1) 
Migrating 
externally (2) 
Household characteristic variables:    
Predicted exp: spline 1 0.0766** -0.0103 -0.0663*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0263) (0.0242) 
Predicted exp: spline 2 -0.111 -0.0672 0.178* 
 (0.122) (0.108) (0.108) 
Predicted exp: spline 3 -0.183 0.148 0.0358 
 (0.133) (0.120) (0.108) 
Predicted exp: spline 4 0.174* -0.141 -0.0328 
 (0.0966) (0.0917) (0.0738) 
Predicted exp: spline 5 -0.0832** 0.0112 0.0720*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0369) (0.0228) 
= 1 if household has bank account 0.0590** -0.0634*** 0.00435 
 (0.0240) (0.0218) (0.0196) 
Birth rank -0.0498*** 0.0310*** 0.0187** 
 (0.0104) (0.00934) (0.00897) 
Proportion of adults in household 0.147** -0.0898 -0.0574 
 (0.0603) (0.0551) (0.0503) 
Total number of siblings 0.0384*** -0.0235*** -0.0149* 
 (0.00815) (0.00768) (0.00766) 
= 1 if household located in urban area 0.0539** -0.00395 -0.0499** 
 (0.0257) (0.0231) (0.0220) 
Individual characteristic variables:    
= 1 if aged 26 to 35 0.0102 -0.0637*** 0.0535** 
 (0.0271) (0.0245) (0.0210) 
= 1 if aged 36 to 45 -0.0389 -0.0166 0.0554 
 (0.0519) (0.0449) (0.0419) 
= 1 if aged 46+ -0.0259 -0.00453 0.0304 
 (0.113) (0.0935) (0.105) 
= 1 if male -0.0769** 0.0385 0.0383 
 (0.0300) (0.0290) (0.0277) 
= 1if female in early adulthood -0.125*** 0.0414 0.0839*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0326) (0.0303) 
= 1 if just completed high school 0.183*** -0.144*** -0.0388 
 (0.0467) (0.0502) (0.0421) 
= 1 if university -0.100*** 0.0818*** 0.0185 
 (0.0340) (0.0304) (0.0234) 
= 1 if primary 0.227*** -0.0628*** -0.164*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0237) (0.0260) 
= 1 if employed -0.0106 -0.0927*** 0.103*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0278) (0.0227) 
= 1 if self-employed 0.102** -0.0301 -0.0714* 
 (0.0396) (0.0346) (0.0399) 
= 1 if student 0.0936*** -0.147*** 0.0533*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0221) (0.0206) 
Network variables:    
=1 if prec non-sib mig present 0.297*** -0.111*** -0.187*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0297) (0.0294) 
=1 if prec sib mig is internal 0.212*** 0.0472** -0.260*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0215) (0.0291) 
80 
 
 
 
=1 if prec sib mig is external 0.279*** -0.202*** -0.0768*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0282) (0.0204) 
    
Regional dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.255 
N 1,731 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
Students are shown to be either more likely to stay at home or migrate externally, and less likely 
to migrate internally, relative to unemployed siblings. This finding may reflect the high demand by 
Kenyans for higher education abroad as discussed in chapter 2. Being self-employed increases the 
probability of not migrating. This seems reasonable as self-employed individuals often have 
location specific skills and a clientele base.39 
The possession of a university education (compared to the base group comprised of secondary 
education) decreases the probability of staying at home and increases that of migrating internally 
but has no effect on external migration. On the other hand, having only a primary education 
increases the probability of staying at home and decreases that of external and internal migration. 
This is contrary to an expectation that higher schooling levels would substantially lower the cost of 
external migration, thus inducing a positive effect on external migration. It is likely that the finding 
is a feature of the reasons for external migration in the Kenyan context. As already discussed above, 
as well as highlighted in chapter 2, most Kenyans migrate externally in search of higher education. 
However, individuals who already possess Kenyan higher education qualifications may find it 
difficult to obtain recognition for their qualifications abroad and thus opt to migrate for work 
purposes within Kenya. 
We also note that having a preceding non-sibling migrant increases the probability of staying at 
home and decreases the probability of migrating internally and externally. The presence of an 
                                                          
39 In the survey, the common occupations for those who are self-employed are farming, carpentry and buying and selling 
goods. 
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internal preceding sibling migrant increases the probability of staying at home and migrating 
internally but decreases the probability of migrating externally. Having an external sibling migrant 
increases the probability of not migrating, and decreases the probability of migrating internally and 
externally. Thus, the deterrence effect of preceding sibling migrants appears stronger in the case of 
external migration. This is probably attributable to the fact that external migration is more costly 
than internal migration which is supported by the finding that better off households have a higher, 
while the poorest ones have a lower, probability of sending external migrants. The finding also 
points to the household income diversification strategy where some siblings migrate and others 
remain at home being stronger in the case of external migration. 
In order to examine the determinants of subsequent sibling migration further, and to 
differentiate network effects from income source diversification motives, we investigate whether 
siblings migrate to the same destination (either internally and externally) as preceding sibling 
migrants, or to another location where there are no preceding sibling migrants. Estimates are 
obtained for the following mutually exclusive categories: not migrating (= 0), migrating to an 
internal destination with no preceding sibling migrants (= 1), migrating to an external destination 
with no preceding sibling migrants (= 2), migrating to the same internal destination as a preceding 
sibling migrant (= 3) and migrating to the same external destination as a preceding sibling migrant 
(= 4). The estimates are presented in Table 4.8 for the preceding sibling migrant variable and they 
represent respectively the five outcomes described above. We see that the presence of a preceding 
sibling migrant increases the probability of not migrating by 23 percentage points on average and 
ceteris paribus. This is again supportive of the NELM view that the motive for sibling migration is to 
diversify household income sources by having some siblings migrate while others remain at home. 
The estimates also reveal that the presence of a preceding sibling migrant decreases the probability 
of migrating internally to a destination with no siblings by 12 percentage points and that of 
migrating externally to a location with no siblings by 21 percentage points, on average and ceteris 
paribus. Thus, households are not likely to diversify income sources through sending migrants to 
diverse destinations.  
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In Table 4.8 we also note that having a preceding sibling migrant increases the probability of 
migrating internally to the same destination as the preceding migrant by six percentage points and 
increases the probability of migrating externally to the same location as the preceding sibling 
migrant by four percentage points. A Wald test to determine whether the coefficients on these two 
variables are equal is upheld (chi2(1) =  0.26, p-value =  0.610).This suggests that if households 
send additional sibling migrants, they will send them to the same location as preceding siblings, 
whether this is internal or external.40 Thus, we find evidence of networks playing a role in the 
migration of subsequent siblings for both external and internal migration. These findings are in 
contrast to those of Kesztenbaum (2008) who reports no evidence of the use of networks as the 
migration of male siblings is not to the same destination. Rather, the study obtains evidence 
suggestive of risk diversification as the migrant destinations are different. 
Table 4.8: Multinomial logit model for different migration destinations (marginal/impact effects) 
Variables Not 
migrating 
(0) 
Int mig to 
destination with no 
sibling (1) 
Ext mig to 
destination with 
no sibling (2) 
Int mig to 
destination 
with sibling (3) 
Ext mig to 
destination 
with sibling (4) 
      
=1 if prec sib mig present 0.233*** -0.120*** -0.212*** 0.0590*** 0.0391*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0112) (0.00926) 
      Regional dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.253 
N 1731 
            
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
 
4.5.3 Discrete failure time analysis 
 
The use of failure (or duration) time models allows us to address some of the limitations 
encountered in the preceding empirical analysis. A major concern with the earlier probability 
                                                          
40 However, caution needs to be exercised in the case of external migration because we only observe the country where 
siblings are located, and not the town or city. The findings may be compromised by the fact that for external migration 
siblings actually migrate to different places within the same country. Nevertheless, even if the sibling is in a different 
town, the fact that he/she is in the same country provides an important network effect.  
83 
 
 
 
analysis is that it fails to control for unobservable variables that vary across households. If these 
omitted variables are important in determining the migration decisions of siblings, a failure to 
control for them will induce a bias on the coefficient for the preceding sibling migrant variable. For 
example, it seems plausible that households with sibling migrants may have common influences 
which determine the migration decisions of siblings. If this is the case, there is likely to be a positive 
correlation between the unobservable variable and the preceding sibling migrant variable. That is, 
households with sibling migrants are likely to have some common factors which determine both 
preceding and subsequent sibling migration. If so, failure to control for this unobservable will yield 
an upward bias on the preceding migrant parameter. A key advantage of the discrete failure time 
analysis undertaken here is that it enables us to account for any neglected heterogeneity at the 
household level. Therefore, we are able to control for the unobservable common influences that 
may characterize households with preceding sibling migrants as well as any other unobservable 
variables at the household level. In undertaking the failure time analysis we model the probability of 
exiting the state of non-migration. The literature reviewed in section 4.2 revealed that several 
studies have analysed the determinants of sibling migration using such duration analysis (e.g. 
Stecklov et al. 2010, Bras and Neven 2007, Palloni et al. 2001). Therefore, the use of failure time 
modelling here enables us to compare the findings to those of other studies.  
Prior to examining the econometric estimates for equations (4.3) and (4.4) we first explore the 
non-parametric hazards for siblings with and without preceding sibling migrants. We capture the 
baseline hazard function non-parametrically through use of duration interval-specific dummy 
variables. To ensure that migration occurs within each time interval we group the dummy variables 
into five year intervals. Comparable studies in the literature have also used year dummy variables to 
capture the baseline hazard (e.g., Stecklov et al. 2010). This pair of smoothed hazard functions is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1. The hazard functions show that there is positive duration dependence in 
the initial periods followed by negative duration dependence thereafter. The shape of the hazard 
functions is broadly comparable to the baseline hazard reported in the study by Stecklov et al. (op. 
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cit.). The migration hazards are higher for siblings without a preceding sibling migrant.41 A log-rank 
test also reveals that the hazard functions are statistically different (chi2(1) = 14.59). This is quite 
compatible with the findings of the logit analysis reported in the preceding sections.  
Figure 4.1: Smoothed hazard function estimates    
 
All the estimation undertaken here is for single risk models. As a complementary alternative, a 
competing risk modeI could permit the modelling of exits into internal and external migration 
destinations. This would have involved the use of a multinomial logit model in conjunction with the 
spell at risk data. However, several factors render the estimation of competing risk models with 
discrete data complicated (see Jenkins 2005). For example, it is not straightforward to adjust for 
neglected heterogeneity in such competing risk models. In order to circumvent these problems, we 
estimate the different exit options using single risk models. The estimates obtained are reported in 
the first instance as logit coefficients rather than marginal or impact effects. Positive coefficients are 
associated with a shorter spell and therefore correspond to a higher migration risk. Negative 
coefficients relate to an increase in the spell and therefore a reduction in the probability of 
migrating. Thus, to determine the effect exerted by a preceding sibling migrant on the probability of 
migrating, we convert the coefficient to an impact effect when interpreting the results. The impact 
effect for the preceding sibling migrant on the probability of migrating is given by the difference 
between the two logistic cumulative distribution function values as follows: 
   
            
               
  
         
            
    (4.5) 
                                                          
41 However, starting around period 37, the migration hazards for siblings with a preceding sibling migrant become higher. 
Given that only a few migrants are in this age range, some interpretational caution is required here. 
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where      are the sample average characteristics of the explanatory variables and   is the 
coefficient for the preceding sibling migrant dummy variable. 
Table 4.9 reports the coefficients obtained for three alternative specifications. The preceding 
sibling migrant dummy variable is the variable of main interest in the first specification. In the 
second and third specifications, dummy variables capturing the gender and destination (i.e., internal 
or external) of the preceding sibling migrant respectively provide the key interest. The coefficients 
obtained for the logit estimator (4.3) and the random-effects logit model (4.4) are reported under 
each specification. The likelihood ratio tests for neglected heterogeneity reveal that it is statistically 
significant and therefore the random-effects model is a more appropriate choice of model 
compared to the standard logit.  
In the pooled logit model in the first specification, the presence of a preceding sibling migrant 
is shown to increase the probability of exiting the state of non-migration and thus increase the 
probability of migrating. This finding is in contrast to the findings we obtained in the earlier 
analysis in section 4.5.1. However, we note that the samples are slightly different given the 
exclusion of siblings with only one or two spells at risk in the failure time models. Moreover, the 
random-effects model reveals that after controlling for neglected heterogeneity, having a preceding 
sibling migrant does not exert any statistically significant effect on the probability of migrating. 
Therefore, as we anticipated, we see that failing to control for unobservable variables at the 
household level results in an upward bias in the estimated coefficient for the preceding sibling 
migrant variable. We see similar contrasts between the logit model and the random-effects logit 
model across all the different specifications in Table 4.9. In all specifications, there is an upward 
bias in the coefficients for the preceding sibling migrant variable when household level neglected 
heterogeneity is not controlled for. 
The random-effects model in the second specification reveals that neither male nor female 
preceding sibling migrants exhibit any statistically significant effect on the probability of migrating. 
Having controlled for neglected heterogeneity in the third specification the estimates indicate that 
the presence of an internal preceding sibling migrant increases the probability of migrating.  
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Table 4.9: Discrete failure time logit estimates (coefficients) 
  Specification I Specification II Specification III 
Variables Pooled 
logit  
Random-
effects logit  
Pooled 
logit  
Random-
effects logit  
Pooled 
logit  
Random-
effects logit  
Age dummies (omitted group: aged 15 to 25):      
= 1 if aged 26 to 35 -1.090*** -0.843*** -1.089*** -0.851*** -1.071*** -0.827** 
 (0.315) (0.322) (0.315) (0.321) (0.314) (0.322) 
= 1 if aged 36 to 45 -0.881 -0.303 -0.891 -0.329 -0.824 -0.293 
 (1.165) (1.157) (1.170) (1.156) (1.173) (1.159) 
= 1 if aged 46  plus -1.242 -0.459 -1.261 -0.494 -1.220 -0.469 
 (1.284) (1.284) (1.286) (1.284) (1.292) (1.286) 
= 1 if male -0.0736 -0.0402 -0.0618 -0.0382 -0.0773 -0.0525 
 (0.159) (0.165) (0.161) (0.165) (0.160) (0.165) 
= 1 if female in early adulthood 0.175 0.232 0.184 0.235 0.175 0.232 
 (0.174) (0.178) (0.175) (0.178) (0.174) (0.178) 
= 1 if young adult just completed hs -1.163*** -1.069*** -1.164*** -1.072*** -1.161** -1.071*** 
 (0.219) (0.224) (0.219) (0.223) (0.219) (0.224) 
= 1 if university education 0.221* 0.290* 0.223* 0.288* 0.263** 0.306** 
 (0.127) (0.149) (0.126) (0.149) (0.127) (0.149) 
= 1 if primary education -0.613*** -0.644*** -0.609*** -0.645*** -0.614*** -0.655*** 
 (0.124) (0.139) (0.124) (0.138) (0.124) (0.139) 
= 1 if household in urban area -0.0231 0.00493 -0.0357 0.00304 -0.0356 -0.0100 
 (0.115) (0.142) (0.116) (0.142) (0.117) (0.142) 
Duration specific dummies (omitted group: spell 26 plus):     
Spells 1 to 5 -1.369 -2.019* -1.379 -2.007* -1.366 -2.059* 
 (1.236) (1.220) (1.240) (1.219) (1.247) (1.223) 
Spells 6 to 10 -1.214 -1.600 -1.226 -1.598 -1.203 -1.630 
 (1.233) (1.215) (1.237) (1.214) (1.244) (1.218) 
Spells 11 to 15 0.186 -0.0965 0.175 -0.0965 0.178 -0.146 
 (1.181) (1.169) (1.186) (1.168) (1.193) (1.172) 
Spells 16 to 20 0.209 0.171 0.199 0.166 0.211 0.136 
 (1.175) (1.169) (1.178) (1.168) (1.185) (1.172) 
Spells 21 to 25 0.383 0.241 0.360 0.238 0.343 0.209 
 (0.393) (0.403) (0.394) (0.403) (0.400) (0.404) 
Network variables:       
= 1 if preceding non-sib mig present -0.274 -0.523** -0.302 -0.537*** -0.309 -0.534** 
 (0.202) (0.208) (0.201) (0.208) (0.201) (0.208) 
= 1 if preceding sib mig present 0.261** 0.140     
 (0.101) (0.0994)     
= 1 if prec male sib mig present   0.187 0.145   
   (0.121) (0.115)   
= 1 if prec female sib mig present   0.312** 0.179   
   (0.129) (0.132)   
= 1 if prec int sib mig present      0.494*** 0.410*** 
     (0.132) (0.122) 
= 1 if prec ext sib mig present      -0.176 -0.327** 
     (0.123) (0.135) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
rho  0.201***  0.196***  0.197*** 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.035) 
    0.909***  0.891***  0.900*** 
  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.098) 
       
Spells at risk 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 
Number of households 700 700 700 700 700 700 
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Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Standard errors are reported in parentheses for the random-effects logit model. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the household level are reported in parentheses for the logit model. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
This amounts to an increase in the probability of migrating by 2.23 percentage points on 
average and ceteris paribus and corresponds to a 37% increase in the probability of migrating, 
relative to the mean. Thus, when the preceding migrant is located within Kenya, it is more likely 
that other siblings will also migrate. 
On the other hand, the presence of an external preceding sibling migrant decreases the 
probability of migrating. The effect exerted equates to a decrease in the probability of migrating by 
1.4 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. This is equivalent to a 23% contraction in the 
migration probability, relative to the mean. Hence, when the preceding migrant is located externally, 
this seems to deter the subsequent migration of other siblings. These findings are akin to those 
obtained in the earlier analysis in section 4.5.1 where the household income diversification strategy 
was found to be stronger in the case of external migration and evidence of preceding sibling 
migrants providing networks for internal migration was obtained. 
It is quite interesting to note that the coefficient for the internal preceding sibling migrant 
variable is significant at the 1% level in both the pooled logit and random-effects model in the third 
specification. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient is only slightly smaller in the random-
effects model. On the other hand, the coefficient for the external preceding sibling migrant variable 
is larger but statistically insignificant in the pooled logit model while it is statistically significant at 
the 5% level in the random-effects logit model. Thus, the upward bias induced by neglected 
heterogeneity is more apparent in the case of an external preceding sibling migrant. Assuming that 
controlling for neglected heterogeneity captures common influences that determine the migration 
of siblings at the household level, the findings seem to suggest that these common influences are 
more prominent for households with external migrants. This is not an unreasonable assumption as 
external migration faces more barriers than internal migration and there may be more unobservable 
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common determinants among households with siblings that participate in external migration. These 
unobservable factors are likely captured when neglected heterogeneity is controlled for in the 
random-effects logit model. 
In all the specifications for the pooled logit model, we see that the presence of a preceding 
non-sibling migrant has no statistically significant effect. In the random-effects models, we see that 
the presence of a non-sibling migrant reduces the probability of migrating. The probability of 
migrating is reduced by about 2.1 percentage points on average and ceteris paribus. The effect relative 
to the mean represents a 35% fall in the probability of migrating. This finding is akin to the findings 
obtained in the earlier analysis in section 4.5.1. There is also evidence of an upward bias in the 
coefficient for the preceding non-sibling migrant variable when neglected heterogeneity is not 
accounted for (though the coefficients are statistically insignificant in the pooled logit models). 
Thus, having accounted for unobservable common influences among households with sibling 
migrants, we find that non-sibling migrants decrease the probability of migration for siblings.  
As a robustness check, we exclude the duration-specific dummy variables and re-estimate all 
the models presented in Table 4.9 for the random-effects logit model (see Table A4.12 of the 
Appendix). The results we obtain without the duration-specific dummy variables resemble those 
presented in Table 4.9 with the exception that the coefficients for the preceding sibling migrant 
variable and the male and female preceding sibling migrant variables are now significant. Therefore, 
the findings are somewhat sensitive to the exclusion of a fairly flexible baseline hazard. 
We also undertake a robustness check to determine whether our findings are sensitive to the 
econometric methods employed. We re-estimate the three specifications presented in Table 4.9 
using linear probability models (LPMs). Table A4.13 in the Appendix presents the estimates for the 
linear probability models. The first columns of each specification show the LPM estimates without 
allowing for neglected heterogeneity. The second and third columns under each specification 
provide estimates obtained for the random-effects and fixed-effects LPMs, respectively. The results 
obtained using the various LPMs are generally consistent with those obtained using the logit and 
random-effects logit models.  
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We now proceed to explore sibling and non-sibling network effects by type of migration in 
more detail. Table 4.10 provides the estimates for the discrete failure time logit models separately 
for internal and external migration.42 These estimates are complemented by the LPM estimates 
reported in Table A4.14 in the Appendix.  
Table 4.10: Migration type discrete failure time logit estimates (coefficients) 
  Internal migration External migration 
VARIABLES Logit Random-effects 
logit 
Logit Random-effects 
logit 
     
= 1 if preceding non-sib mig present -0.839*** -1.097*** -0.729** -0.802*** 
 (0.286) (0.292) (0.372) (0.300) 
= 1 if preceding sib mig present 0.667*** 0.553*** -0.0821 -0.214 
 (0.162) (0.149) (0.168) (0.174) 
     
Other control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Duration-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho  0.151***  0.143*** 
  (0.045)  (0.056) 
    0.765***  0.740 
  (0.133)  (0.169) 
     
Spells at riskϮ 6,546 6,546 6,731 6,731 
No. of households 433 433 436 436 
          
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Standard errors are reported in parentheses for the random-effects logit model. Robust standard errors clustered 
at the household level are reported in parentheses for the logit model. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
(iv) Ϯ The combined spells at risk are greater than 12,150 because the ‘internal migration’ sample consists of siblings 
from households with internal migrants only or no migrants. The ‘external migration’ sample consists of siblings 
from households with external migrants only or no migrants.  
 
In the random effects logit models in Table 4.10 we see that the presence of a preceding 
sibling migrant increases the probability of migrating internally but has no statistically significant 
effect on the probability of migrating externally.43 On the other hand, there is a strong negative 
effect of non-sibling migrants on the probability of migrating both internally and externally. The 
                                                          
42 These internal and external migration models are estimated as single risk models. Thus, the samples consist of siblings 
belonging to households with internal (external) sibling migrants only and those belonging to households with no sibling 
migrants. We exclude siblings belonging to households with both internal and external migrants as these are only a few 
observations and it is not feasible to estimate a model for this. 
43 However, for the LPM models in Table A4.14, the presence of an external preceding sibling migrant registers a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the probability of migrating.  
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findings relating to the effect of non-sibling migrants for the pooled logit models also reveal a 
strong negative effect on the exit from non-migration state. This corresponds with the results 
obtained in the earlier analysis using the binary logit model where we found that non-sibling 
migrants decrease the probability of migrating. 
4.6 Summary and conclusions  
 
In the initial analysis of this chapter, we employ a binary logit model to determine the effect of 
the presence of a preceding sibling migrant on the subsequent migration decisions of Kenyan 
siblings. We emphasise that the findings of this analysis are best interpreted as conditional on the 
presence of a preceding sibling (non-sibling) migrant. This interpretation is appropriate given 
difficulties in empirically testing the potential endogeneity of the preceding sibling variable. In 
addition, due to the absence of suitable instrumental variables, in the binary logit analysis we do not 
account for selection bias owing to any systematic differences between households with and 
without sibling migrants. Thus, the appropriate interpretation for the findings there is as 
conditional probabilities. 
We find that both preceding sibling and non-sibling migrants induce a strong negative effect on 
the probability of migrating for siblings. This provides evidence for the migration of siblings being 
driven by a household income diversification strategy where some siblings migrate and others 
remain at home. Preceding non-sibling migrants are found to have the same deterrence effect for 
subsequent sibling migration as preceding sibling migrants. In addition, both male and female 
siblings are shown to participate in the household income diversification strategy. The empirical 
analysis also reveals that if a sibling who has a preceding sibling migrant migrates they are likely to 
move to the same internal or external destination as the preceding sibling migrant rather than to a 
different destination. Thus, the findings indicate that sibling networks have a positive effect on the 
subsequent migration decisions of siblings. The findings also reveal that households do not achieve 
income source diversification through sending siblings to diverse destinations. Rather, income 
source diversification is principally achieved through some siblings migrating and others remaining 
at home. 
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A limitation of the foregoing analysis is that it fails to take into account the potential variation 
in unobservables that influence sibling migration decisions across households. Therefore, we 
employed discrete failure time methods to control for this variation. The use of discrete failure time 
models thus enabled us to control for neglected heterogeneity at the household level by estimating 
a random-effects logit model. The empirical estimates obtained indicate that neglecting such 
heterogeneity yields an upward bias on the coefficient of the preceding sibling migrant variable. 
Controlling for neglected heterogeneity at the household level, we find that the overall effect of the 
presence of a preceding sibling migrant on the probability of migrating is statistically insignificant. 
On the other hand, the presence of preceding non-sibling migrants is found to decrease the 
probability of migrating. However, we are aware that the results obtained for the random-effects 
model could be sensitive to the parametric assumptions made regarding neglected heterogeneity. 
This is an issue that clearly requires further investigation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A4.1: Summary statistics for the per capita expenditure model 
Variables All Non-migrant 
(0) 
Migrant                   
(1) 
t-test/z-score Ϯ  
Predicted log of expenditure per capita 10.42 (0.96) 10.4 (0.81) 10.43 (1.01) -1.22 
= 1 if head is male 0.7 (0.46) 0.82 (0.38) 0.65 (0.48) 16.9*** 
Age of head 48.9 (15.15) 42.67 (12.73) 51.41 (15.32) 26.65*** 
Household size 5.53 (2.52) 5.46 (2.55) 5.56 (2.51) -1.75** 
Education variables:     
= 1 if head has no education 0.18 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39) -4.70*** 
= 1 if head has primary education 0.31 (0.46) 0.34 (0.47) 0.3 (0.46) 3.34*** 
= 1 if head has post-primary education 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) -0.36 
= 1 if head has post-secondary education 0.14 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.15 (0.35) -1.99** 
= 1 if head has university education 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.27) 0.1 (0.3) -2.80*** 
= 1 if head has secondary education 0.23 (0.42) 0.26 (0.008) 0.22 (0.005) 4.77*** 
χ2 test for education dummies    17.55*** 
Proportion of elderly people 0.08 (0.16) 0.04 (0.11) 0.09 (0.17) -15.82*** 
Proportion of children  0.13 (0.16) 0.19 (0.17) 0.11 (0.15) 21.96*** 
     
Sample size 9700 2784 6916  
          
Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) The non-migrant category refers to individuals belonging to households with no migrants. The migrant 
category refers to individuals belonging to households with at least one migrant. 
(iii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test is: H0: μ0 = μ1/H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
(iv) The χ2 test is testing for differences between non-migrants and migrants for the education categorical variable.  
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Table A4.2: OLS estimates for the per capita expenditure model 
VARIABLES  I: OLS without 
interactions 
II: OLS with 
interactions 
   
= 1 if head is male 0.0329 0.127*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0443) 
Age of head -0.00967 0.363*** 
 (0.00884) (0.106) 
Age of head squared 0.000108 -0.00486*** 
 (9.47e-05) (0.00141) 
Household size -0.0636*** -0.0624*** 
 (0.00807) (0.00884) 
= 1 if head has no education -0.329*** 0.678** 
 (0.0565) (0.265) 
= 1 if head has primary education -0.147*** -0.604*** 
 (0.0419) (0.209) 
= 1 if head has post-primary education 0.0918 -0.284 
 (0.0882) (0.378) 
= 1 if head has post-secondary education 0.484*** -0.0509 
 (0.0536) (0.232) 
= 1 if head has university education 1.163*** 0.255 
 (0.0662) (0.362) 
= 1 if head has secondary education Omitted category 
Proportion of elderly people -0.300 0.0447 
 (0.203) (0.821) 
Proportion of children  -2.100*** -4.778*** 
 (0.283) (1.684) 
Proportion of children squared 2.100*** 5.125* 
 (0.591) (3.058) 
= 1 if hh located in urban area 0.207*** 0.496 
 (0.0375) (0.466) 
   
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Interactions of regional dummies with all the variables No Yes 
Interactions of urban/rural dummy with all the variables No Yes 
Sample size 2,784 2,784 
R-squared 0.449 0.545 
      
Notes to the table: 
(i) The dependent variable is the log of actual expenditure per capita. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(iii) Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
(iv) The 2,784 observations used in the OLS regression relate to individuals belonging to non-migrant households. 
Several observations are dropped due to multicollinearity in the interacted terms. 
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Table A4.3: List of destinations for sibling migrants in the sample 
External destination N Internal destination  N Internal destination  N 
United kingdom 37 Athi river 2 Mandera 3 
Tanzania 18 Bam 1 Mangu 1 
United states 132 Banana 1 Mbeere 1 
Uganda 42 Bungoma 4 Meru 3 
Canada 9 Bunyala 1 Migori 2 
Germany 21 Busia 1 Mombasa 28 
Australia 6 Changamwe 1 Muhoroni 1 
India 3 Dadaab 1 Muranga 2 
Netherlands 6 Eldamaravin 2 Mwea 1 
Italy 5 Eldoret 22 Mwingi 1 
Rwanda 2 Embu 4 Nairobi 207 
South Africa 14 Garissa 2 Naivasha 3 
Sudan 8 Gathiga 2 Nakuru 18 
Norway 2 Gatundu 1 Narok 1 
United Arab Emirates 22 Gilgil 1 Ndenderu 1 
Congo 3 Homabay 5 Nduberi 1 
Sweden 1 Kabungi 1 Njoro 4 
Belgium 2 Kakamega 4 Nyahururu 1 
Switzerland 1 Kenyeya 1 Nyamira 1 
China 1 Kericho 9 Nyathuna 1 
Saudi Arabia 6 Kiambu 3 Nyeri 3 
Libya 1 Kisii 1 Oyugis 1 
Zimbabwe 1 Kisumu 12 Riandu 1 
France 1 Kitale 3 Rongo 1 
Ethiopia 1 Kitengela 1 Ruiru 1 
Russia 1 Likaya 1 Siaya 1 
  Likoni 2 Soi 1 
  Limuru 3 Teso 1 
  Loi 1 Thika 7 
  Lungale 2 Ufanisi 1 
  Maasai mara 1 Wajir 1 
  Machakos 2 Wangige 1 
  Makueni 1 Webuye 1 
  Malaba 1 Westland 1 
  Malindi 3   
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Table A4.4: Binary logit model estimates with varying migration lengths of preceding sibling migrant 
(marginal/impact effects)  
Variables I II III 
    = 1 if preceding sib mig present -0.229*** -0.176*** -0.125*** 
 
(0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0284) 
Other variablesϮ  Yes Yes Yes 
    Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.212 0.197 
N 1,731 1,731 1,731 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) In specifications I, II, and III, the preceding sibling migrant dummy variable is equal to one if the preceding 
sibling migrated (i) more than a year ago, (ii) more than two years ago, and (iii) more than three years ago, 
respectively. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(iii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
Table A4.5: Binary logit model estimates excluding siblings with age gap of two or less (marginal/impact 
effects)  
Variables 
 
  =1 if preceding sib mig present -0.243*** 
 
(0.0267) 
  Other variablesϮ Yes 
  Pseudo R-squared 0.240 
N 1455 
    
Notes to the table: 
(i) The sample size is smaller as siblings with an age gap of two or less years are excluded. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(iii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A4.6: Binary logit model estimates with age threshold of 18 and 21 (marginal/impact effects) 
VARIABLES I II 
   
=1 if preceding sib mig present -0.267*** -0.283*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0310) 
 (0.154) (0.159) 
   
Other variables Ϯ Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.214 0.234 
N 1,384 1,002 
      
Notes to the table: 
(i) The sample size is smaller as the age threshold is 18 in specification (I) and 21 in specification (II). 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(iii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
 
Table A4.7: Binary logit model estimates excluding all full-time students (marginal/impact effects) 
VARIABLES  
  
=1 if preceding sib mig present -0.260*** 
 (0.0328) 
  
Other variablesϮ Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 
N 1,006 
    
Notes to the table: 
(i) The sample size is smaller as siblings who are full-time students are excluded. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(iii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A4.8: Binary logit model estimates with first born dummy interaction (marginal/impact effects) 
VARIABLES   
  = 1 if preceding sibling migrant present -0.167*** 
 
(0.0343) 
= 1 if first born 0.0898*** 
 
(0.0254) 
= 1 if first born interacted with preceding sibling migrant dummy -0.0819 
 
(0.0524) 
  Other variables included Yes 
Regional dummy variables Yes 
Religion dummy variables Yes 
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.230 
N 1,731 
    
Notes to the table:  
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.  
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space 
(see text for details).  
 
 
Table A4.9: Binary logit model estimates excluding parents in preceding non-sibling migrant variable 
(marginal/impact effects) 
VARIABLES  
  
=1 if preceding sib mig present -0.232*** 
 (0.0252) 
=1 if preceding non-sib mig present -0.292*** 
 (0.0444) 
  
Other variablesϮ Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.232 
N 1,731 
    
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Ϯ The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A4.10: Binary logit model estimates with sample restricted definition of migrant (marginal/impact 
effects) 
VARIABLES 
 
  = 1 if preceding sibling migrant present -0.247*** 
 
(0.0246) 
= 1 if preceding non-sibling migrant present -0.344*** 
 
(0.0471) 
  Other variables included Yes 
Regional dummy variables Yes 
Religion dummy variables Yes 
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2339 
N 1,656 
    
Notes to the table:  
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.  
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space 
(see text for details).  
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Table A4.11: Binary logit model estimates: alternative specifications (marginal/impact effects) 
VARIABLES Specification I Specification II 
Household characteristic variables: 
  = 1 if household head is male 0.0453*** 0.0271 
 
(0.0175) (0.0215) 
Age of household head 0.00230* -0.00321** 
 
(0.00131) (0.00139) 
Household size 0.0549*** 0.0920*** 
 
(0.00890) (0.00974) 
= 1 if head has secondary education 0.0205 -0.00328 
 
(0.0196) (0.0237) 
= 1 if head has university education 0.0268 0.0216 
 
(0.0264) (0.0335) 
Number of elderly people in household -0.118*** -0.0333 
 
(0.0216) (0.0237) 
Number of children in household -0.0238* -0.0623*** 
 
(0.0141) (0.0146) 
Number of adults in household  -0.126*** -0.179*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.00832) 
Number of siblings in household  -0.107*** -0.0569*** 
 
(0.00821) (0.0103) 
= 1 if household located in urban area -0.0389** -0.0248 
 
(0.0169) (0.0202) 
Individual characteristic variables: 
  Aged 15 to 25 -0.0949*** 0.0110 
 
(0.0205) (0.0246) 
Aged 36 to 45 0.0560* 0.0277 
 
(0.0300) (0.0402) 
Aged 46+ 0.114 0.0944 
 
(0.0696) (0.0816) 
Birth rank 0.109*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.00765) (0.00891) 
= 1 if male 0.0630*** 0.0599** 
 
(0.0221) (0.0275) 
= 1 if female in early adulthood 0.106*** 0.0940*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0297) 
= 1 if just completed high school -0.125*** -0.102*** 
 
(0.0411) (0.0382) 
= 1 if university 0.0225 0.0746** 
 
(0.0232) (0.0305) 
= 1 if primary -0.0938*** -0.161*** 
 
(0.0194) (0.0219) 
= 1 if employed -0.0327 -0.0212 
 
(0.0256) (0.0273) 
= 1 if self-employed -0.158*** -0.125*** 
 
(0.0346) (0.0361) 
= 1 if student -0.0208 -0.0812*** 
 
(0.0208) (0.0229) 
Network variables: 
  = 1 if preceding sibling migrant present -0.171*** -0.155*** 
 
(0.0176) (0.0201) 
=1 if preceding non-sibling migrant present -0.163*** -0.198*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0272) 
   Regional dummy variables Yes Yes 
Religion dummy variables Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummy variables Yes Yes 
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Pseudo R-squared 0.5472  0.4634 
N 1,731 1,731 
      
Notes to the table:  
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses.  
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space 
(see text for details).  
 
Table A4.12: Discrete failure time random-effects logit estimates (coefficients) 
Variables I II III 
    = 1 if preceding non-sib mig present -0.493** -0.499** -0.481** 
 
(0.197) (0.197) (0.198) 
= 1 if preceding sib mig present 
  
0.192** 
   
(0.0957) 
= 1 if preceding male sib mig present  
 
0.186* 
 
  
(0.111) 
 = 1 if preceding female sib mig present  
 
0.218* 
 
  
(0.128) 
 = 1 if preceding int sib mig present  0.456*** 
  
 
(0.118) 
  = 1 if preceding ext sib mig present  -0.271** 
  
 
(0.130) 
  
    Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Duration-specific dummies No No No 
    
 
0.150*** 0.151*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
0.761*** 0.765*** 0.776*** 
 
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
Spells at risk 12,150 12,150 12,150 
Number of households 700 700 700 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A4.13: Discrete failure time LPM estimates (coefficients) 
  Specification I Specification II Specification III 
Variables Pooled 
LPM 
Random-
effects 
LPM 
Fixed-
effects 
LPM 
Pooled 
LPM 
Random-
effects 
LPM 
Fixed-
effects 
LPM 
Pooled 
LPM 
Random-
effects 
LPM 
Fixed-
effects 
LPM 
          
= 1 if prec non-sib  -0.0130 -0.0305*** -0.0427*** -0.0142 -0.0307*** -0.0426*** -0.0143 -0.0302*** -0.0416*** 
 (0.00878) (0.00871) (0.0103) (0.0088) (0.00867) (0.0102) (0.0088) (0.00851) (0.00986) 
= 1 if prec sib mig  0.0163** -0.00140 -0.0120       
 (0.00648) (0.00707) (0.00766)       
= 1 if prec male sib mig    0.0136* 0.00240 -0.00570    
    (0.00809) (0.00846) (0.00905)    
= 1 if prec female sib mig    0.0189** 0.00126 -0.00767    
    (0.00902) (0.0105) (0.0113)    
= 1 if prec int sib mig        0.0331*** 0.0166 0.00405 
       (0.0010) (0.0110) (0.0119) 
= 1 if prec ext sib mig        -0.00903 -0.0249*** -0.0309*** 
       (0.00659) (0.00742) (0.00812) 
          
Other control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Duration-specific 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Religion dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Ethnicity dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
          
R-squared 0.022 0.017 0.010 0.022 0.017 0.010 0.023 0.018 0.010 
R-squared within  0.041 0.041  0.040 0.041  0.041 0.042 
R-squared between  0.005 0.053  0.005 0.052  0.004 0.051 
Spells at risk  12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 12,150 
No. of households 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 
                    
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses for the pooled LPM. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A4.14: Migration type discrete failure time LPM estimates (coefficients) 
  Internal migration External migration 
VARIABLES Pooled LPM Random-
effects LPM 
Pooled LPM Random-
effects LPM 
     
= 1 if preceding non-sib mig present -0.0254*** -0.0344*** -0.0208** -0.0281** 
 (0.00746) (0.0105) (0.00828) (0.0115) 
= 1 if preceding sib mig present 0.0374*** 0.0234*** -0.00166 -0.0245*** 
 (0.01065) (0.00789) (0.00714) (0.00738) 
     
Other control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Duration-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Religion dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ethnicity dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.029 0.0253 0.025 0.019 
R-squared within  0.021  0.031 
R-squared between  0.10  0.017 
     
Spells at risk 6,546 6,546 6,731 6,731 
No. of households 433 433 436 436 
          
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed 
tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses for the pooled LPM. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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5 The Remittance Behaviour of Kenyan Sibling Migrants  
5.1 Introduction 
 
Adult children play a central role in providing financial and other assistance to their parents in 
most developing countries. In the Kenyan context, care for parents by adult children is often 
considered a filial responsibility with family welfare being valued over individual welfare (Armer 
and Gewirtz 1986). This assistance can directly cater for parental needs (Dow and Werner 1983), 
for example, or be channelled towards specific purposes such as educating younger siblings (Gomes 
1984). The reliance of parents on the support of adult children assumes particular significance in 
Kenya given the lack of government assistance for the elderly (Buchmann 2000). Elderly people are 
considered to be among the most vulnerable members of society in Kenya, registering the highest 
poverty levels and often not in receipt of pension income (Kakwani et al. 2006). The inability to 
save for retirement due, among other things, to unemployment, low wages, and a lack of access to 
finance exacerbates poverty levels among the elderly (Kenya Retirement Benefits Authority 2007). 
Thus, the support offered by adult children is often central to the livelihoods of elderly persons. 
Kenyan migrant children often compensate for their inability to provide physical care due to their 
absence from the parental home by providing financial support. 
Remittances by migrants are an important component of household income in Kenya, with 
migration being mainly driven by economic objectives. Remittances sent between members of the 
nuclear family maintain the income levels of family members and serve to maximize the utility of 
the nuclear family as a group (Mukras et al. 1985). Knowles and Anker (1981) report that 
remittances in Kenya are usually sent between close relatives, mainly husbands and wives, and 
parents and children. The latter comprises the greater proportion thus supporting the notion that 
children in Kenya are an important source of financial support for their parents. The remittances 
sent by adult children seem to be motivated by a variety of factors. These factors include, for 
instance, the need to assist parents in old age (especially as alternative forms of support are limited), 
financing the education of younger siblings, inheritance motives, and cultural norms and 
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expectations. The increasingly prominent role of remittances in Kenya, as articulated in chapter 2, 
merits empirical research that enhances understanding of how migrants behave when remitting to 
their households of origin. In the current chapter, we investigate the remittance behaviour of 
Kenyan sibling migrants, which provides a more novel focus on this particular research theme. 
5.1.1 Research questions  
 
As already noted, the aim of the current chapter is to investigate the motivations for sending 
remittances by sibling migrants through examining the remittance behaviour of a sample of sibling 
migrants in Kenya. The data used for the analysis are again obtained from the World Bank Africa 
Migration Project household survey conducted for Kenya in 2009, the details of which were 
discussed earlier in chapter 3.  
We undertake empirical analysis to examine how Kenyan multiple sibling migrants interact 
when remitting to the household of origin in order to determine the dominant drivers of their 
remittance behaviour. Firstly, we investigate whether remitting behaviour differs according to 
whether the migrant is a sole1 or multiple2 sibling migrant. Secondly, we investigate how, if at all, 
the amount of remittances sent by one sibling migrant is related to the volume of remittances sent 
by another sibling.  
A key motivation of the research is to ascertain whether the remitting behaviour of Kenyan 
multiple sibling migrants conforms to the main remittance motives identified in the existing 
remittance literature. The three main extant remittance motives examined are competitive 
inheritance-driven motives (Bernheim et al. 1985, Hoddinott 1992), independent self-insurance 
motives (Lucas and Stark 1985, Rosenzweig 1988), and altruistic motives (Lucas and Stark 1985, 
Funkhouser 1995). We also propose that there may be other possible motives for remitting that 
may help to explain the remittance behaviour of migrants. In particular, we suggest that in the case 
                                                          
1 A sole sibling migrant is an individual who is the only sibling migrant in the household, but who belongs to a household 
that has at least two siblings. 
2 A multiple sibling migrant refers to an individual from a household where at least two children of the household head 
are migrants. 
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of multiple migrants, there may be a sharing of responsibilities that influence remittance allocation 
arrangements when siblings remit to the household of origin. 
5.1.2 Research contribution  
 
The remittance behaviour of sibling migrants is a relatively under-researched topic in the 
literature, especially in the Kenyan context. The current chapter contributes to the literature by 
employing a relatively recent dataset that was specifically designed to capture migration and 
remittance flows. To the author’s knowledge, the empirical studies that have analysed the behaviour 
of multiple sibling migrants in the existing literature have done so for different contexts from the 
current one and employed different econometric methods. Moreover, the few studies in the 
literature that have analysed remittance motives for the case of Kenya have used relatively older 
datasets than the current one (e.g., Hoddinott 1992 and 1994, Knowles and Anker 1981). The cited 
studies respectively use a 1982 survey of smallholders and a 1974 household survey. Thus, the 
current analysis potentially contributes more contemporary insights for the understanding of 
Kenyan migrant remitting behaviour. 
In addition, the emphasis on siblings in the current chapter generates a more homogeneous 
sample for the purposes of analysis. This will hopefully provide deeper insights into the remittance 
motives of migrants since we do not expect sibling and non-sibling migrants to have similar 
motivations when remitting. For example, while spouses naturally share the responsibility of 
providing for the household, this responsibility is less evident for siblings (Naufal 2007). Restricting 
our sample to siblings alone enables us to distil the motivations for remitting for this particular sub-
set of migrants.  
In the current study we acknowledge that the existing remittance literature contains theories 
that are useful for explaining the remittance behaviour of migrants. Nonetheless, the changing 
natures of migration and remittance patterns require the consideration of alternative motives and 
drivers of remittances. This research proposes that the current remittance literature needs to be 
expanded in order to incorporate more contemporary remittance motives. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: section 5.2 provides a review of the relevant literature and 
also discusses key theories in the literature germane to the current study. Section 5.3 discusses the 
data and provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The 
empirical methodology is articulated in section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents and discusses the empirical 
findings, including various checks that are undertaken to determine whether the main results are 
robust to different specifications of the empirical model. Finally, section 5.6 provides a summary of 
the main findings, as well as some concluding remarks.  
5.2 Literature review 
 
In this section we review the main theories of remittance behaviour that feature in the 
remittance literature. The findings of the set of empirical studies in the literature that are specific to 
multiple migrant and sibling remittance behaviour are also reviewed.  
5.2.1 Review of theory 
 
5.2.1.1 Remittance theories 
 
The economic literature on migration has been heavily influenced by Lucas and Stark (1985) 
and their new economics of labour migration (NELM). This theory views migration as a decision 
made at the household level. Migrant remittances are seen as part of a strategy aimed at diversifying 
the resources of the household amid risks related to the absence of efficient insurance markets in 
the home country. In the NELM model, remittances are motivated by pure altruism, pure self-
interest or tempered altruism/enlightened self-interest. 
In the altruistic model, the migrant is assumed to derive utility from the utility of those left at 
home (Becker 1981). This utility depends on the consumption levels of both the family and 
migrant. Hence, a fall in recipient household income or an increase in migrant income have positive 
effects on migrant remittances (Funkhouser 1995). Lucas and Stark (1985) present the following 
altruistic model where the migrant derives utility (  ) from the utility of those remaining at home, 
and the utility of the latter depends on per capita consumption (  ): 
107 
 
 
 
                
 
        ]     (5.1) 
where   is the wage of the migrant,   is the amount they remit,    is the consumption of the 
migrant,    are altruistic weights attached to various household of origin members, and   is the size 
of the household of origin. For the household, consumption per capita may be assumed to increase 
with income per capita at home and vary with household size if economies or diseconomies of scale 
in consumption exist. Hence,  
        
 
 
          (5.2) 
where   is the income per capita at home before receipt of any remittances. Choosing a level of   
that maximizes (5.1) subject to (5.2) provides a remittance equation:  
                  (5.3) 
Because the migrant is altruistic, if both his utility function and the household of origin utility 
functions are well behaved, 
  
  
 is predicted to be positive and 
  
  
 negative. The sign of  
  
  
 is 
unrestricted because if there are economies of scale in consumption, an increase in household size 
given      could exert a negative effect on the amount of remittances sent, whereas if there are 
diseconomies of scale in consumption, the effect would be positive. For example, if there is a large 
proportion of school age children in the household, the demand for remittances could be high 
given the need to meet expenses such as school fees. On the contrary, if there is a large proportion 
of working adults, the demand for remittances could decrease if they all contribute towards the 
welfare needs of the household. In the empirical literature, studies that have obtained an inverse 
relationship between the amount of remittances sent and the number of migrants from the same 
origin household provide support for altruistic motives driving the remittances behaviour of 
multiple migrants (e.g., Agarwal and Horowitz 2002, Funkhouser 1995). 
In the pure self-interest model, the motivation to remit relies purely on individual incentives 
and the absence of altruism by the migrant toward the family (Lucas and Stark 1985). Thus, 
remittances will increase with household of origin assets and income, migrant income, and the 
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probability of inheritance which is dependent on, among other things, the age of parents and the 
number of siblings. However, only in the case of an aspiration to inherit, can self-interest be 
distinguished from altruism in the behaviour of the migrant. Here, a larger income and/or wealth 
of the household should lead to more remittances (see Hagen-Zanker and Siegel 2007). The 
presence of other migrants is predicted to have a positive effect on the probability of remitting and 
the amount of remittances sent under competitive self-interest motives. The following are some 
studies in the literature that have found evidence in support of inheritance motives driving migrant 
remittances: Pleitez-Chavez (2004), De la Brière et al. (2002), Hoddinott (1992 1994), Lucas and 
Stark (1985) and Bernheim et al. (1985). Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992), Cox et al. (1998) have 
also found positive relationships between transfer amounts and recipient incomes supporting an 
inheritance motive. 
In general, while remittance sending may be driven by self-interest motives, the self-enforcing 
mechanism on which it depends may actually be altruism (Chami et al. 2003). This gave rise to 
tempered altruism/enlightened self-interest motives which are seen as intermediate forms of 
motivation. Thus, remittances are interpreted as part of an inter-temporal, mutually beneficial 
contractual arrangement between the migrant and the origin household, with altruism and self-
interest facilitating the enforcement of the contract (see, e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985, Hagen-Zanker 
and Siegel 2007). For example, due to market failures in the place of origin, some members migrate 
to labour markets that are not perfectly correlated with the home market and enter into a co-
insurance agreement with the remaining household members (Stark and Bloom 1985). Therefore, 
migrants remit in response to shocks to household income and also to reduce income uncertainty in 
the destination, and thus ensure the household’s support during adverse times (Roberts and Morris 
2003). Migration thus acts as a reciprocal risk-reducing co-insurance strategy. Studies that report 
evidence for the co-insurance motive include Lucas and Stark (1985) who find that during times of 
hardships (such as drought), urban-to-rural remittances in Botswana increase for rural households 
possessing drought-prone assets. Cox et al. (1998) find that remittances received by households in 
Colombia are a function of their income risk. Rosenzweig (1989) finds that remittances to rural 
households in India respond to shocks on parental income. 
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However, it can be difficult to distinguish between altruistic and insurance motives. This is 
particularly so when measures of risk in the household of origin are used, as opposed to measures 
of risk at the destination. The use of the latter appears more persuasive because an increase in 
income uncertainty in the host country is unlikely to directly impact remittances motivated by 
altruism since no additional need on the part of the household is induced (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 
2009). A study by Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) uses measures of income uncertainty in the 
host country such as the legal status of migrants, the receipt of benefits, the availability of social 
networks, work experience, and the length of stay. The study finds that a rise in income uncertainty 
in the host country increases remittances because migrants are risk-averse and insure themselves by 
remitting more to the household. If multiple migrants are driven by co-insurance motives, each 
migrant is expected to independently self-insure with the origin household. Hence, any contract the 
migrant enters into with the household does not depend on the remittance activities of other 
household members (see, e.g., Agarwal and Horowitz 2002). Thus, the leading prediction under this 
independent strategy is that the presence of other migrants will exert no effect on the remittances 
sent by a migrant.  
5.2.2 Review of empirical evidence 
 
The few empirical studies that have analysed the behaviour of multiple migrants in the 
literature, to the author’s knowledge, have done so within different settings from the current one 
and employed different econometric methods. Similar to our focus in the current research, 
Piotrowski (2008) examines the remittance behaviour of siblings, albeit for a context dissimilar to 
ours and using different empirical methods. Using data from rural households in Nang Rong, 
Thailand, and migrant-sibling pairs as the unit of analysis, Piotrowski investigates sibling differences 
in remittance behaviour. The study employs a multinomial probit model with dependent variables 
measuring whether both, neither, or only one of the siblings in the pair remitted, as well as whether 
a sibling sent the same or different amounts than the reference sibling. Various relative attributes of 
siblings are used as explanatory variables. The results of the study reveal that differences in 
occupation, gender, and marital status across sibling pairs all have a net effect on remittance 
behaviour. Though the study is on sibling remittance behaviour, the research question it addresses, 
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as well as the data and econometric methods it employs, are very distinct from the current study. In 
addition, the study does not provide any justification for the use of a multinomial probit model, and 
in its empirical application does not appear to relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. Therefore, the author permits no correlation in the unobservables that influence the 
different remittance outcomes examined.  
Naufal (2008) uses an heteroskedastic tobit model for a sample of Nicaraguan migrants 
belonging to the same household and finds the decisions to remit are positively correlated across 
migrant unobservables. However, the study is unable to differentiate between whether the positive 
correlation in these unobservables is an attribute of competition among migrants belonging to the 
same household, similarities in behaviour due to a shared background or an ex-ante agreement. A 
shortcoming of the study by Naufal is that the dataset does not contain a breakdown of the amount 
of remittances sent by each migrant. The author approximates per-migrant remittances based on 
the total amount of remittances received by the household and the number of remitting migrants. 
In the case where there is more than one remitting migrant, total remittances are averaged over the 
number of remitters. As such, the study is unable to differentiate between individual sibling 
remittance behaviour. The data used for the current thesis chapter has the advantage that we 
observe exactly how much an individual migrant remitted to the household. Thus, in contrast to the 
existing literature, the data contain the actual remittances of sibling migrants who belong to the 
same household of origin. These data represent an advance on what is currently available in the 
literature. 
In a study that more closely resembles the current one, Antman (2012) examines the financial3 
and physical4 contributions of siblings to their families of origin. The study assumes sibling 
contributions to be the outcome of a non-cooperative game as the relationship between older 
parents and their adult children is assumed to be largely independent and to incorporate conflicting 
interests. This assumption of a non-cooperative bargaining model is central to the identification 
                                                          
3 In the study, financial contributions are monetary transfers by both migrant and non-migrant siblings to their parents. 
4 Physical contributions refer to the amount of time (i.e., number of hours) non-migrant children spend helping their 
parents, conditional on parents reporting difficulties with activities of daily living. 
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strategy used in the paper, and thus the reported results are uninformative of a cooperative 
bargaining approach. The data used are obtained from the Mexican Health and Aging Study 
(MHAS) for the years 2001 and 2003. The unit of analysis are siblings whose parents were born 
before 1950. The paper considers sibling contributions to be endogenous and uses other sibling 
characteristics as instrumental variables. These are comprised of the number of sisters, the number 
of siblings in each of four education categories, the sum of ages, the sum of children of other 
siblings, the number of married siblings, the total number of siblings, and the total birth orders of 
other siblings. IV linear regression and tobit models are employed and estimated separately for 
migrants and non-migrants, and for financial and physical contributions. The main results reveal 
that a 100 peso increase in sibling financial contributions to their parents leads to a six-peso 
increase in the financial contribution of the individual sibling migrant and an increase of about 12 
pesos for the non-migrant child. This positive relationship indicates strategic complementarity in 
migrant and non-migrant financial contributions. The cross-effects between financial and time 
contributions across siblings are found to be negative thus suggesting substitution across siblings. 
The time contributions of siblings are found to be strategic substitutes. The author suggests that the 
distinction between the complementarity of financial contributions and the substitutability of time 
contributions across siblings suggests that children expect their parents to mainly consider financial 
contributions when allocating bequests. The author also suggests that the magnitude of 
complementarity is higher for non-migrants as some migrants do not plan to return home, and thus 
have weaker bequest motives. Unlike Antman, our dataset does not contain information on the 
time contributions of siblings and therefore we cannot consider non-financial contributions. In 
addition, our focus is exclusively on migrants. Furthermore, the non-cooperative assumption that is 
central to the identification strategy in the study seems implausible for the current context. As 
highlighted in section 5.1, in the Kenyan context, adult children play a crucial role in supporting 
elderly parents even after they have established their own independent households.  
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) examine the effect of multiple migrants on the level of 
remittances anticipating the presence of other remitting migrants to reduce the average size of 
remittances if motivated by altruism. Using data from the Guyana Living Standards and 
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Measurement Survey, they estimate the decision to remit and the amount of remittances sent by 
multiple versus sole migrants. They employ a Heckman selection model. In order to identify the 
remittance model parameters, they use a variable measuring whether a migrant had been settled in 
the host country for more than one year to shift the probability of remitting but not the amount. 
They find that the presence of other migrants decreases remittance levels per migrant, thus 
supporting altruistic motives. In addition, the authors use the unemployment rate in the destination 
as a risk variable assuming it to have a positive effect if remittances are motivated by co-insurance 
and an indeterminate effect if through altruism. They find weak explanatory power for the 
insurance model and a statistically insignificant effect for the unemployment variable. The study 
undertaken by Agarwal and Horowitz (op. cit.) is similar in spirit to the current study and employs 
broadly comparable empirical methods, though the contexts are somewhat different. However, 
unlike in the current study, their data do not contain information on the amount of remittances 
sent by each migrant and so the total remittances received by a household are averaged across the 
number of remitting migrants to approximate per-migrant remittances. This could provide 
misleading outcomes in the case where migrants within the same household remit differing 
amounts. The research in this chapter also differs from that contained in the study by Agarwal and 
Horowitz in its focus on siblings. 
Using U.S. data from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS) collected in 1969, 
1971, 1973, and 1975, Bernheim et al. (1985) examine whether bequests are used to influence the 
behaviour of potential beneficiaries. Their data consist of elderly parents with two or more living 
children. The dependent variable is a measure of the contact between parents and a child (referred 
to as the supply of attention per child).5 The main explanatory variable of interest is the value of 
bequeathable wealth per child. The definition of bequethable wealth includes financial investments, 
physical property, and other equity. OLS estimates of the model yield an insignificant effect for 
bequeathable wealth holdings on the supply of attention per child. To solve for the potential 
endogeneity of this wealth measure, the lifetime earnings of parents are used as instrumental 
                                                          
5 The supply of attention per child is constructed as a function of the number of children who visit or telephone their 
parents weekly and the number of children who visit or telephone their parents monthly. This is weighted by the total 
number of children and is normalized such that the maximum contact equals unity. 
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variables. The justification is that lifetime earnings are positively correlated with bequeathable 
wealth but unlikely to have a strong correlation with the amount of attention given by children. 
Using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, the authors find that such wealth is strongly 
correlated with the attention provided to parents by their children. The coefficient on bequeathable 
wealth in the 2SLS model is found to be about eight times as large as that of the OLS estimate. The 
difference in the magnitude of the OLS and 2SLS coefficients is quite large and raises questions 
about the validity of the instruments used. Although the study provides a theoretical justification 
for the instruments, it does not report any tests to determine their validity (i.e., relevance and 
orthogonality).  
Hoddinott (1992) uses a survey conducted in Karateng (western Kenya) to investigate the 
nature and level of assistance that children provide their elderly parents. The study examines 
whether parents can influence the level of assistance their offspring provide by adapting the non-
cooperative bargaining model of intergenerational transfers developed by Bernheim et al. (1985). 
The study excludes daughters of the head from the sample because land in Karateng is passed on 
from father to son, so the disinheritance threat does not apply to daughters. Thus, the dependent 
variables are restricted to the assistance provided by sons, their wives, and their children. Time and 
money transfers are jointly estimated using a 2SLS estimation procedure. This study provided 
support for the hypothesis that parents can use inheritable assets to influence the level of assistance 
that they receive from their sons. In addition, the number of sons was found to have a significant 
effect on monetary transfers. However, due to a small sample size (74 households) the results 
obtained cannot be generalized in any meaningful way. Using the same data as above, Hoddinott 
(1994) finds evidence that the level of remittances is influenced by parental ability to reward good 
behaviour through the promise of bequests. Hoddinott assumes that there is a benchmark, minimal 
amount of money that each migrant is expected to remit and that parents can encourage transfers 
above this level by offering a “reward” in the form of land or any other inheritable asset. 
For the Dominican Sierra, De la Brière et al. (2002) test whether remittances to parents are 
motivated by an insurance contract between parents and their migrant children, or an investment in 
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potential bequests. The data used consist of 400 farm households surveyed by the authors in 1994. 
The analysis restricts attention to migrant children of the household head as they are the main 
source of remittances. The main explanatory variables used in this model are a variable measuring 
shock to the income of a parent (proxied by the number of days of work in the year lost due to 
illness) expected to have a positive effect on the amount of remittances, the level of risk-aversion of 
a parent (proxied by the household income level) assumed to have a negative effect, and a migrant’s 
risk aversion (proxied by the income level) expected to have a positive effect. The inheritance 
model is specified as the decision to remit by a migrant as a contribution to investment in 
household assets that are later to be inherited. The overall finding of the analysis is that both 
insurance and inheritance motives induce remittances, but the latter more strongly than the former.  
Table 5.1: Summary of studies with multiple migrant variables  
Paper Data source & time 
period 
Data type Main 
estimation 
methods 
Identification 
variables 
Multiple migrant variables & 
effects 
Hoddinott 
(1994) 
1982 survey of 
smallholders in Central 
Province, Kenya  
Cross-sectional Heckman 
selection model 
District dummy 
variables and a 
dummy variable 
equalling one if the 
migrant has been 
absent for 
more than one year  
Presence of other male sibling 
migrants (+ve effect on amount 
of remittances but with a caveat 
as difference in means 
insignificant) 
Funkhouser 
(1995) 
1987 El Salvador 
household survey 
1989 Nicaraguan Institute 
of Statistics & Censuses 
Cross-sectional Tobit model 
Two-stage self-
selection model 
Not Applicable Number of migrants: -0.033 
(probability of remitting for El 
Salvador), -ve effect on amount; 
insignificant for both the 
probability & the amount for 
Nicaragua 
Gubert 
(2002) 
1997 survey of 8 villages in 
Kayes, western Mali 
Cross-sectional Powell’s 
censored least 
absolute 
deviation 
Not Applicable Number of migrants: -ve effect 
on probability and amount; +ve 
effect on amount at household 
level  
Agarwal 
and 
Horowitz 
(2002) 
1992/3 Guyana household 
and income survey  
1992/3 Guyana World 
Bank living standard 
measurement survey 
Cross-sectional Heckman 
selection model 
Whether a migrant 
had been settled in 
the host country for 
more than a year 
Number of migrants: -0.11 
(probability of remitting), -0.26 
(log of remittances) 
Unemployment (risk variable): 
insignificant 
Piotrowski 
(2008) 
Rural household survey in 
Nang Rong, Thailand 
Cross-sectional                      Multinomial 
probit model 
Not Applicable Not Applicable 
Antman 
(2012) 
2001 and 2003 Mexican 
Health and Aging Study 
(MHAS)  
Cross-sectional                      IV regression; 
IV tobit 
Characteristics of 
other migrants 
Amount remitted by other 
siblings (+ve effect on 
remittances) 
Other siblings’ time 
contributions to the household  
(-ve effect on time contribution) 
Naufal 
(2008) 
2001 Nicaraguan Encuesta 
Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medición de Niveles de 
Vida (EMNV) 
Cross-sectional Heteroskedastic 
tobit model 
Not Applicable +ve correlation of remittance 
decisions across multiple siblings 
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Table 5.1 provides a summary of the main studies reviewed here relevant to our empirical 
analysis. These studies offer a basis of comparison for the empirical estimates subsequently 
reported in section 5.5.  
5.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
In this section, we discuss the main explanatory variables for the empirical analysis and present 
summary statistics for these variables. The dataset used was discussed in detail in chapter 3. Due to 
the emphasis on multiple sibling migration we conduct the analysis on sibling migrants belonging to 
households with more than one child of the household head. We also restrict the sample to 
migrants who are more than 15 years old. This is because from this age onwards, we expect most 
migrants to be in a position to send remittances home independently, if they wish. The final sample 
of usable observations consists of 1,092 sibling migrants who are children of the household head in 
the 647 households in the sample containing at least two siblings. Table 5.2 presents a breakdown 
of multiple sibling migrant households by number of sibling migrants and indicates that the 
majority of households in the sample have two sibling migrants. 
Table 5.2: No. of sibling migrants in households with multiple sibling migrants 
No. of sibling migrants No. of households 
2 207 
3 76 
> 3 80 
Total 363 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates from World Bank Africa Migration Project dataset. 
Two dependent variables are used in the preliminary analysis - a dummy dependent variable 
measuring whether or not a migrant remitted to the household of origin and the total amount of 
remittances sent. Remittances refer to the value of both cash and in-kind remittances sent to the 
household in the 12 months prior to November/December 2009, valued in Kenyan shillings. The 
following goods are reported as in-kind remittances in the survey: washing machine, furniture, 
stove/cooker, microwave, air conditioner, computers and accessories, DVCD/DVD/video, 
motorbike, cars, buses, trucks, posh mill, hair dressing equipment, sewing machine, tractor, 
agricultural equipment, mobile phone, other goods. In the dataset, the conditional mean value of 
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non-zero remittances is 100,925 shillings while the median is 16,000 shillings. This wide deviation 
between the mean and median is due to the presence of four very large values. The largest of these 
four is respectively 188 and 1,225 times larger than the mean and median. The presence of 
extremely large and small remittance values is common in household datasets (De la Briere 2002). 
However, these four values appear to be overly extreme.6 Eliminating the four values from our 
analysis results in a conditional mean of 59,576 shillings and a median of 15,500 shillings. In our 
econometric analysis, we thus exclude these four outliers. 
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis are motivated by the literature on 
migrant remittances discussed earlier, but are also constrained by the nature of the information 
available in our dataset. The education level of the sibling is classified into university, secondary, or 
primary education or less. A shortcoming of the data is that we do not have information on current 
education. Hence, we only know what education the migrant had at the time of migration but not if 
and how much education they acquired after migrating. The age of the sibling is captured using 
dummy variables grouped into ten year age intervals. The employment status of the migrant is 
defined using the following dummy variables: employed, student, self-employed, unemployed. The 
living situation of the migrant is captured by including dummy variables defined as follows: lives 
alone, lives with spouse and/or children and lives with other. The “other” category refers to 
relations such as cousins, brother, sister, or even friends. Dummy variables measuring how long the 
migrant has been in the destination are also included. These are defined for one to three years, four 
to five years, and six or more years. The other migrant-specific explanatory variables include the 
gender, marital status, and location (i.e., internal or external) of the sibling. In addition, a variable 
measuring the receipt of any monetary transfers from the household of origin in the previous 12 
months is also included in the analysis.  
Variables that are specific to the household of origin include the gender of the household head 
and four mutually exclusive dummy variables for the age of the household head. These are defined 
                                                          
6 The details of the extreme values are as follows: (i) Male sibling aged 35 years in Congo remitted 19 million shillings 
(about USD 220,000), (ii) Female sibling aged 32 located in the US remitted 3,030,000 shillings (about USD 35,000), (iii) 
Male sibling aged 40 located in Dubai remitted 2,010,000 shillings (about USD 23,000), and (iv) Female sibling aged 28 
located in Denmark remitted 6,000,000 shillings (about USD 70,000). 
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for less than 44, 45 to 54, and greater than 55. The education level of the household head is defined 
for the categories of university, secondary, or primary or less. A set of employment status dummy 
variables for the household head are defined for employed, self-employed, unemployed and retired. 
The following household demographic variables are constructed: the proportion of elderly people 
(defined as members who are more than 59 years old), the proportion of children (defined as 
members who are less than seven years old), and the total number of members currently living in 
the household. A dummy variable for whether or not the household owns land and/or a house is 
also constructed. In addition, a variable measuring whether or not a non-sibling migrant is present 
in the household is also included in the analysis.  
Lastly, a set of regional dummy variables are also constructed and these are for the regions of 
Nairobi, Central, Eastern, North-eastern, Coast, Rift valley, Nyanza and Western. Geographical 
differences can account for some of the variation in the probability of receiving remittances and the 
amount received. For example, as discussed in chapter 2, Nairobi, Coast and the Rift Valley tend to 
be provinces of net inward migration with the others being provinces of net outward migration. 
Thus we expect the latter provinces to be more likely to receive internal remittances. However, 
since the former provinces are wealthier, we expect them to have higher incidents of external 
migration and thus to be more likely to receive remittances from abroad.  
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the predicted signs of the effects of some of the key variables 
introduced above under the different motives for remittances found in the existing literature. 
Table 5.3: Predicted signs for the effects of key variables  
Effect on level of remittances Pure 
altruism 
Pure self-
interest 
Co-
insurance 
Loan 
repayment 
Exchange 
motives 
Presence of other sibling migrants - + zero ? ? 
Migrant education level ? ? ? + + 
Migrant income + + ? + + 
Length of migration - ? ? +, later - ? 
Migrant receipt of transfers from the household ? ? - ? ? 
Location of migrant (external = 1) + ? ? ? ? 
Household of origin head age + + ? ? ? 
Household of origin income  - + - +/- +/- 
Proportion of elderly people in origin household - - ? ? ? 
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Table 5.4 provides summary statistics for the variables discussed in this section. The first 
column reports combined summary statistics, the second and third columns report summary 
statistics for sole and multiple sibling migrants respectively, and the fourth column reports the t-
test/z-scores for tests for mean/proportion differences between sole and multiple sibling migrants. 
The table reveals that the average amount of cash and/or in-kind remittances sent is about 30,000 
shillings (approximately USD 340). There is no statistically significant difference in the mean value 
of remittances sent by sole versus multiple sibling migrants. 
The table also reveals that 50% of migrants sent cash and/or in-kind remittances to the 
household in the 12 months prior to November/December 2009. The majority of remittances were 
sent in the form of cash, compared to in-kind remittances. Hoddinott (1992) reports that 68% of 
migrants sent remittances in the previous 12 months. This is higher than the proportion of 
migrants sending remittances in our sample and may have arisen from differences in the sample 
surveyed. The sample in Hoddinott (op. cit.) consists of spouses, sons and daughters of rural 
households in the Central province of Kenya who are living in the urban areas of Kenya. When we 
restrict our sample to migrants whose households of origin are located in the Central province, we 
find that 49% of siblings remitted. However, in order to have a more comparable sample to that of 
Hoddinott (op. cit.) we also incorporate both sibling and non-sibling migrants into the subset of 
migrants from the Central province. We find that 68% of migrants in this sub-sample remitted. 
This is equivalent to the proportion obtained in the Hoddinott study. 
The table also shows that 76% of siblings are multiple sibling migrants. Sole sibling migrants 
are shown to be more likely to remit than multiple sibling migrants. Sole sibling migrants are more 
likely to be younger and male. The proportion of sole migrants who are students and/or 
unemployed is also higher than that of multiple migrants. On the other hand, multiple sibling 
migrants are more likely to be employed and be married, compared to sole migrants. Multiple 
migrants are also more likely to reside with a spouse and/or children, while sole migrants are more 
likely to live alone.  
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Table 5.4: Summary statistics for sole and multiple sibling migrants 
 Variables All Sole migrants        
(0) 
Multiple 
migrants (1) 
t-test/z-
scoreϮ 
Dependent variables:     
Value of cash & in-kind rems (Ksh) 29751 (93906) 35876 (101257) 27866 (91507) 1.2 
Value of cash only rems (Ksh) 26798 (90024) 32477 (98213) 25050 (87338) 1.16 
Value of in-kind only rems (Ksh) 2953 ( 20595) 3399 (15101) 2816 (22017) 0.4 
= 1 if remitted cash & in-kind; = 0 otherwise 0.5 (0.5) 0.54 (0.5) 0.48 (0.5) 1.78* 
= 1 if remitted cash only; = 0 otherwise 0.34 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) -0.02 
= 1 if remitted in-kind only; = 0 otherwise 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.19 
Individual characteristic variables:     
= 1 if multiple sibling migrant 0.76 (0.42)    
Age dummy variables:     
= 1 if aged 15 to 25; = 0 otherwise 0.3 (0.46) 0.37 (0.48) 0.27 (0.45) 3.05*** 
= 1 if aged 26 to 35; = 0 otherwise 0.45 (0.5) 0.42 (0.49) 0.46 (0.5) -1.13 
= 1 if aged 26 to 45; = 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.38) 0.12 (0.33) 0.19 (0.39) -2.32** 
= 1 if aged 46+; = 0 otherwise 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.28) 0.08 (0.28) 0.15 
χ2 test for age dummies    11.66*** 
= 1 if male; = 0 otherwise 0.57 (0.5) 0.61 (0.49) 0.55 (0.5) 1.49* 
Education dummy variables:     
= 1 if university education; = 0 otherwise 0.18 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.18 (0.39) -1.20 
= 1 if secondary education; = 0 otherwise 0.63 (0.48) 0.61 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48) -0.61 
= 1 if primary education; = 0 otherwise 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.18 (0.38) 1.92** 
χ2 test for education dummies    4.27 
Employment status dummy variables:       
= 1 if employed; = 0 otherwise 0.6 (0.49) 0.54 (0.5) 0.62 (0.49) -2.24** 
= 1 if self-employed; = 0 otherwise 0.1 (0.3) 0.09 (0.28) 0.1 (0.3) -0.76 
= 1 if unemployed/student; = 0 otherwise 0.30 (0.46) 0.37 (0.48) 0.28 (0.45) 2.90*** 
χ2 test for employment dummies    15.73*** 
= 1 if married; = 0 otherwise 0.46 (0.5) 0.39 (0.49) 0.48 (0.5) -2.50** 
Living situation dummy variables:     
= 1 if lives with spouse and/or children; = 0 
otherwise 
0.39 (0.49) 0.3 (0.46) 0.42 (0.49) -3.35*** 
= 1 if lives with relatives and/or friends; = 0 
otherwise 
0.2 (0.4) 0.17 (0.37) 0.21 (0.41) -1.44* 
= 1 if lives alone; = 0 otherwise 0.41 (0.49) 0.53 (0.5) 0.38 (0.48) 4.51*** 
χ2 test for living situation dummies    20.21*** 
Migration length spline 1 3.63 (1.54) 3.13 (1.58) 3.78 (1.5) -6.02*** 
Migration length spline 2 2.76 (5.88) 1.25 (3.35) 3.22 (6.39) -4.74*** 
= 1 Receives transfers from hh of origin; = 0 
otherwise 
0.17 (038) 0.28 (0.45) 0.14 (0.34) 5.42*** 
= 1 if located in external destination; = 0 
otherwise 
0.39 (0.49) 0.49 (0.5) 0.35 (0.48) 4.08*** 
Household characteristic variables:     
Household age:     
= 1 if head aged 25 to 44; = 0 otherwise 0.08 (0.27) 0.15 (0.36) 0.06 (0.23) 5.02*** 
= 1 if head aged 45 to 54; = 0 otherwise 0.25 (0.44) 0.36 (0.48) 0.22 (0.41) 4.60*** 
= 1 if head aged 55 to 65; = 0 otherwise 0.29 (0.46) 0.25 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46) -1.62* 
= 1 if head aged 66 or more; = 0 otherwise 0.37 (0.48) 0.23 (0.42) 0.42 (0.49) -5.41*** 
χ2 test for head age dummies    57.96*** 
Head education dummy variables:     
= 1 if head has university education; = 0 
otherwise 
0.1 (0.29) 0.1 (0.3) 0.09 (0.29) 0.127 
= 1 if head has secondary education; = 0 
otherwise 
0.39 (0.49) 0.34 (0.47) 0.4 (0.49) -1.87** 
= 1 if head has primary education; = 0 
otherwise 
0.52 (0.5) 0.56 (0.5) 0.5 (0.5) 1.75** 
χ2  test for education dummies    3.64 
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Head employment dummy variables:     
= 1 if head is employed; = 0 otherwise 0.18 (0.38) 0.28 (0.45) 0.15 (0.36) 4.99*** 
= 1 if head is self-employed; = 0 otherwise 0.38 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.37 (0.48) 1.2 
= 1 if head is unemployed; = 0 otherwise 0.15 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35) -0.08 
= 1 if head is retired; = 0 otherwise 0.29 (0.45) 0.16 (0.36) 0.33 (0.47) -5.48*** 
χ2  test for employment dummies    41.67*** 
Proportion of elderly people  0.21 (0.27) 0.09 (0.14) 0.25 (0.29) -8.35*** 
=1 if hh owns land/house; = 0 otherwise 0.88 (0.32) 0.86 (0.34) 0.89 (0.31) -1.19 
= 1 if head is male; = 0 otherwise 0.69 (0.46) 0.65 (0.48) 0.7 (0.46) -1.61* 
Proportion of children  0.06 (0.12) 0.08 (0.13) 0.06 (0.11) 2.15** 
Household size  4.48 (2.24) 5.22 (2.11) 4.25 (2.23) 6.18*** 
= 1 if non-sibling migrant present; = 0 
otherwise 
0.13 (0.33) 0.08 (0.27) 0.14 (0.35) -2.47** 
= 1 if household in urban location; = 0 
otherwise 
0.42 (0.49) 0.47 (0.5) 0.4 (0.49) 1.80** 
     
N 1092 257 835  
 
Notes to the table: 
(i) The remittance values reported are based on the non-censored observations therefore average over 542, 140, 
and 402 observations for the combined, sole, and multiple sibling migrant samples, respectively. 
(ii) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test here is: H0: μ0 = μ1/H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
(iv) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between sole and multiple migrants for categorical variables. 
 
The summary statistics also reveal that more sole migrants received transfers from the 
household of origin compared to multiple migrants, and that more sole migrants are located in an 
external destination. In regard to the household characteristics, we see that sole migrants have 
younger household of origin heads than multiple migrants. Multiple migrant household heads are 
less likely to be employed, more likely to be retired and more likely to be male compared to sole 
migrant heads. The proportion of elderly people is higher in multiple sibling migrant households, 
while the proportion of children is lower. The household size is larger for sole migrants. Multiple 
sibling migrants are more likely to have non-sibling migrants. Finally, we see that the households of 
sole sibling migrants are more likely to be located in urban than in rural areas compared to those of 
multiple sibling migrants. 
Table 5.5 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis focusing on multiple 
sibling migrants only. The first column reports statistics for the pooled sample of multiple sibling 
migrants. The second and third columns report statistics for remitters and non-remitters, 
respectively, and the fourth contains t-tests/z-scores for the difference in means/proportions 
between non-remitters and remitters.   
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Table 5.5: Summary statistics for multiple sibling migrants 
Variables All Remitters  
(1) 
 Non-remitters 
(0) 
 t-test/z-
scoreϮ 
Dependent variable: 
    
Value of cash & in-kind rems (Ksh) 35950 (165265) 72522 (229167) 
  
Individual characteristic variables: 
    
Value of cash & in-kind rems by others (Ksh) 67493 (216422) 85665 (250065) 49630 (175782) -2.209** 
= 1 if male; = 0 otherwise 0.55 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.5 (0.5) -2.383*** 
Age 30.57 (8.40) 32.03 (7.63) 29.13 (8.87) -4.639*** 
Birth rank 2.10 (1.20) 2.27 (1.24) 1.92 (1.13) -3.90*** 
= 1 if married; = 0 otherwise 0.50 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) -4.756** 
Education dummy variables: 
    
= 1 if secondary education; = 0 otherwise 0.65 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 0.67 (0.47) 1.037 
= 1 if university education; = 0 otherwise 0.18 (0.38) 0.23 (0.42) 0.13 (0.34) -3.385*** 
= 1 if primary education; = 0 otherwise 0.17 (0.38) 0.14 (0.35) 0.20 (0.40) 2.09** 
χ2 test for education dummies    13.27*** 
Living situation dummy variables: 
    
= 1 if lives alone; = 0 otherwise 0.39 (0.49) 0.43 (0.5) 0.35 (0.48) -2.358*** 
= 1 if lives with spouse and/or children; = 0 
otherwise 0.41 (0.49) 0.46 (0.5) 0.35 (0.48) -2.816*** 
= 1 if lives with other relations; = 0 otherwise 0.21 (0.40) 0.11 (0.31) 0.30 (0.46) 6.42*** 
χ2 test for living situation dummies    39.02*** 
Length of migration (years) 6.75 (6.81) 6.94 (5.98) 6.57 (7.55) -0.713 
= 1 if located in external destination; = 0 
otherwise 0.37 (0.48) 0.4 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48) -1.504* 
Household characteristic variables: 
    
Head education dummy variables: 
    = 1 if head has secondary education; = 0 
otherwise 0.43 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.44 (0.5) 0.5685 
= 1 if head has  university education; = 0 
otherwise 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.12 (0.32) 1.416*** 
= 1 if head has  primary education; = 0 
otherwise 0.47 (0.50) 0.50(0.50) 0.44 (0.50) -1.43* 
χ2 test for head education dummies    3.06 
Number of children in household 0.37 (0.78) 0.36 (0.76) 0.38 (0.8) 0.232 
Number of elderly people in household 0.81 (0.75) 0.9 (0.72) 0.71 (0.77) -3.372*** 
Household size 4.28 (2.23) 4.49 (2.1) 4.07 (2.33) -2.477*** 
= 1 if non-sibling migrant present; = 0 
otherwise 0.14 (0.35) 0.09 (0.29) 0.19 (0.39) 3.830*** 
= 1 if household owns land and/or house; = 0 
otherwise 0.90 (0.29) 0.92 (0.27) 0.89 (0.32) -1.597* 
N 700 347 353 
           
Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test here is: H0: μ0 = μ1/ H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants. *, **, *** represent the statistical 
significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
(iii) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between non-remitters and remitters for categorical variables. 
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The sample size is smaller due to the restriction to multiple migrants and has only 700 siblings. 
Moreover, not all the variables featured in the preliminary analysis are included in this analysis. We 
only employ those variables found to have a significant effect on either the probability of remitting 
or the amount of remittances sent by multiple migrants. We also conflate some of the variables that 
are otherwise disaggregated in the initial analysis (e.g., age variables). This is done to avoid over-
parameterizing the econometric models given the small sample size. 
The table reveals that the average amount of remittances sent by multiple sibling migrants is 
about 36,000 shillings (approximately USD 400). Males are more likely to remit and remitters also 
tend to be older than non-remitters. Having a university education, living alone, living with a 
spouse and/or children, and being located in an external destination all increase the chances of 
remitting. Remittances are more likely to be sent if the household has a higher number of elderly 
people and if the household size is bigger. Siblings are more likely to remit if the household owns 
land and/or a house and less likely if there are non-sibling migrants belonging to the same 
household of origin. We also introduce a variable capturing the birth rank of the sibling here as a 
measure of bargaining power. Higher values represent older siblings. We see that older siblings are 
more likely to remit. 
5.4 Empirical methodology 
 
Three econometric methodologies are dominant in the literature when it comes to modelling 
the determinants of the amount of migrant remittances: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Heckman 
two-step procedures, and censored tobit models. Studies that have used OLS include Johnson and 
Whitelaw (1974) and Knowles and Anker (1981). A shortcoming associated with the OLS model is 
that it does not account for zero remittance observations, which truncate the equation error term, 
leading to biased and inconsistent estimates if the scale of censorship is sizeable. The popular tobit 
models address this censorship by assuming that there is only one remittance decision in which the 
decisions of whether and how much to remit occur simultaneously (Tobin 1958). 
Remittance studies that have used the tobit model include Brown (1997) and Markova and 
Reilly (2007). However, the imposition of a sign constraint on the probability and levels effect is a 
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strong empirical assumption. In order to determine the suitability of the censored tobit model for 
our empirical analysis, we conducted a well-known specification test. This revealed a decisive 
rejection of the censored tobit model.7 The tobit model is therefore deemed unsuitable for the 
current application as the inherent misspecification yields inconsistent estimates (see Wooldridge 
2010 p. 685).  
The Heckman two-step procedure addresses this shortcoming by treating the transfer of 
remittances as a sequential ‘two-step’ decision and allowing the effect of a given variable on the 
decision to remit to be different from its effect on the level of remittances (Heckman 1979). 
Hoddinott (1994), Brown and Connell (2006) and Liu and Reilly (2004) provide examples of 
remittance studies that have used the Heckman procedure, which is also interpreted as a generalized 
tobit model. The identification of the selection effect is one of the key challenges in using the 
Heckman procedure. This is only achieved if there is (at least) one variable in the selection equation 
that is not included in the remittance equation. The identifying variables we use in the current 
analysis are discussed in section 5.5 below but we now briefly outline the structure of the Heckman 
procedure for the current application. The selection mechanism that governs the decision to remit 
can be defined in terms of a latent variable as follows: 
  
      
            (5.4) 
where           .    is a vector of characteristics that determines whether the  th sibling  
remits or not (see Table 5.4) and           
  . If   
     then the event of remitting occurs and 
if   
     it does not. The regression model is only observed if   
   . The remittance regression 
equation may then be expressed as: 
         
             (5.5) 
                                                          
7 The likelihood ratio test, based on Lin and Schmidt (1984) yields a test statistic of 372 for this application. 
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where           
   and    is a vector of characteristics for individual   that determines how 
much they remit and represents the set of explanatory variables. This model is only observed for 
          siblings in our case. 
The error terms of equations (5.4) and (5.5) follow a bivariate normal distribution as follows: 
                
    
       
where     represents the covariance between the two unobservable error terms. The correlation 
coefficient between the errors in the two equations is expressed as    
   
     
. 
The Heckman two-step procedure is implemented as follows. In the first step, the reduced 
form selection equation (i.e., the decision to remit or not) is estimated using a probit model and 
maximum likelihood estimates for the   vector are obtained. This reduced form should contain all 
relevant exogenous variables and should also contain identifying variables which are not included in 
the   vector determining the remittance amount equation. The estimates from the reduced form 
equation are used to construct empirical measures for the inverse-Mills ratio (  ) defined as follows: 
       
    
    
    
    
    (5.6) 
The inverse-Mills ratio represents the pseudo-residuals from the probit model for the case 
where the event actually occurs. The two terms       and       denote the cumulative distribution 
function and probability density function operators respectively.  
 In the second step of the procedure, the following equation is estimated by OLS: 
          
              (5.7) 
where   is the selection coefficient,         and          . OLS yields estimates for the 
elements in the   vector and the selection parameter   which are consistent and asymptotically 
normal. The expected value of the equation for the second stage of the Heckman two-step 
procedure is thus represented as follows: 
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           (5.8) 
The Heckman procedure provides a test for sample selectivity (or non-random) bias. If    , 
then there is no correlation between the unobservables in the selection and the remittance 
equations and    . Thus, the test for the statistical significance of   is a formal test for sample 
selection. Equation (5.5) can be estimated by OLS and yields consistent estimates if there is no 
sample selectivity bias. 
Finally, in order to determine whether to use a logged or non-logged dependent variable in 
expression (5.5) or (5.7) above, we compare the R-squared values for both models using a heuristic 
approach suggested by Ramanathan (1998). The procedure entails estimating the log-linear model 
and obtaining its fitted values. The antilogs of the fitted values are computed. The square of the 
correlation coefficient between the antilogs of the fitted values and the actual variable is then 
computed. This is then compared to the unadjusted R-squared from the linear regression model 
with the non-logged dependent variable. The model with the larger unadjusted R-squared is the 
preferred model. In our empirical analysis, the data favour the non-logged model and thus we use 
an unlogged dependent variable. This then allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the 
estimates and a cleaner insight as to the magnitude of the estimated effects obtained.  
5.5 Empirical results  
 
We first estimate the Heckman selection model for the sample of sole and multiple sibling 
migrants. The identification restrictions in the Heckman model are provided by the following 
variables: (i) the current size of the household of origin, (ii) a dummy variable capturing whether 
there is a non-sibling migrant from the same household of origin,8 (iii) a dummy variable for 
whether the household of origin is located in an urban or a rural area,9 and (iv) a dummy variable 
for the gender of the household of origin head.10 All these variables exert an insignificant effect on 
the level of remittances (p-value = 0.333) but are jointly significant in determining the probability of 
                                                          
8 In the sample, 12% of siblings belong to a household of origin with a non-sibling migrant. 
9 About 57% of households are based in rural areas. 
10 In the sample, 70% of siblings belong to a household of origin headed by a male. 
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remitting (p-value = 0.001) thus statistically justifying their use as identifying variables. The 
rationale for using these variables as identifiers in the current application is briefly discussed. 
Firstly, it could be argued that households headed by women are more likely to receive 
remittances compared to those headed by men (Carling 2008). This is because migrants tend to be 
more altruistic towards female heads. The act of remitting could be influenced by social pressure if 
children who send remittances to their mothers are perceived as more caring towards them. 
However, the amount of remittances sent is more private and thus likely to be dictated by the need 
of the recipient and not their gender per se. The presence of non-sibling migrants in the household 
potentially decreases the probability of remitting as the remitting responsibility is distributed across 
more individuals. However, the amount of remittances sent is more likely to be determined by how 
much the migrant is capable of remitting and the needs of the receiving household, not the 
presence of non-sibling migrants per se. An increase in the size of the household is likely to increase 
the demand for remittances as migrants may feel obliged to remit to larger households. However, it 
does not necessarily affect how much is actually remitted as an increase in household size may not 
directly translate to an increase in the amount of remittances needed.11 In addition, the capacity of 
the migrant to remit should affect the level of remittances sent and not the size of the receiving 
household in itself. Households located in urban areas generally have higher income levels, can 
diversify their income sources more easily compared to rural households, and so are less likely to 
demand or require remittances. However, the amount of remittances a migrant sends, if they decide 
to remit, should not be affected by urban/rural location itself. Overall, and given their statistical 
relevance, it does not appear implausible to treat these four identifying variables as exogenous with 
respect to the decision of how much to remit and as independent of the level of remittances. 
In the Heckman two-step model, the inverse Mills ratio is found to be statistically insignificant. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of no selectivity bias is upheld by the data in this application. This 
suggests that the selectivity in sibling decisions to remit and the amount of remittances to send has 
been captured entirely through the inclusion of the observable covariates. Because there is no 
                                                          
11 For example, if additional household members contribute towards household income, their presence may not affect the 
level of remittances demanded by the household. 
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sample selection problem in terms of unobservables, the remittance levels model can be estimated 
by uncorrected OLS using the sample of positive remitters (see Wooldridge 2010 pp. 805-6). We 
thus employ OLS for the level of remittances and a probit model for the probability of remitting as 
the preferred models. The results from the Heckman two-step selection model are provided in the 
Appendix (see Table A5.1) for completeness.   
5.5.1 OLS and probit model estimates 
 
The first column of Table 5.6 reports marginal/impact effects for the probability of remitting 
using a probit model based on the full sample of remitting and non-remitting siblings. The 
dependent variable is equal to 1 if a migrant remitted and 0 otherwise. The second column presents 
estimates for the remittance volume model based on OLS using the sample of non-zero remitters 
given the absence of selection effects. Here, the dependent variable is the total amount of cash and 
in-kind remittances sent to the household measured in Kenyan shillings. In the OLS and probit 
model, robust standard errors clustered by household are reported in order to take into account the 
clustering effect of the presence of siblings from the same households.  
The empirical estimates show that multiple sibling migrants are 10 percentage points less likely 
to remit, on average and ceteris paribus, relative to sole sibling migrants. This corresponds to a 20% 
decrease in the probability of remitting relative to the mean. To check if the negative effect holds 
for the different types of remittances sent, we estimate a multinomial logit model for the following 
categories of remittances: no remittances, cash only, in-kind only, and both cash and in-kind 
remittances. We also find a statistically significant negative effect of being a multiple sibling migrant 
on the probability of remitting for the cash and in-kind remittance category, and an insignificant 
effect for the cash only and in-kind only categories (see Table A5.2 in the Appendix). This seems to 
indicate that migrants respond to the joint remittances sent to the household and not to the 
individual remittance components. 
Table 5.6 also reveals that, conditional on a sibling remitting, the amount of remittances sent by 
a multiple sibling migrant is not statistically different from that sent by a sole sibling migrant. This 
finding is invariant to whether the model is estimated using different definitions for the remittance 
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metric. For instance, we also estimate the OLS model under three specifications with the following 
dependent variables: (i) the value of cash remittances sent, (ii) the value of in-kind remittances sent, 
and (iii) the value of both cash and in-kind remittances sent. In all three specifications we obtain an 
insignificant effect for the multiple sibling migrant dummy variable (see Table A5.3 in the 
Appendix).  
Table 5.6: Probit model (marginal/impact effects) and OLS regression (coefficients) 
VARIABLES Probit model 
marginal/impact 
effects (remit = 1) 
OLS model 
coefficients  
(remit value) 
Individual characteristic variables:   
= 1 if multiple sibling migrant -0.0974*** -8,746 
 (0.0334) (13,517) 
=  1 if aged 26 to 35 0.0349 16,902 
 (0.0364) (10,660) 
= 1 if aged 26 to 45 0.0331 22,327 
 (0.0489) (14,980) 
= 1 if aged 46+ 0.0183 -12,886 
 (0.0565) (19,210) 
= 1 if male -0.0388 -5,081 
 (0.0262) (10,590) 
= 1 if university education 0.0455 31,006 
 (0.0489) (19,749) 
= 1 if secondary education 0.000893 4,399 
 (0.0350) (11,545) 
= 1 if employed 0.429*** 49,818*** 
 (0.0302) (12,581) 
= 1 if self-employed 0.272*** 24,578* 
 (0.0572) (14,548) 
= 1 if married 0.0766* -8,412 
 (0.0396) (12,859) 
= 1 if lives with spouse and/or children -0.0620 8,211 
 (0.0421) (11,611) 
= 1 if lives with relatives and/or friends -0.0919** 21,440 
 (0.0380) (21,714) 
= 1 if migration length: 1 to 3 years 0.0226** 9,542*** 
 (0.00988) (3,324) 
= 1 if migration length: 4 to 5 years -0.00358 730.2 
 (0.00255) (974.3) 
= 1 if receives transfers from hh of origin -0.175*** -8,985 
 (0.0436) (15,910) 
= 1 if located in external destination 0.0335 79,127*** 
 (0.0324) (13,894) 
Household characteristic variables:   
=1 if head aged 25 to 44 -0.00493 -4,427 
 (0.0683) (24,167) 
=1 if head aged 45 to 54 0.0154 7,122 
 (0.0512) (21,799) 
=1 if head aged 55 to 65 -0.00270 -6,352 
 (0.0394) (19,511) 
=1 if head has university -0.0459 42,163 
 (0.0627) (36,241) 
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=1 if head has secondary 0.0337 -9,521 
 (0.0337) (14,554) 
=1 if head is self-employed 0.00818 -25,745 
 (0.0417) (25,964) 
=1 if head is unemployed -0.105* -13,023 
 (0.0550) (34,379) 
=1 if head is retired -0.0645 -51,360 
 (0.0478) (34,311) 
Proportion of children in origin hh -0.362*** -63,378 
 (0.133) (38,694) 
Proportion of elderly people in origin hh 0.0238 40,562 
 (0.0884) (40,224) 
=1 if hh owns land/house 0.00873 3,834 
 (0.0566) (20,666) 
=1 if head is maleϮ -0.0671*  
 (0.0354)  
Size of hh of originϮ 0.0313***  
 (0.00892)  
= 1 if non-sibling migrant presentϮ -0.0900*  
 (0.0481)  
=1 if hh of origin in urban locationϮ -0.0616*  
 (0.0323)  
   
Regions Yes Yes 
N 1,092 542 
R-squared  0.234 
Pseudo R-squared 0.312  
      
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) In columns (I) and (II), robust standard errors clustered by household are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Ϯ These variables are not included in the OLS regression model to prevent over parameterizing the model. The 
variables were originally used as identification variables in the Heckman selection model and were found to 
have statistically insignificant effects on the level of remittances sent. 
(iv) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
(v) The t-ratio for the selection effect is -0.13 (p-value = 0.895).  
 
In contrast to Hoddinott (1992 and 1994), who reports inheritable assets to have a positive 
effect on the amount of remittances sent for the case of Kenya, our results appear to be 
inconsistent with self-interest competitive motives as drivers of the remittance behaviour of 
Kenyan sibling migrants. If siblings are driven by competition, the presence of other sibling 
migrants should have a positive effect on both the probability and the amount of remittances sent 
to the household of origin. This evidence against inheritance motives is also supported by the 
insignificance of the dummy variable capturing whether or not the household of origin owns land 
and/or a house (in both the OLS and probit models). To further investigate this motive, we include 
a variable interacting land and/or house ownership with the multiple sibling migrant dummy 
variable. The coefficients on the interacted term, as well as on the non-interacted variables, are all 
130 
 
 
 
statistically insignificant. As an additional test, we run the regression models separately for multiple 
sibling migrants as we expect the parental threat of disinheritance to be more credible for this 
subset of migrants. We anticipate the presence of an additional migrant will increase competition 
and parents can more credibly threaten disinheritance as inheritable assets can be passed on to 
another migrant. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variable for land and/or house 
ownership retain their statistical insignificance.  
Our findings also seem to conflict with pure altruism as the sole driver of sibling remittance 
behaviour. Under altruism, we expect the presence of other sibling migrants to have a negative 
effect on both the probability and the amount of remittances sent. Such evidence has been reported 
in the literature in the studies of Funkhouser (1995) and Gubert (2002). Further evidence against 
altruistic motives is contained in Table 5.6, which reports that if the head is unemployed, relative to 
being employed, this decreases the probability of remitting. However, it has no effect on the 
amount of remittances sent. The estimates for the remaining head employment status variables are 
all found to be statistically insignificant. These findings do not provide support for altruism since 
we expect unemployed and retired heads to be more in need of remittances. In addition, under 
altruism we expect variables that indicate a higher level of need in the household to exert a positive 
effect on the remittances of migrants. The proportion of elderly people in the household potentially 
provides an indicator of the level of household need. We find this variable to have an insignificant 
effect on the amount of remittances sent to the household thus contradicting pure altruistic 
motives. 
We conduct robustness checks to determine if the results we obtained are sensitive to the 
exclusion of students in the sample of sibling migrants. The key results remain the same using a 
sample excluding students (see Table A5.4 of the Appendix). This provides support that the 
inclusion of students has no detrimental effects on the core findings of the analysis conducted in 
this chapter.  
The insignificance of the presence of other sibling migrants on the amount of remittances sent 
to the household of origin may be suggestive of an independent self-insurance contract between 
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each sibling migrant and the household of origin (Stark and Lucas 1988). However, the negative 
effect on the probability of remitting is not compatible with siblings being motivated to remit by an 
independent self-insurance contract, as the effect should be statistically insignificant if this is the 
case. Unfortunately, the absence of variables in the dataset that offer a measure of risk constrains 
testing co-insurance motives more explicitly. In the literature, the findings of Agarwal and 
Horowitz (2002) for Guyanese migrants are at variance with the self-insurance motive. They use a 
variable measuring the unemployment rate12 at the destination as a risk variable assuming it to be 
positive if the motive is insurance and indeterminate if the motive is altruism. They obtain an 
insignificant effect on this particular risk variable. Agarwal and Horowitz (op. cit.) instead find that 
per-migrant remittances are negatively and significantly related to the number of migrants thus 
lending support to an altruistic motive. We introduced a variable for the unemployment rate in the 
destination country as a measure of risk. We obtained a statistically insignificant effect for this 
variable in the OLS model and a negative and significant effect in the probability model. Although 
this finding is in conflict with the predictions of the co-insurance motive, caution is justified here as 
the unemployment rate variable is likely to provide a very crude proxy for risk in the current case. 
Overall the foregoing evidence provides no empirical support for competition, pure altruism 
and self-insurance motives. Rather, it seems that other motives besides those that are to be found in 
the traditional remittance literature may better explain the remittance motives of Kenyan siblings. 
The findings in Table 5.6 reveal that the employment status of the sibling influences both the 
probability of remitting and the amount of remittances sent (see discussion below). Since 
employment variables are likely to be proxies of the earnings capacity of a migrant, it seems that it 
is the capacity of siblings to remit that influences their remittance behaviour. Unfortunately, we do 
not have information about the incomes of migrants and therefore are not able to test this 
proposition directly. In addition, the negative effect of the presence of other sibling migrants on the 
probability of remitting seems to reveal that there is some form of sharing of remitting 
                                                          
12 Their dataset contains information on the destination continent of the migrant. Since they do not know the destination 
country, the authors generate the risk variable by taking a weighted average of the unemployment figures of the 
commonwealth countries in that continent under the assumption that the destination of a Guyanese migrant would also 
be an English speaking country as Guyana is a commonwealth country. The weights used are the population levels of the 
countries. 
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responsibilities among multiple migrants. That is, the presence of other siblings decreases the 
remittance burden on any one sibling migrant. This may manifest itself in terms of a negative effect 
in the probability model for the variable capturing the presence of other siblings. However, if this is 
the case the nature of the sharing of remittance responsibilities is indeterminate given the 
insignificant effect of the presence of other migrants on the amount of remittances sent. In 
addition, it is not clear what sign to expect if it is the case that there are shared responsibilities. For 
example, a negative effect of the presence of other migrants on the amount of remittances sent 
could imply that multiple siblings each contribute towards meeting the remittance needs of the 
household such that each migrant assumes a smaller share of the remittances. This would be 
analogous to the altruistic model which predicts a negative sign for both the probability and the 
amount of remittances sent. On the other hand, the insignificant sign we obtain here may imply 
that a remitting multiple migrant assumes the full share of remittances sent to the household. This 
could possibly suggest a strategy where multiple sibling migrants take turns to meet the remittance 
needs of the household such that the remitting migrant bears the full share of the remittances. 
Unfortunately, given the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are unable to determine whether this 
feature is persistent across other periods. 
Migrant characteristic variables 
We do not find statistically significant effects for the age and education level of the sibling 
migrant in either the probit or the OLS models. Sibling migrants who are employed (self-employed) 
are found to be 43 (28) percentage points more likely to remit and remit about 50,000 (25,000) 
shillings more compared to sibling migrants who are either students13 or unemployed, on average 
and ceteris paribus. This corresponds to an increase of 86 (56)% in the probability of remitting, 
relative to the mean, and an increase of 83 (42)%14 in the amount of remittances sent for employed 
and self-employed siblings, respectively. This is to be expected since employed siblings are likely to 
earn more and thus assume more of the remitting responsibility. 
                                                          
13 In general the uncharacteristically high number of students represented in the survey as a whole suggests the need for 
some interpretational caution in regard to this estimate. However, in this chapter we see that the estimates we obtain are 
robust to the exclusion of students from the sample.  
14 The mean value of remittances sent for the sample of positive remitters is 59,942 shillings. 
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Married sibling migrants are eight percentage points more likely to remit than single sibling 
migrants, on average and ceteris paribus, but the effect on the amount of remittances sent is found to 
be statistically insignificant.15 Living with relatives or friends decreases the probability of remitting 
by nine percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, but has no effect on the amount of 
remittances, compared to living alone. As per the co-insurance theory, siblings living with relatives 
or friends are likely to draw on their social capital to eliminate uncertainty and secure stability in the 
destination. In such circumstances, they are less likely to rely on insurance from the household of 
origin. However, this explanation is somewhat weakened by the finding of an insignificant effect 
for this variable in the remittance level model, as well as the insignificance registered in both the 
probability and remittance level model for the variable living with a spouse and/or children in the 
destination.  
The estimated effects for the migration duration splines appear to offer support for the 
remittance decay hypothesis, albeit weakly. Although the estimated coefficients are not as well 
determined as we would like, the positive and significant effect in the spline for 1 to 3 years on the 
probability of remitting and the amount of remittances sent and the insignificant effect in the spline 
for 4 to 5 years broadly suggest an increase in the amount remitted in earlier years and a decrease in 
subsequent ones. Most studies in the literature find support for the remittance decay hypothesis 
(e.g., Niimi et al. 2009, Liu and Reilly 2004). 
Sibling migrants who receive transfers from the household of origin are less likely to remit but 
the receipt of such transfers has no effect on the amount of remittances sent. The data reveal that 
most remittance transfers to migrants are going to students. Nearly 50% of students in the sample 
receive transfers from the household, while only 9% of migrants who are not students receive such 
transfers. There is no statistically significant effect of external location on the probability of 
remitting. However, siblings located in external destinations remit about 79,000 shillings more than 
                                                          
15 We investigate the suggestion by Markova and Reilly (2007) that the presence of immediate family members at the 
destination implies potentially weaker ties to the household of origin thus affecting remittances negatively. We test this by 
interacting the married dummy variable with living with the spouse and/or children dummy variable. We find that 
married siblings who live with their spouse and/or children are less likely to remit, but the effect on the amount of 
remittances sent is statistically insignificant. This seems to support altruistic motives towards one’s immediate family. 
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do internal migrants. This is equivalent to an increase of 132% in the amount of remittances sent 
relative to the mean. It seems likely that this large effect could be explained by differences in the 
income levels at internal and external destinations.  
Household characteristic variables  
Some of the findings on the household variables have already been discussed in the context of 
the results obtained for the multiple sibling migrant dummy variable. Characteristics of the 
household such as the age and the education level of the household head, and the proportion of 
elderly people in the household, do not seem to influence the remittance behaviour of sibling 
migrants. The proportion of children in the household (i.e., individuals less than seven years) has a 
negative effect on both the probability and the amount of remittances sent. This may, for example, 
reflect that children at this age consume less and also incur no educational expenses. Households 
with a higher proportion of children may therefore have relatively less expenses and thus require 
less remittances. Migrants are less likely to send remittances if the head is male. This is possibly 
because female headed households have greater economic needs. An increase in the size of the 
household increases the probability of remitting by 31 percentage points on average and ceteris 
paribus. This probably reflects the greater need of those households with more members. The 
presence of a non-sibling migrant decreases the probability of remitting by nine percentage points. 
This is similar to the finding on the multiple sibling migrant dummy variable. A t-test to determine 
if the effect of other sibling migrants is different from that of non-sibling migrants results in the 
null hypothesis of equality being upheld (p-value = 0.904). Finally, we see that migrants are less 
likely to send remittances to urban households compared to rural ones.  
5.5.2 IV model estimates 
 
The preliminary analysis revealed that the traditional remittance sending motives that are found 
in the literature (viz. self-interest competitive, independent co-insurance, and pure altruistic motives) 
do not adequately explain the remittance behaviour of Kenyan siblings. We alluded to the fact that 
there may be other motives that may influence the remittance behaviour of siblings such as a 
sharing of remitting responsibilities among multiple migrants. In this follow-up analysis, we narrow 
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down the sample to multiple sibling migrants only. We estimate the effect of the total amount of 
remittances sent by other siblings belonging to the same household of origin on the amount of 
remittances sent by a sibling. As in Antman (2012), the rationale in using the total remittances sent 
by other siblings as the explanatory variable of interest is that siblings are assumed to care about the 
total remittances received by their parents, as opposed to the average. 
Due to the exclusive focus on multiple sibling migrants, the sample is now smaller than that for 
the initial analysis comprising a total of 700 siblings. We anticipate that if there is some form of 
sharing of remitting responsibilities, there could be a positive relationship between the amount of 
remittances sent by other siblings and a sibling’s own remittances. This would imply that the 
remittances of multiple siblings are complementary. On the other hand, there could be a negative 
relationship if the remittances of multiple siblings are substitutes. Lastly, a non-response may point 
to the remittance needs of the household being fully met at a given time when other siblings remit 
such that there is no corresponding remittance response from a sibling within that period. 
However, we acknowledge that it is difficult to assert the form of the sharing as the cross-sectional 
nature of the data prevents us from observing the remittance behaviour of siblings in other periods. 
As in the first analysis reported in the current chapter, the failure of the tobit specification 
implies that a Heckman two-step procedure would be the more appropriate estimation procedure. 
However, as anticipated from the findings of the first phase of the analysis, the correlation between 
the unobservable determinants of the propensity to remit and the unobservable determinants of the 
amount of remittances sent ( ) is also found to be statistically indistinguishable from zero for the 
sample of multiple sibling migrants. Thus the null hypothesis of a random sample of remitters is 
upheld by the data implying that an OLS model based on the sample of positive remitters (but with 
no selection correction term) is an appropriate one to use here.16  
Having determined that the uncorrected OLS model is the most suitable for our analysis, a 
major concern is that its parameters may not be identified because the variable measuring the 
                                                          
16 We exclude those variables that only have an effect on the probability of remitting but not on the level of remittances 
as revealed by the Heckman two-step model.  
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remittances of other sibling migrants may be endogenous due to a simultaneity bias. That is, the 
remittances of sibling   are a function of the remittances of other siblings and vice versa. Such 
simultaneity is referred to by Manski (1993) as a “reflection” problem that arises when the 
behaviour of an individual affects, and is also affected by, the behaviour of a reference group, in 
this case his/her other siblings. For example, in raising their children, parents may instil values of 
loyalty towards the family that then influence their remittance behaviour in adulthood. In some 
cases, the correlation in behaviour among siblings may be a result of their participation in 
institutions that teach about giving in their earlier lives (e.g., churches). Another potential cause of a 
correlation between unobservables may be siblings remitting if they believe that the money they 
send will be used wisely. The standard errors in the OLS model are clustered at the household level 
in order to correct for the correlation in the unobservables between siblings belonging to the same 
household. However, the clustering of standard errors only has an impact on the efficiency of the 
estimates and not their consistency. It is well known that when explanatory variables are 
endogenous, OLS yields biased and inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of an explanatory 
variable on an outcome variable (see Bound et al. 1995). A common strategy for dealing with this 
endogeneity is to use instrumental variables (IV) estimation, using as instruments variables thought 
to have no direct association with the outcome of interest but highly correlated with the regressor 
of interest. After some experimentation,17 we find the following variables to be the most suitable 
instruments: (i) the total number of other sibling migrants with secondary education and (ii) the 
total number of other sibling migrants living in an external destination.  
In the literature, Antman (2012) also uses summations of other sibling characteristics as 
instruments for the amount of remittances sent by a sibling. These instruments should be relevant 
in predicting the amount of remittances sent by other siblings (i.e., in the reduced form equation) 
but orthogonal to the error term of sibling  ’s remittance equation in order to qualify as a valid set 
                                                          
17 We consider all the characteristics relating to other sibling migrants (e.g. their age, employment and marital status, living 
situation, gender and length of migration) as possible instrumental variables. In addition, we also attempt to use 
unemployment rates in the destination as instrumental variables. The unemployment rate in the destination may influence 
a sibling to remit independently of other sibling’s remittance decisions due to co-insurance motives. However, a large 
proportion of siblings are located in the same destination as other sibling migrants thus invalidating the suitability of this 
variable for use as an instrument. Moreover, the evidence obtained in the initial analysis of this chapter was at variance 
with remittances being driven by independent co-insurance motives. 
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of instruments. To test for the orthogonality of the instruments, we use both the Sargan and 
Hansen test statistics. The null hypothesis that the instruments are orthogonal to the error process 
in the main equation is upheld using both the Sargan (chi2(1) = 0.448) and Hansen (chi2(1) = 
0.194) tests. 
In testing for the relevance of these instruments, we find them to be jointly statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance in the remittance equation for other siblings (F(2, 327) = 
7.74). However, because the F-value of 7.74 is below the rule-of-thumb of 10 suggested by Staiger 
and Stock (1994) we infer that the instruments are weak and may not be relevant for the task at 
hand. The implications of this are that the IV procedure will incorporate a small sample bias in the 
estimate relative to OLS, and the nominal size of any tests will be incorrect given the second stage 
estimator does not converge on a normal distribution regardless of the sample size used.  
We anticipated that these instruments may be weak. For example a sibling may take into 
account the characteristics of other siblings in deciding how much to remit.18 Hence, even if the 
instruments do not affect the dependent variable directly, they may do so indirectly through other 
channels that are not controlled for in our regression. The null hypothesis of the Wu-Hausman test 
for the exogeneity of the variable capturing the amount of remittances sent by other siblings is 
upheld by the data (p-value = 0.164) suggesting that the variable is exogenous. However, given the 
weak instruments, the power of the Wu-Hausman test is acknowledged to be poor and therefore 
we proceed to employ an IV strategy but the approach adopted caters for the weak instruments 
used. 
It has been established in the literature that when instruments are weak, the point estimators of 
a linear IV model are biased and Wald tests are unreliable (Stock et al. 2002 provide a review of 
this). Employing an IV approach is likely to result in the standard errors on IV estimates being 
larger than OLS estimates, and much larger if the excluded instrumental variables are only weakly 
                                                          
18 However, these variables are found to be the most suitable ones in the dataset to use as instruments based on their 
statistical (in)significance in the main and reduced form equations. An attempt to use unemployment rates and other 
economic indicators in the destination of a sibling was futile owing to a lack of variation in these variables. This is largely 
because the majority of siblings are located in the same destination as other siblings belonging to the same household. 
138 
 
 
 
correlated with the endogenous variable (Nichols 2006). Bound et al. (1995) demonstrate that if the 
correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak, then even a 
small correlation between the instrument and the error term can produce a larger inconsistency in 
the IV estimate than in the OLS estimate (see also Angrist et al. 1996). This therefore casts doubt 
on the reliability of the IV model estimates. Moreira (2003) proposes a Conditional Likelihood 
Ratio (CLR) test that is robust to the use of weak instruments within an IV framework. The test 
also provides a confidence interval for the parameter for the endogenous variable that is robust to 
the presence of weak instruments and the exclusion of relevant instruments, and allows valid 
inference for the parameter (see Moreira and Poi 2003, Mikusheva and Poi 2006). We thus employ 
this approach in the current analysis.  
The results obtained are reported in Table 5.7. The first column of the table reports the OLS 
model estimates based on the sample of positive remitters. The estimates for the OLS model reveal 
that a one shilling increase in the amount of remittances sent by other siblings increases the 
remittances sent by a sibling by 28 cents, on average and ceteris paribus. However, both the IV and 
Conditional IV results reveal that after correcting for the endogeneity of the variable for the 
amount of remittances sent by other siblings, there is no statistically significant effect on the 
remittances sent by a sibling to the household. As shown in the table, there is an upward bias on 
the OLS coefficient of the variable for the amount of remittances sent by other siblings. This 
suggests that there is a positive correlation between the unobservables that determine the 
remittances sent by siblings.19  
The insignificant effect of the amount of remittances sent by other siblings holds for both the 
IV and Conditional IV when we estimate the models separately for cash and in-kind remittances. 
The results obtained contrast with those of Antman (2012) who reports a positive effect for the 
financial contributions of other siblings after employing an IV strategy. 
 
                                                          
19 The upward bias on the OLS coefficient is not indicative of measurement error as this would have biased the OLS 
coefficient towards zero.  
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Table 5.7: OLS, IV and Conditional IV regression estimates (multiple sibling migrants only) 
Variables OLS IV  Conditional IV 
    
Amount of remittances sent by other siblings 0.282*** 0.0752 0.0752 
 (0.0510) (0.156) (0.160) 
    
    
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test confidence interval  [-0.31, 0.38], 
p-value= 0.669 
F-test of instruments  F(2, 327) = 7.74,  
p-value =  0.0005 
 
Sargan test (assuming homoscedasticity)  chi2(1) = 0.448, 
p-value = 0.503 
 
Hansen's J-statistic (assuming heteroscedasticity)  chi2(1) = 1.69,  
p-value = 0.194 
 
Wu-Hausman exogeneity test   F(1,327) = 1.95,  
p-value = 0.164 
 
Weak instrument robust tests for endogenous variable: Ϯ   
Conditional Likelihood Ratio test  stat (.) = 0.20,     
p-value = 0.658 
 
Anderson-Rubin test  chi2(2) = 0.65,     
p-value = 0.722 
 
Lagrange multiplier test  chi2(1) = 0.20,  
p-value = 0.656 
 
J test for over-identification  chi2(1) = 0.45,  
p-value = 0.502 
 
Wald testϝ   chi2(1) = 0.23,  
p-value = 0.629 
 
    
Other explanatory variables  Yes Yes Yes 
N 347 347 347 
R-squared 0.250 0.203 0.203 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see Table 
5.5). 
(iv) The following variables are used as instruments in the IV and Conditional IV models: the total number of 
other sibling migrants with secondary education and the total number of other sibling migrants residing in 
an external destination. 
(v) Ϯ These are tests of the significance of the coefficient on the endogenous variable in the IV model which 
are robust to weak instruments. 
(vi) ϝ This a Wald test of the significance of the coefficient on the endogenous variable in the IV model and is 
not robust to weak instruments. 
 
Overall, when we treat the remittances of other siblings as exogenous, the total amount of 
remittances sent by other siblings has a positive and statistically significant effect on the remittances 
of a sibling. This seems to suggest that the remittances of multiple sibling migrants are 
complementary. However, after controlling for the endogeneity of the remittances, we find that the 
amount of remittances sent by other siblings has no statistically significant effect on sibling 
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remittances. The finding mirrors the results obtained in the earlier analysis reported in this chapter. 
The insensitivity of a sibling’s remittances to those sent by other siblings suggests that in and of 
themselves, remittances sent by others have no direct effect on the remittances of a sibling. Rather, 
there seems to be an underlying factor motivating multiple sibling migrants to remit to the 
household, other than the amount remitted by other family members. Thus, the remittances of 
multiple sibling migrants neither complement nor substitute each other. As mentioned earlier, a 
potential explanation for this may be that if there is a sharing of remittance responsibilities, the 
remittance needs of the household may be fully met by particular siblings at any given time.  
5.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
The evidence reported in this chapter reveals that multiple sibling migrants are less likely to 
remit compared to sole sibling migrants. However, being a multiple sibling migrant has no effect on 
the amount of remittances sent if a migrant remits. In addition, when we narrow the analysis to 
multiple sibling migrants only and treat the remittances sent by other siblings as endogenous, we 
find that the amount of remittances sent by other siblings exert no statistically significant effect on 
the remittances sent by a sibling.  
Our empirical findings suggest no support for pure altruism as the main remittance motivator 
for Kenyan sibling migrants. While the finding that multiple migrants are less likely to remit in the 
probability model suggests altruism as a potential driver of the remittances sent by migrants, we do 
not find other persuasive evidence in its support. The variables that capture the level of need of the 
origin household are found to be either statistically insignificant or to have perverse signs for such a 
motive. For example, household heads who are unemployed are found to receive less remittances, 
and those who are retired do not receive any more or less remittances compared to those who are 
employed. This is at variance with what is suggested by an altruistic model.  
Our findings are also in conflict with competitive remittance behaviour among multiple sibling 
migrants. This is contrary to most of the existing evidence on the motives of migrant remittances in 
Kenya. For example, Hoddinott (1994) finds that remittances are driven by self-interest motives 
related to inheriting land from parents. The deviation of our findings from those of past studies 
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may be explained by differences in the samples employed. For example, in contrast to Hoddinott 
our sample includes both internal and external migrants. In addition, Hoddinott’s sample is based 
on rural households in the Central province of Kenya. The migrants in that sample are likely to be 
driven by rather different motivations than migrants in our one who are drawn from all provinces 
within Kenya and are not confined to the rural areas. In addition, the time periods differ 
substantially. Our study is more recent compared to that of Hoddinott, and is separated in time by 
about a quarter of a century.  
The evidence obtained also shows that the statistically insignificant effect of the presence of 
other migrants on the amount of remittances sent is inconsistent with independent co-insurance 
motives whereby the migrant self-insures with the household of origin. For example, we find largely 
insignificant effects for variables capturing the living situation of migrants. In addition, transfers 
from the household of origin are primarily received by students thus weakening the co-insurance 
proposition. Following Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), we included a risk variable measuring the 
unemployment rate in the destination. We obtained an insignificant effect for the risk variable in 
the OLS model and a negative effect in the probability model thus casting further doubt on the 
validity of the co-insurance motive in our sample. This finding is different to that of Knowles and 
Anker (1981) who find that remittances sent by Kenyan migrants act as a form of insurance for 
future return to the household of origin. However, their study uses data collected in 1974 and is 
comprised of only internal migrants. Thus, differences in both the time period and the type of 
migration make it difficult to draw any direct comparisons with that study. Unfortunately, our 
dataset lacks suitable risk measures and thus we cannot test the co-insurance motive more directly.  
We therefore propose that there could be other motives that are relevant in explaining the 
remitting behaviour of Kenyan siblings besides those that are to be found in the extant remittance 
literature. The evidence we obtained revealed that the earnings capacity of siblings, as proxied by 
their employment status, has a significant effect on both the probability of remitting and the 
amount of remittances sent. Unfortunately, a lack of earnings data precludes us from investigating 
this further. The insignificant effect obtained on the amount of remittances sent by others when the 
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IV method is employed may point to the fact that Kenyan siblings do not respond to the 
remittances of others per se but rather there are other factors that influence their remittances. We 
allude to the notion of a sharing of remittance responsibilities among multiple siblings but cannot 
fully ascertain the form of such a strategy given that the data are cross sectional. We propose that as 
an agenda for future research, the remittance literature needs to be expanded in order to 
incorporate other remittance motives that are not fully captured in the current literature. 
A weakness relating to the dataset we use is that the household of origin responded to the 
survey, and not migrants themselves. Thus, we are unable to capture any remittances transmitted 
among multiple sibling migrants. This is a potentially important phenomenon for the co-insurance 
motive as siblings could be co-insuring each another. However, given data limitations, this is 
beyond the scope of our analysis.  
We are careful not to draw strong conclusions from our empirical findings reported above. 
Firstly, given the weak instruments used in the IV model, we remain sceptical about the validity of 
our estimates even after employing the various tests and methods assumed robust to weak 
instrumentation. The current analysis is somewhat limited in its scope given the data are drawn 
from a cross-sectional survey. Hence, while our findings allude to the remitting behaviour of 
Kenyan multiple sibling migrants being influenced by a sharing of remitting responsibilities, we are 
unable to exactly ascertain the form of the strategy. It may be the case that siblings take periodic 
turns to remit to their households of origin but this cannot be observed given the absence of data 
for other time periods. A second caveat is that the information about the remittances sent by 
siblings was provided by the household head, or in a few cases, his/her deputed representative. The 
challenge inherent in this is that of recall error as the head may not accurately remember the exact 
amount of remittances sent by each sibling. Another potential bias resulting from the head being 
the respondent may arise from, for example, an unwillingness to disclose the fact that some of 
his/her children may not have been supporting the household as much as he/she would have liked. 
It could be the case, therefore, that the reported per sibling remittance amounts are biased towards 
equality. This then has implications for the estimates obtained in the empirical analysis. However, 
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the evidence for measurement error is not obvious when the IV approach is applied. Rather, 
applying the IV approach suggests that there is a positive correlation between the unobservables 
that determine the remittances of multiple siblings. Nevertheless, the absence of strong instruments 
demands caution in the interpretation of the last set of empirical results reported in this chapter.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A5.1: Heckman two-step selection model (coefficients) 
Variables Remittance level model Selection model 
Individual characteristic variables:   
= 1 if multiple sibling migrant -7,822 -0.362*** 
 (13,947) (0.124) 
= 1 if aged 26 to 35 16,515 0.130 
 (14,710) (0.126) 
= 1 if aged 26 to 45 21,904 0.123 
 (18,553) (0.167) 
= 1 if aged 46+ -12,938 0.0683 
 (23,961) (0.202) 
= 1 if male -4,745 -0.144 
 (10,580) (0.0956) 
= 1 if university 30,534* 0.169 
 (18,265) (0.172) 
= 1 if secondary 4,344 0.00332 
 (14,427) (0.129) 
= 1 if employed 44,692 1.597*** 
 (43,763) (0.128) 
= 1 if self-employed 20,833 1.014*** 
 (38,178) (0.180) 
= 1 if married -9,151 0.285* 
 (15,833) (0.150) 
= 1 if lives with spouse and/or children 8,652 -0.231 
 (14,833) (0.152) 
= 1 if lives with relatives and/or friends 22,480 -0.342** 
 (18,355) (0.135) 
Migration length: spline 1 9,352** 0.0839** 
 (4,265) (0.0353) 
Migration length: spline 2 780.2 -0.0133 
 (1,183) (0.00874) 
= 1 if receives transfers from hh of origin -6,854 -0.651*** 
 (26,413) (0.151) 
= 1 if located in external destination 78,811*** 0.124 
 (11,409) (0.104) 
Household characteristic variables:   
= 1 if head aged 25 to 44 -4,005 -0.0183 
 (26,194) (0.236) 
= 1 if head aged 45 to 54 7,306 0.0572 
 (18,269) (0.174) 
= 1 if head aged 55 to 65 -6,158 -0.0101 
 (13,178) (0.127) 
= 1 if head has university 43,045* -0.171 
145 
 
 
 
 (23,593) (0.201) 
= 1 if head has secondary -9,590 0.125 
 (11,576) (0.114) 
= 1 if head is self-employed -25,915 0.0304 
 (15,984) (0.152) 
= 1 if head is unemployed -12,076 -0.390** 
 (21,590) (0.191) 
= 1 if head is retired -50,831*** -0.240 
 (18,517) (0.171) 
Proportion of children in origin hh -61,537 -1.345*** 
 (48,708) (0.464) 
Proportion of elderly people in origin hh 41,716 0.0887 
 (28,087) (0.251) 
=1 if hh owns land/house 3,505 0.0325 
 (18,831) (0.166) 
= 1 if head is male  -0.250** 
  (0.113) 
Size of hh of origin  0.116*** 
  (0.0285) 
= 1 if non-sibling migrant present  -0.335** 
  (0.147) 
= 1 if hh of origin in urban location  -0.229** 
  (0.109) 
λ  -5,352 
  (40,498) 
   
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
N 1,092 1,092 
Number of censored N 542  
      
 Notes to the table: 
(i) The dependent variable in the selection model takes the value of 0 if the migrant did not send remittances 
and 1 if the migrant sent remittances. In the remittance equation, the dependant value is the value of cash 
and in-kind remittances sent by the migrant in the past 12 months, measured in Kenyan shillings. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
(iii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
(iv) VCE robust standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. 
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Table A5.2: Multinomial logit model (impact effects) 
VARIABLES I: None II: Cash 
only 
III: In-kind 
only  
IV: Both cash 
and in-kind 
     Multiple sibling migrant 0.108*** -0.0264 -0.0114 -0.0705*** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0365) (0.0187) (0.0252) 
     Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,092 1,092 1,092 1,092 
Pseudo R-squared 0.248 
          
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
(ii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
 
Table A5.3: OLS regression: Cash vs. in-kind vs. both remittances (coefficients) 
VARIABLES I: Cash only II: In-kind 
only 
III: Both 
cash and in-
kind 
    Multiple sibling migrant -8,381 -601.0 235.9 
 
(12,769) (1,239) (7,119) 
    Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
N 542 542 542 
R-squared 0.165 0.152 0.085 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
(ii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
 
Table A5.4: Probit model (marginal/impact effects) and OLS regression (coefficients) - sample excluding 
students 
VARIABLES Probit model 
marginal/impact 
effects (remit = 1) 
OLS model 
coefficients 
(remit value) 
   
= 1 if multiple sibling migrant -0.120*** -2,298 
 (0.0387) (14,098) 
   
Other variables Yes Yes 
N 894 521 
R-squared  0.236 
Pseudo R-squared 0.236  
      
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) In columns (I) and (II), robust standard errors clustered by household are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
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6 How Do Remittances Shape the Expenditure Patterns of Kenyan 
Households? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There is no general consensus in the literature regarding what remittances are used for at the 
receiving household level. For example, some studies argue that remittances are mainly spent on 
immediate consumption goods such as food and utilities. An alternative view in the literature 
asserts that households consider remittances to be a form of transitory income. As such, 
households spend more at the margin on human and physical capital investments than on 
consumption goods and this potentially contributes positively to local economic development 
(Adams 1998) and poverty reduction (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Examining evidence on the uses of 
remittances is therefore an important research topic, more so as migration is likely to continue as an 
economic phenomenon into the future. 
In the current chapter, we empirically investigate the uses of remittances by Kenyan 
households. The evidence in the literature on the uses of remittances in the Kenyan context to date 
suggests that they are often allocated to income generating activities and expenditures related to 
education, health, housing and food (see, e.g., Kiiru 2010). Remittances have also been shown to 
act as a social safety net for Kenyan households (Lacroix 2011). However, to the author’s 
knowledge, no empirical study has assessed the effect of remittances on expenditure patterns for 
the case of Kenya using the econometric methods employed in this chapter, or addressed research 
questions concerning their uses in the approach adopted here. The current chapter aims to fill these 
lacunae in the literature through the use of the household survey outlined in chapter 3. This survey 
was specifically designed to capture migration and remittance flows in order to make inferences 
about remittance uses in a way no previous survey has done thus far for Kenya. The behaviour of 
Kenyan households in allocating remittances to household expenditure is therefore a valuable 
research topic to explore as it gives insights into the impact remittances have on the welfare of the 
recipient households. 
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6.1.1 Research questions 
 
The objectives of this chapter are three-fold. Firstly, we set out to investigate whether the 
expenditure patterns of Kenyan households differ by type of household by comparing the marginal 
spending behaviour of households on a range of commodities. This enables us to determine 
whether different types of households behave differently in terms of their expenditure patterns. In 
particular, we compare the expenditure patterns of migrant households to those of non-migrant 
households using an Almost Ideal Demand Systems (AIDS) approach. The following seven 
categories of commodity are incorporated into the analysis: food, non-food, utilities, durable goods, 
physical investments, education and health. Using a similar approach for migrant households only, 
we explore whether there are differentials in spending behaviour according to the remittance receipt 
status of the household. The key research question in this part of the analysis relates to whether 
there are differences in the allocation of expenditure budget shares according to whether or not a 
migrant household receives remittances. 
Secondly, we investigate whether the budget shares of migrant households are sensitive to the 
source of remittances, specifically the identity of the remitter. We classify remitters according to 
their relationship to the household of origin as follows: siblings, spouses, other significant relatives, 
or any combination of the aforementioned categories (see section 6.3.2 for the definitions). This 
part of the analysis provides an insight into the relative bargaining powers of different types of 
remitters and the impact they exert on the expenditure patterns of households. It allows us to 
interrogate whether household preferences for the type of expenditure that remittances are 
allocated to differ by remitter source.  
Alongside this, we also analyse the impact of the total amount of remittances received on the 
budget shares of Kenyan migrant households. A research question central to this analysis is whether 
there is complete pooling of income within the household or if income out of remittances is 
allocated differently to income from other sources. One of the views in the literature considers 
remittances to be fungible and thus spent at the margin like income from any other source. In other 
words, households treat a shilling from remittance income like a shilling from wage income and 
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therefore do not alter their expenditure behaviour upon receiving remittances. This is consistent 
with the theory of unitary models where households are considered to be a single entity with all 
members possessing unified preferences such that only total income, and not the composition of 
income, matters. We are able, therefore, to test the unitary model proposition to ascertain whether 
Kenyan migrant households pool their income together when allocating it to expenditure. 
Finally, we undertake a novel investigation which entails comparing what Kenyan households 
report to have spent their remittances on to the way in which they actually apportion their general 
income to expenditure. This part of the analysis involves estimating and comparing remittance 
budget shares20 to expenditure budget shares for the corresponding sample of households that 
reported positive remittance expenditure for specific commodities. The presence of information on 
how remittances were spent provides a unique opportunity to carry out this analysis. The key 
research question here relates to whether Kenyan households’ reported use of remittances 
coincides with their allocation of expenditure out of general income. 
6.1.2  Research contribution 
 
The current chapter provides some important contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, a 
number of studies have examined remittance uses using budget share equations but, to the author’s 
knowledge, only one study (Simiyu 2013) has done so for Kenya. This chapter therefore contributes 
to the literature by investigating the effect of remittances on household expenditure in a context for 
which few studies have been conducted to date.  
One of the dominant household decision making model paradigms in the literature is the 
collective model where interests and bargaining power may differ among members, with the 
composition and source of household income being a relevant factor in explaining expenditure 
decisions (e.g., Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992, Browning et al. 1994). The literature has mainly 
analysed this topic from a remitter gender angle (e.g., De la Briere et al. 2002, Lopez-Erka et al. 
2011, Gobel 2013), and/or for the case of internal versus external remittances (e.g., Adams and 
                                                          
20 Remittance budget shares refer to the share of remittances, out of total cash remittances received by the household, 
allocated to a specific category of commodity. 
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Cuecuecha 2010). Guzman et al. (2008) provide an exception by considering the relationship of the 
remitter to the household in much the same way as we do. However, our context and motivations 
are quite distinct from those of their study. As such, the current chapter provides additional 
perspectives on the dynamics of household budget allocations according to the source of income. 
Examining the extent of the bargaining power that different remitters (as classified by their 
relationship to the household) exert on the expenditure patterns of households represents a novel 
analysis that does not explicitly feature in the current literature. 
Most of the evidence for the effect of remittances on household expenditure patterns in Kenya 
draws from early studies and is somewhat mixed. For example, Rempel and Lobdell (1978) 
conclude that remittances from rural-to-urban migrants have little impact on the development of 
the region of origin. In contrast, Collier and Lal (1984) report for rural Kenya that remittances 
enable the recipient households to hold more productive capital than non-recipient ones. In a more 
recent study, Simiyu (2013) finds that remittances are mainly used for immediate consumption 
needs such as utilities and transportation costs for the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces of Kenya. 
However, the study employs a small sample of 295 households. In addition, no data are available on 
remitters hence households receiving remittances are assumed to be receiving them from just one 
remitter. Thus, in contrast to the current study, the effect of the identity of the remitter cannot be 
isolated.  
Finally, another contribution of the current chapter is the comparison of household self-
reported uses of remittances to the uses from general income. This provides a more in-depth 
understanding of household remittance use behaviour and permits inferences regarding the 
accuracy of the reported uses of remittances. This analysis provides the first of its kind in the 
literature to the knowledge of the author.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a review of the empirical evidence on 
the expenditure behaviour of remittance receiving households. Section 6.3 discusses the data used 
to explore the research questions presented in section 6.1.1, including presenting and discussing 
summary statistics for the key variables of interest in the econometric analysis. This is followed by 
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section 6.4 which provides a discussion of the econometric methodologies employed to undertake 
the analysis. Section 6.5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 6.6 provides 
some concluding remarks.  
6.2  Literature review 
 
A number of studies in the literature have employed various econometric methods to assess the 
effect of remittances on household expenditure behaviour. For example, Zarate-Hoyos (2004) 
examined the consumption patterns of remittance receiving households using the 1989 Mexican 
income and expenditure survey exploiting Engel curve analysis. The study models the expenditure 
shares of various commodities using variables measuring household income, the receipt (or non-
receipt) of remittances, and the size of the household. Their findings reveal that households that 
receive remittances do not spend a disproportionate share of their remittance income on current 
consumption, health and education but instead save a larger proportion of their income than 
households that do not receive remittances.  
Taylor and Mora (2006) control for the endogeneity of migration decisions and test for 
differences in expenditure patterns between migrant and non-migrant households using data from 
the 2003 Mexico national rural household survey. They find that households with international 
migrants have large marginal budget shares for investments, health and consumer durables and 
small marginal budget shares for food and housing. Households with internal migrants are found to 
have relatively large marginal budget shares for health, housing, services and education and small 
marginal budget shares for supermarkets, consumer durables, and investments. They use a 
simultaneous equation model in which household expenditure shares are influenced by the decision 
to spend income on certain consumption and investment goods and also the decision to participate 
or not in migration. The authors use a two-stage approach. In the first stage a probit model is 
estimated for the purchase decisions in each expenditure category. In the second, inverse-Mills ratio 
terms from the first stage are included as right-hand side variables in the corresponding budget 
share equations. A system of expenditure equations is then estimated using the Almost Ideal 
Demand System (AIDS) framework. The estimates reveal that as total expenditures in households 
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with migrants increase, the share of income used for investments also increases, while the share 
spent on consumption falls, especially for international migration relative to non-migrant 
households. 
Castaldo and Reilly (2007) investigate, using an Engel curve approach, the extent to which the 
consumption patterns of Albanian households are affected by the receipt of migrant remittances. 
The data used are drawn from the 2002 Albania Living Standards Measurement survey. They model 
the budget shares of good   in household   on the log of total household expenditure controlling 
for a vector of household and regional characteristics. They also include dummy variables 
measuring whether internal, external, or no remittances were received by the household. They find 
that external remittances increase the household budget shares for durable goods and utilities, and 
decrease the budget share on food. However, these households are found to have a more 
expenditure elastic demand for food than households not receiving remittances. Internal 
remittances are found to exert no independent effect on the spending patterns of households.  
Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) analyse how the receipt of internal and international remittances 
affects the marginal spending behaviour of households using data from the 2000 Guatemala 
ENCOVI survey. They again use a two-stage selection model with the probability of receiving 
remittances modelled in the first stage equation and budget share expenditures in the second. The 
Dubin and McFadden method is used to correct for the correlation in error terms between the 
remittance and consumption models. The authors find that compared to households not receiving 
any remittances, those that receive international remittances have a lower marginal propensity to 
consume food, and those receiving either internal or international remittances have a higher 
marginal propensity to consume education and housing.  
Adams (1991) studies how remittances affect the consumption behaviour of rural households 
in Egypt using household surveys conducted in 1986-87 by calculating expenditure elasticities and 
marginal propensities to consume over a range of expenditure levels using the Engel curve method. 
He finds that migrant households do not spend a disproportionate share of their remittance 
earnings on consumption but on other items, including housing.  
153 
 
 
 
Adams and Cuecuecha (2013) use household survey data from the 2005/6 Ghana Living 
Standards Survey (GLSS 5) to investigate how internal and external remittances affect the marginal 
spending behaviour of households on food, consumer goods/durables, housing, education, health 
and other expenditure. They find that households receiving internal or external remittances in 
Ghana spend less at the margin on food than those that do not receive remittances with similar 
income levels and characteristics. They also find that households receiving internal or external 
remittances spend more at the margin on education, housing, and health. These results hold after 
controlling for the endogeneity of remittances and potential selection bias in the household receipt 
of remittances. 
Cattaneo (2012) also uses an Engel curve framework to investigate the effect of the receipt of 
remittances on education expenditures by households in Albania. The study treats total income as 
endogenous. Using both parametric and semi-parametric econometric methods, the author finds 
that remittances do not increase spending on education. A quantile regression analysis shows that 
remittances have a positive effect only among the bottom deciles, but the effect is small in size with 
no statistically significant difference across selected percentiles of the conditional distribution. The 
findings imply that incomes from different sources are not pooled together within the household 
thus providing support for non-unitary household models. 
Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances reduce the hazard rate of dropping out of 
school. The effect of remittances is also found to be statistically different from that of other income 
sources thus offering further support for non-unitary models.  
Simiyu (2013) investigates the effect of remittances on household expenditure categories using 
panel data for 2007 and 2009 for rural households from the Rift Valley and Nyanza provinces of 
Kenya. A set of budget share equations for different expenditure categories are estimated using a 
household fixed effects model21 and a remittance variable is added as an independent variable in 
each equation. The results obtained indicate that remittances are mainly used for immediate 
consumption needs such as utilities and transportation costs. The study finds that remittance 
                                                          
21 The use of a fixed effects model with only two time periods is somewhat wasteful of the variation in the data. 
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receipts exert a negative impact on education expenditure as a share of total household expenditure, 
but impact positively on food, health and other household expenditure categories. The author 
attributes this finding to the small size of remittances22 which means they can generally only be 
spent on daily consumption needs and basic necessities. However, the study is quite restricted in its 
analysis especially as the sample used is relatively small comprising just 295 households and drawn 
from only two of the eight provinces in Kenya. In addition, no data are available on remitters hence 
households receiving remittances are assumed to be receiving them from just one remitter. As such, 
in contrast to the current study, the effect of the identity of the remitter cannot be determined.    
Hines (2014) uses the same dataset as the current thesis to investigate the impact of migration 
and remittances on household human capital investment in Kenya using OLS and 2SLS that 
controls for selection into migration. The 2SLS takes into account the potential endogeneity of 
remittances in the education expenditure model by using the following instrumental variables:  
GDP per capita in the destination country, the stock of Kenyan migrants in the destination country, 
household ownership of a bank account, and the average amount of remittances received by 
households in a district. The dependent variable used for this model is the log of education 
expenditure and the explanatory variable of interest is the log of remittances. A caveat associated 
with using logged variables in this manner is the presence of zero values as some households did 
not spend on education and/or receive remittances. The study employs a rather crude technique to 
circumvent this problem by taking the log of one where there are zero values. The study also 
examines the impact of remittances on the share of education expenditure allocated to the total 
budget. The study finds that remittances are correlated with higher levels of expenditure in 
education. However, remittances are found to have no significant effect on the share of total 
expenditure allocated to education. 
Aga et al. (2014) employ World Bank survey data for Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Uganda to investigate the link between international remittances and household financial inclusion 
using a simple linear probability model. To control for the potential endogeneity of remittances, the 
                                                          
22 The average amount of remittances received per year is 13,610 shillings. 
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following economic indicators in the migrant host countries are used as instruments: a weighted per 
capita income of the countries where migrants reside and the proportion of international migrants 
from the household that are currently employed. The study finds that the receipt of international 
remittances exerts a positive effect on the probability of a household opening a bank account in all 
five countries.   
6.3 Data and summary statistics 
6.3.1 Dependent variables 
 
The key dependent variables of interest in the current empirical analysis are the budget shares 
for the following seven broad expenditure categories: food, non-food, utilities, durable goods, 
physical investments, education and health. The use of the budget share instead of absolute values 
as the dependent variable enables us to exploit the Almost Ideal Demand Systems (AIDS) 
framework (see section 6.4 for a discussion of the AIDS model) popularized by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980). These budget shares are constructed by classifying the expenditures that are 
self-reported by the household head (or his/her representative) into broad categories consisting of 
related commodities based on recalling how much money was spent on each expenditure item. 
Figure 6.1 in the appendix provides a copy of the expenditure section of the survey questionnaire. 
From this we can see that for expenditure on food, the household reports for the past completed 
week how much it spent on meat and non-meat products including the consumption of food self-
produced by the household. In the non-food category, a range of goods and services such as 
transport costs, clothing and footwear, wedding/engagement/funeral, home improvements, 
personal care/leisure/entertainment, luxury goods (including jewellery and luxury cars), mortgages 
and loan repayment, and other expenditure (e.g. cigarettes, alcohol, and beauty salon) are included. 
In this category, transport costs and personal care/leisure/entertainment are reported for the 
period relating to the past week, and the rest of the items are reported for the past six months. The 
utilities category includes expenditure on cooking fuels, rent for housing (including imputed rent), 
and payments for gas, water, electricity, etc. Cooking fuels are reported for the past completed week 
while the remaining items are reported for the past six months. Items such as household appliances, 
vehicles, mobile phones, computers, and electronic goods are classified as durable goods. The 
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amount of money spent on these over the previous six months is reported. Physical investments 
comprise the establishment of a business, the purchase of a house or a tract of land, the purchase 
of productive assets such as a sewing machine or water pump, and purchasing farming equipment 
such as trucks, tractors, and spraying machines. The money spent on all these items is also reported 
for the past six months. Expenditures on education relate to money spent on schooling or 
entrepreneurship (e.g., tuition and tutor fees, school uniforms, and books and supplies) and are 
reported for the past six months. Health expenditure is also reported for the past six months and 
includes spending on doctor fees, hospital fees and medicines. Table 6.1 reports the expenditure 
categories used and the items contained in each of the broadly defined commodity groups. 
The distinction between durable goods and physical investments merits some discussion here 
given our focus on these two items in the subsequent chapter. In this study, durable goods refer to 
expenditure on consumer goods used to meet more long term needs. Physical investments refer to 
those outlays for which the individual expects to enjoy some pecuniary return in the future. There is 
some debate in the literature regarding whether expenditure on housing should be classified under 
durable goods (see Adams 1991)23 or physical investments (see Taylor and Mora 2006, Adams and 
Cuecuecha 2010). We classify expenditure on housing as a physical investment as we take the view 
that new and improved housing offers possible economic returns to the household and also can be 
a direct stimulus to the local construction industry. The classification of housing in the physical 
investments category seems justifiable within the Kenyan context where there is a huge shortfall in 
housing provision by the government to the extent that housing development plays an important 
role in providing local employment (albeit on a short-term basis), boosting the demand for local 
housing inputs as well as providing rental accommodation (see, e.g., Mitullah 2013).  
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Adams (1991) classifies housing expenses as both durable goods and investments.  
157 
 
 
 
Table 6.1: Description of expenditure categories  
Categories Goods/commodities 
Food Grains, cassava, plantain, yam, pulses, fruits, vegetables, including self-consumption 
Meat: fish, chicken, red meat including self-consumption 
Non-food Transportation (e.g., bus/taxi, gasoline) 
Clothing and footwear 
Wedding/engagement/funerals 
Home improvements (e.g., roof, floor, plumbing) 
Luxury goods (jewellery and luxury cars) 
Mortgage and loan repayment 
Other24 
Utilities Cooking fuels (e.g., kerosene) 
Rent for housing (imputed rent) 
Payments for utilities (e.g., gas, water, electricity) 
Durables Household appliances (e.g., furniture, kitchen ware, refrigerators, air conditioners, 
bedding, carpet) 
Car/motorcycle/vehicle/tuk tuk 
Cell phone/mobile phone (initial cost) 
Computer 
Other electronic goods (e.g., DVDs, TV)  
Physical investments Setting up a business/opening a store  
House or land purchase  
Productive assets (e.g., sewing machine, water pump) 
Farming equipment (e.g., trucks, tractor, ox plough, harvester, spraying machines, 
water pumps) 
Education Education/apprenticeship (including tuition fees, tutor fees, school uniforms, books, 
and supplies) 
Health Health (doctor fees, hospital fees, medicines, drugs) 
 
A main challenge we have with the data is the variation in the time period over which different 
expenditure items are reported. The expenditures are divided into two different periods of recall 
based on frequency of purchase, and these are the past one week and the past six months. On the 
other hand, remittances received by the household (which represent a key explanatory variable for 
the empirical analysis) are reported for the period relating to the previous 12 month period. Thus, 
to ensure comparable time coverage for the array of expenditure items in our analysis, we make a 
number of assumptions regarding the spending behaviour of households that enable us to compute 
annualized values. We aggregate items relating to expenditures in the past week to their yearly 
                                                          
24 Other expenditure reported for the past one week includes personal care/leisure/entertainment (e.g., cigarettes, 
alcohol, and beauty salon). It also includes any other expenditure which is not specified (this is reported for the past six 
months). For the latter, only 53 households reported this kind of expenditure. 
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values. For most items relating to spending in the past six months, we include the values as they are 
reported. This is because we assume that expenditure on one-off events such as weddings, 
engagements and funerals, durable items such as household appliances, vehicles and electronics, 
and physical investments such as land or house purchases are non-recurrent. However, we compute 
yearly values for the following expenditure items reported for the period covering the past six 
months: education costs, health costs, clothing and footwear, rent for housing, utilities, and 
mortgage/loan repayment. For this set of expenditure items, it appears reasonable that spending 
over the most recent six months would be reflective of spending in the six months preceding that 
period as they represent recurring expenses. However, there are obviously some shortcomings 
associated with the reporting and construction of these data, as well as some of the assumptions 
made. For example, the fact that households report expenditure on durable goods, physical 
investments, utilities and non-food for the previous six months may distort the data if some 
households purchased items in the six months prior to this reference period. Thus, a household 
that reports a zero expenditure on physical investments in the past six months may have allocated 
expenditure to this item in the six months prior to the time period referred to. As such, taking such 
a household as having spent nothing in the physical investment category for the year may be 
incorrect. However, the way the data were collected in the survey prevents us from being able to 
redress this particular problem. We undertake some robustness checks in the subsequent analysis to 
determine the effect of aggregating the data in this manner. 
Another limitation associated with the data collection is that the survey was undertaken 
between 24 October and 23 December 2009. This variation in timing may affect the amount of 
money spent on different items. For example, because expenditures such as food and transport are 
reported for the past completed week, households interviewed closer to Christmas may report 
higher spending than households interviewed in October and November as a reflection of the 
increase in spending associated with the holiday season. We attempt to capture such seasonal 
variation by including among the explanatory variables dummy variables for the month in which a 
household was interviewed. In the sample, 35% of households were interviewed in December, and 
the remainder in November or earlier. In addition, the fact that food and meat consumption are 
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imputed means that food prices reported by households that produce their own food may differ 
from those that do not. Controlling for the urban/rural location of the household potentially 
captures this effect since the majority of rural households in Kenya produce at least some of the 
food they consume.  
 6.3.2 Explanatory variables 
A set of explanatory variables was constructed for the age, gender, education level, and 
employment status of the household head. Measures were also computed for the total expenditure 
per capita25 of the household, the number of children less than seven years, the number of elderly 
people greater than 59 years, and the household size. In addition, dummy variables capturing 
whether a household is located in an urban or a rural area, as well as controls for the regional 
location were also included in the budget share specifications. 
The variables relating to the receipt of remittances by the household are of primary concern for 
the current analysis. Variables measuring whether or not the household received remittances and 
the amount of cash as well as in-kind remittances received by the household are constructed from 
the survey data. Cash remittances are defined as money transfers by migrants to the household in 
the 12 months prior to the date of interview. In-kind remittances are goods sent to the household 
by migrants in the 12 months preceding the interview date.26 In addition, dummy variables 
capturing the relationship of the remitter to the household of origin are defined as follows: sibling, 
spouse, significant relative, or a combination of the former three categories. Sibling remitters are 
those remitters who are children of the household head. Spouse remitters are husbands or wives of 
the household head who sent remittances. Significant relatives are sons or daughters-in-law, 
parents, siblings, grandchildren, or other relatives of the household head who sent remittances to 
the household. In the sample, the majority of remittances are mainly sent by the children of the 
household head (62%), followed by spouses (18%) and siblings of the head (10%). 
                                                          
25 Total expenditure per capita is constructed by adding up all the separate expenditure items reported by the household 
in the survey, annualized where relevant, and dividing this by the total number of members in the household. 
26 In-kind remittances include the following: refrigerators, freezers, TVs, HiFi systems, washing machines, furniture, 
stove/cooker, microwave, air conditioners, computers and accessories, DVD/video, cars, posh mills, hair dressing 
equipment, sewing machine, agricultural equipment, mobile phones, etc. 
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6.3.3 Summary statistics 
 
The main explanatory variables that feature in the empirical analysis are described in Table 6.2 
and Table 6.3 presents summary statistics for the variables. After the elimination of some 
observations due to missing responses, the final sample of usable data consists of 1,871 households, 
of which 35% do not have any migrants. In addition, among the 1,214 households that have 
migrants, 64% received remittances. Table 6.3 also reports t-tests/z-scores for the differences in 
means/proportions for migrant versus non-migrant households, and remittance receiving versus 
non-remittance receiving households for the case of migrant households only.  
The first entries in the table report the average budget shares for the seven commodity 
categories of interest (i.e., food, non-food, utilities, durable goods, physical investments, education, 
and health). The table reveals that non-migrant households spent five percentage points more on 
food than migrant households. Migrant households spent respectively 0.6, 2.3, and 1.8 percentage 
points more on durable goods, education, and health than non-migrant households. There are no 
statistically significant differences between migrant and non-migrant households in the average 
budget shares for non-food commodities, utilities, and physical investments. In addition, Table 6.3 
reports that there are no statistically significant differences between the average budget shares of 
remittance receiving and non-receiving migrant households for all categories of commodities. 
Table 6.3 also reveals that migrant households had higher total expenditure per capita than 
non-migrant households. The summary statistics also indicate that migrant households tend to have 
older heads compared to non-migrant households. The proportion of male headed households is 
larger for non-migrant than migrant households. The proportion of households with heads who 
have primary education is smaller for migrant than non-migrant households. We also note that 
there is a higher proportion of employed heads in non-migrant compared to migrant households, 
while the opposite is the case for unemployed heads. Migrant households are also shown to have 
more children than non-migrant households. 
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Table 6.2: Description of variables used in the analysis 
Variable Variable description 
Food share (fd_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on food to the total (annual) expenditure of 
the household 
Non-food share (nonfd_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on non-food to the total (annual) 
expenditure of the household 
Utilities share (uti_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on utilities to the total (annual) expenditure 
of the household 
Durables share (dur_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on durables to the total (annual) expenditure 
of the household 
Physical investments share (phy_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on physical investments to the total (annual) 
expenditure of the household 
Education share (educ_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on education to the total (annual) 
expenditure of the household 
Health share (heal_sh) The ratio of the total (annual) expenditure on health to the total expenditure of the 
household 
Log of total household expenditure per 
capita (ln_perK_totexp) 
The logarithm of the per capita total (annual) expenditure of the household 
Total remittances (tot_rem) The total (annual) amount of cash remittances received by the household measured in 
Kenyan shillings 
Receipt of remittances (rec_rem) = 1 if the household received cash remittances; = 0 otherwise 
No cash remittances received 
(no_rem) 
= 1 if the household did not receive any cash remittances; = 0 otherwise 
Receipt of sibling remittances 
(sib_rem) 
= 1 if the household received cash remittances from a sibling; = 0 otherwise   
Receipt of spouse remittances 
(spo_rem) 
= 1 if the household received cash remittances from a spouse of the household head; = 
0 otherwise  
Receipt of significant relatives 
remittances (sig_rem) 
= 1 if the household received cash remittances from other significant relatives  of the 
household head; = 0 otherwise 
Receipt of combined remittances 
(com_rem) 
= 1 if the household received cash remittances from a combination of spouse, siblings 
and other significant relatives of the household head ; = 0 otherwise   
Receipt of in-kind remittances 
(inkind_rem) 
= 1 if the household received in-kind remittances; = 0 otherwise 
Head age < 30 (head_age1) = 1 if the household head is aged less than 30; = 0 otherwise 
Head age 30 to 40 (head_age2) = 1 if the household head is between 30 and 40 years; = 0 otherwise 
Head age 40 to 50 (head_age3) = 1 if the household head is between 40 and 50 years; = 0 otherwise 
Head age 50 to 60 (head_age4) = 1 if the household head is between 50 and 60 years; = 0 otherwise 
Head age > 60 (head_age5) = 1 if the household head is more than 60 years; = 0 otherwise 
Gender of the head (head_sex) = 1 if the household head is male; = 0 otherwise 
Head primary education (head_pri) = 1 if the household head has primary education; = 0 otherwise 
Head secondary education (head_sec) = 1 if the household head has secondary education; = 0 otherwise 
Head university education (head_uni) = 1 if the household head has university education; = 0 otherwise 
Head employed (head_emp) = 1 if the household head is employed; = 0 otherwise 
Head self-employed (head_self) = 1 if the household head is self-employed; = 0 otherwise 
Head unemployed (head_unemp) = 1 if the household head is unemployed; = 0 otherwise 
No. of children (chn_num) The number of children in the household 
Household size (hh_size) The total number of people in the household 
Urban/rural (urbrural) = 1 if the household is located in an urban area; = 0 otherwise 
December = 1 if household was interviewed in December; = 0 otherwise 
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Table 6.3: Summary statistics of main explanatory variables 
  Combined Non-migrant 
(0) 
Migrant (1) t-test/z-
scoreϮ 
Rec-rem (0) Rec-rem (1) t-test/   
z-
scoreϮ 
Dependent variables:       
fd_sh 0.415 (0.238) 0.447 (0.229) 0.397 (0.240) 4.32*** 0.399 (0.245) 0.396 (0.238) 0.20 
nonfd_sh 0.227 (0.200) 0.226 (0.190) 0.228 (0.201) -0.21 0.231 (0.196) 0.227 (0.203) 0.31 
uti_sh 0.2 (0.164) 0.203 (0.157) 0.198 (0.168) 0.57 0.205 (0.173) 0.195 (0.165) 1.06 
dur_sh 0.023 (0.061) 0.019 (0.049) 0.025 (0.067) -1.86** 0.023 (0.058) 0.026 (0.072) -0.84 
phy_sh 0.017 (0.078) 0.014 (0.063) 0.018 (0.085) -1.19 0.015 (0.079) 0.02 (0.088) -0.97 
educ_sh 0.081 (0.137) 0.066 (0.117) 0.089 (0.146) -3.56*** 0.088 (0.148) 0.09 (0.144) -0.21 
heal_sh 0.037 (0.083) 0.025 (0.053) 0.043 (0.095) -4.57*** 0.039 (0.092) 0.046 (0.097) -1.25 
Explanatory variables:       
ln_perK_totexp 10.913 (1.267) 10.606 (1.223) 11.080 (1.259) -7.85*** 11.258 (1.409) 10.977 (1.154) 3.76*** 
tot_rem 73157 (548631) 4639 (43063) 110238 (677572) -3.99*** --- 173354 (843412) --- 
rec_rem 0.450 (0.50) 0.104 (0.305) 0.636 (0.481) -25.70*** --- --- --- 
Remitter relationship dummies: 
sib_rem 0.184 (0.387) --- 0.283 (0.013) --- --- 0.283 (0.451) --- 
spo_rem 0.083 (0.276) --- 0.128 (0.276) --- --- 0.128 (0.334) --- 
sig_rem 0.136 (0.343) 0.104 (0.305) 0.154 (0.361) -3.05*** --- 0.154 (0.361) --- 
com_rem 0.045 (0.207) --- 0.069 (0.254) --- --- 0.069 (0.254) --- 
no_rem 0.552 (0.497) 0.896 (0.304) 0.366 (0.482) 25.60***    
χ2 test (remitter relationships)   541.02***    
inkind_rem 5002 (60398) 390 (3602) 7499 (74827) -2.43*** 3742 (29756) 9650 (91048) -1.32* 
Household head age dummies: 
head_age1 0.139 (0.346) 0.209 (0.407) 0.101 (0.302) 6.47*** 0.077 (0.267) 0.115 (0.320) -2.13** 
head_age2 0.208 (0.406) 0.336 (0.473) 0.139 (0.346) 10.30*** 0.138 (0.345) 0.140 (0.347) -0.09 
head_age3 0.203 (0.402) 0.225 (0.418) 0.190 (0.393) 1.80** 0.210 (0.408) 0.179 (0.383) 1.35* 
head_age4 0.189 (0.391) 0.114 (0.318) 0.229 (0.420) -6.12*** 0.301 (0.459) 0.188 (0.391) 4.56*** 
head_age5 0.259 (0.438) 0.116 (0.320) 0.336 (0.473) -10.70*** 0.267 (0.443) 0.376 (0.485) -3.88*** 
χ2 test (head age)   226.90***   31.17*** 
head_sex 0.687 (0.464) 0.785 (0.411) 0.634 (0.482) 6.81*** 0.762 (0.426) 0.561 (0.500) 7.16*** 
Head education dummies: 
head_pri 0.345 (0.476) 0.367 (0.482) 0.334 (0.472) 1.44* 0.301 (0.459) 0.352 (0.478) -1.83** 
head_sec 0.383 (0.486) 0.400 (0.490) 0.373 (0.484) 1.15 0.367 (0.482) 0.377 (0.485) -0.36 
head_uni 0.115 (0.320) 0.104 (0.305) 0.122 (0.327) -1.19 0.190 (0.393) 0.083 (0.276) 5.56*** 
χ2 test (head education)   8.23**   32.14*** 
Head employment dummies: 
head_emp 0.335 (0.472) 0.443 (0.497) 0.276 (0.447) 7.41*** 0.369 (0.483) 0.223 (0.416) 5.54*** 
head_self 0.381 (0.486) 0.393 (0.489) 0.375 (0.484) 0.76 0.353 (0.478) 0.387 (0.487) -1.19 
head_unemp 0.155 (0.362) 0.110 (0.313) 0.180 (0.384) -4.01*** 0.140 (0.348)  0.202 (0.402) -2.71*** 
χ2 test (head employment)   94.25***   32.68*** 
chn_num 0.595 (0.870) 0.489 (0.831) 0.791 (0.908) 7.27*** 0.400 (0.780) 0.540 (0.855) -2.83*** 
hh_size 4.258 (2.333) 4.231 (2.287) 4.273 (2.358) -0.37 4.041 (2.420) 4.405 (2.313) -2.60*** 
urbrural 0.487 (0.500) 0.498 (0.500) 0.482 (0.500) 0.65 0.597 (0.491) 0.416 (0.493) 6.18*** 
december 0.349 (0.477) 0.355 (0.479) 0.346 (0.476) 0.38 0.312 (0.464) 0.365 (0.482) -1.87** 
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N 1871 657 1214   442 772   
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test here is: H0: μ0 = μ1/ H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants (or remittance receiving and non-receiving).  
(iii) *, **, *** represent the statistical significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
(iv) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between non-migrant and migrant (or remittance receiving and non-
receiving) households for categorical variables. 
 
Some differences relating to remittance receiving and non-remittance receiving migrant 
households are also revealed in the summary statistics. Non-remittance receiving migrant 
households appear to have higher per capita expenditure compared to remittance receiving migrant 
households. We also note from the table that migrant households with male heads are less likely to 
receive remittances. A higher proportion of migrant households with heads who have primary 
education received remittances compared to those that did not, while the opposite is true for the 
case of heads with a university education. The proportion of migrant households that received 
remittances is lower for the case of employed heads and higher for unemployed heads. We also 
note that a higher proportion of households that received remittances had more children compared 
to those that did not receive remittances. Finally, the household size is larger for those migrant 
households that received remittances, and migrant households in urban areas were less likely to 
receive remittances compared to rural households. 
6.3.4 Self-reported remittance data 
 
There are other dependent variables used in the empirical analysis in this chapter to compare 
household remittance budget shares to the corresponding general expenditure budget shares. These 
include the self-reported share of remittances out of total cash remittances received by the 
household allocated to a specific category of commodity. We derive self-reported remittance uses 
from the following question: How did your household spend the money sent by (NAME) in the past 12 
months? Food, education, health, rent (house, land), marriage/funeral, cars/trucks, rebuilt house, built new house, 
business, land purchase, livestock purchase, improved farming, migrant physical investment, financial assets (bonds, 
stocks), transferring to intended recipient, other (specify). The amount of remittances, if any, spent on each 
of these categories is specified. For each category, we restrict the analysis to only those households 
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that reported positive (i.e., non-zero) remittance expenditure in a given category. As such, the 
samples are different in size and composition for each category. There is a reduction in the sample 
sizes across the categories due to censorship in the reported uses of remittances. Of the households 
that received remittances, 74% report having spent them on food, 26% on non-food, 43% on 
education, 43% on health, and 35% on physical investments. Only 87 households report having 
spent the remittances received on utilities. After eliminating observations based on missing data, the 
sample size for utilities becomes even smaller. We therefore exclude this category from our analysis 
due to the small sample size. We also exclude the durable goods category for the same reason.  
In the sample 71% of households reported how the total amount of remittances they received 
were spent. The remainder just reported the use of only a proportion of the remittances received. 
As such, the reported remittances do not add up to the total amount of remittances received for 
this latter set of households. Several explanations could account for this. For example, it could be 
that some households saved some of the remittances received. However, the absence of questions 
relating to whether and how much of remittances were allocated to savings leaves us unsure as to 
whether this is actually the case or not. The shortfall could also be the result of recall errors in the 
way households reported how they used remittances. Or, it could be that at the time of the survey 
some households had not yet spent all of the remittances they had received in the previous 12 
months. 
Table 6.4 presents summary statistics for these additional variables, namely the average 
remittance budget shares. We see that the largest share (nearly half) of total cash remittances 
received is reported to have been spent on physical investments. This is followed by spending on 
food (45%), education (36%), non-food (33%) and health (21%).  
Several points need to be noted about the way households self-reported their uses of 
remittances. As shown above, the question concerning the uses of remittances provided a list of the 
different commodities on which the household may have spent remittances. Households then 
indicated how much, if any, of the remittance income received was spent on each item. The listing 
of commodities may have elicited biased responses if households were more inclined to report 
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higher amounts for categories they found appealing. However, the fact that questions relating to the 
expenditure of households on different commodities were posed in a broadly similar way provides 
a basis to make comparisons between the two. In addition, the advantage of listing the commodities 
is that it avoids mis-reporting that may result from reliance on free recall. Furthermore, listing 
commodities has the advantage of enabling us to make more meaningful comparisons across 
households. This is because an open-ended question may have resulted in too many divergent 
responses, thus making it difficult to classify into commodity groups. 
Table 6.4: Summary statistics for dependent variables for self-reported remittance uses 
Variable Variable description Mean (stan dev) N 
fdrem_sh The ratio of remittances reported to have been spent on food to total 
cash remittances received by the household 
0.45 (0.311) 572 
nonfdrem_sh The ratio of remittances reported to have been spent on non-food items 
to total cash remittances received by the household 
0.33 (0.320) 197 
edurem_sh The ratio of remittances reported to have been spent on education to 
total cash remittances received by the household 
0.36 (0.287) 329 
healrem_sh The ratio of remittances reported to have been spent on health to total 
cash remittances received by the household 
0.21 (0.217) 331 
phyrem_sh The ratio of remittances reported to have been spent on physical 
investments to cash total remittances received by the household 
0.49 (0.318) 271 
       
Notes to the table:  
(i) The household compositions differ under each category. 
 
Another issue is that the way the uses of remittances are reported reveals the presence of spikes 
at predictable thresholds of the remittance shares.27 In particular, the data reveal bunching at the 
following proportions: 1, 0.5, 0.333, 0.25, 0.666 and 0.166. This shows that in responding to the 
question, respondents most likely estimated how much they spent out of total remittances using 
fractions. For instance, a respondent may reason that they spent one-half or a third of the 
remittances received on food. This implies that the responses provided may be subject to a 
measurement error due to the manner in which the use of remittances was recalled.28 A potential 
consequence of this measurement error is to inflate the standard errors of the coefficients in the 
                                                          
27 This is not the case when households report their uses of general income. 
28 The presence of spikes could potentially be dealt with econometrically using an interval regression model, for example. 
However, this approach is not pursued in the current study. 
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regression model thus making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis (see, e.g., Wooldridge 
2010, p. 79-82).  
In addition, there are four cases where the sum of the self-reported uses of remittances 
exceeded the total amount of remittances the households are reported to have received. We 
eliminate these four observations from the final analysis. Finally, the samples that we use in 
conducting the remittance use analysis are very selective. It is quite likely that there is selection bias 
with regards to the type of households that report spending remittances on certain categories of 
goods. However, these types of bias are ignored for the purpose of this analysis as they are difficult 
to model econometrically in the absence of good instrumentation and more adequate information. 
6.4  Empirical methodology 
6.4.1  Almost Ideal Demand System framework 
 
The empirical methodology we adopt uses a demand analysis structure to estimate household 
budget shares for different commodities within an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
framework (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). The AIDS model is one of the most popular 
demand system models used in the literature. The model and its variants have been used extensively 
in empirical studies to analyse household consumer behaviour. Within the AIDS framework, the 
budget shares of the various commodities are linearly related to the logarithm of real total 
expenditure and the logarithms of relative prices. The model possesses most of the properties that 
are desirable in conventional demand analysis and has a functional form which is consistent for use 
with household budget and cross-sectional data (Deaton and Muellbauer 1986, Deaton 1997). In 
cross-section studies it is concerned with the explanation of behavioural differences between 
households (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980 p. 18). In such studies, it is usually assumed that all 
households face identical prices such that the explanations for behavioural differences are found 
exclusively in terms of the differences in total expenditure and in household characteristics. 
The AIDS model has been applied across a wide range of applications in order to compute, 
inter alia, expenditure elasticities and marginal budget shares for different categories of commodities. 
For example, Case and Deaton (1998) assess the effects of pension cash receipts on the allocation 
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of income to food, schooling, transfers and savings. Other studies that have employed variants of 
the AIDS model to analyse the expenditure patterns of households include Maitra and Ray (2003), 
Zarate-Hoyos (2004), Adams (2005), Taylor and Mora (2006), Castaldo and Reilly (2007), Tabuga 
(2007), and Adams and Cuecuecha (2010).  
A common functional form for the AIDS model is the Working-Leser model which describes 
household expenditure behaviour by relating budget shares linearly to the logarithm of total 
household expenditure (see Working 1943, Leser 1963) and can be expressed as follows:  
                         (6.1) 
where     represents the share of good   in household   (i.e., the ratio of expenditure on good   to 
total household expenditure). This implies that the proportion of total expenditure devoted to good 
  tends to decrease in an arithmetic progression as total expenditure increases in a geometric 
progression.    is total household expenditure,    and    are unknown parameters to be estimated 
and     is an error term. 
A key property of the demand function is the adding-up restriction. Adding up requires that 
       and this is satisfied provided the following parametric restrictions are met: 
     ,             (6.2)  
If equation (6.1) is estimated equation by equation using ordinary least squares,29 the parameter 
estimates     and     will satisfy equation (6.2) automatically (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980 p. 23-
24).  
A number of extensions have been introduced into the basic Working-Leser model to include 
other factors that may affect the budget shares of different types of goods. Following Castaldo and 
Reilly (2007), we include controls for the different sources of migrant remittances and specify the 
model as follows: 
                                                          
29 A shortcoming encountered in using OLS is that it does not take into account the correlation in the error terms across 
all the budget equations. As a robustness check, we use the seemingly unrelated regression estimator (SURE) as it 
addresses this issue. 
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            (6.3)  
where           households.    is the budget share of good   in household  ,    is the total 
expenditure per capita of household  ,   
  is a vector of household and regional characteristics (see 
Table 6.3). The    and    are again the unknown parameters corresponding to the  th good,    is an 
unknown parameter vector to be estimated, and     is an error term that captures the unknown 
variation in the     budget share for the     household. The    vector contains a mutually exclusive 
set of dummy variables capturing whether the household received remittances from a sibling, 
spouse, significant relative, a combination of the former, or no remittances at all. The estimates for 
the    vector reveal the magnitude of the impact of different types of remittances received on the 
relevant budget share. 
An important assumption of this variant of the AIDS model is the separability of preferences. 
This means that commodities can be partitioned into groups so that preferences within groups can 
be described independently of the quantities in the other groups (Deaton and Muellbauer op. cit. p. 
122 - 127). This implies that we can have a sub-utility function for each group and that the values 
of these sub-utilities combine to yield total utility. Thus, we can assume that households will 
allocate their income among different commodities in the same manner as each other. 
Marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities can be computed from the OLS estimates 
from the budget share equations. Following Castaldo and Reilly (2007), we present expressions for 
the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities. In equation (6.3), the marginal budget share 
for good   and household   is defined as follows:  
       
    
   
        (6.4)  
where     is the consumption of good   by household  , and    is the total consumption by 
household  . The budget share of good   and household   is defined as: 
     
   
  
        (6.5) 
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After some manipulation the marginal budget share is derived as: 
            
   
  
               (6.6)  
OLS estimates and the mean budget shares can be used to calculate the above expression. 
Using the definition of elasticity, the expenditure elasticity of good   for household   is 
computed in the conventional way as follows: 
               
 
   
  
   
   
       (6.7)  
The computation of elasticities has the advantage that it allows us to determine if a good is a luxury 
(     ), necessity (     ) or indeed an inferior good (     ). The sampling variances for (6.6) 
and (6.7) are easily computable assuming    is evaluated at its sample mean. 
A main concern in the application of budget share equations to cross-sectional household data 
is that there is a censorship effect when it comes to the decision of whether or not to spend on 
certain expenditure items. In the current application, it is reasonable to treat certain expenditure 
categories as non-censored as there are only a small number of households that report zero 
expenditures. These include the categories of food, non-food and utilities.30 On the other hand, 
durable goods, physical investments, education and health are censored given 50%, 84%, 40%, and 
32% of households have respectively zero expenditure for these categories. It is intuitive that many 
households will have zero expenditures for these categories as the assets comprising the categories 
are quite lumpy (e.g., vehicles, houses, land, and equipment). For education, there are households 
that do not have children of school going age. In terms of health, some households may not have 
anyone requiring medical treatment during the period of observation, and thus have a zero 
expenditure in this category. Hence, household expenditure on these categories is observed only 
when its spending is greater than zero. Thus, the three main reasons for a zero expenditure on a 
good are permanent zero expenditures,31 zero expenditure during the survey period32 and optimal 
                                                          
30 There are only four (0.2%), 99 (5%), and 67 (4%) households with zero expenditures for these respective categories. 
31 Permanent zero expenditure occurs in the case where a household will never consume the commodity. 
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zero expenditure33 (Tafere et al. 2010). The budget shares for the aforementioned categories are 
thus censored at zero. This implies that the samples for which positive expenditures in these 
categories are observed may not be random and failure to correct for this will yield potentially 
biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.  
One way to address this censorship would be to use a two-step procedure where a probit 
model is estimated in the first stage for expenditure on each category and the inverse-Mills ratios 
are then computed. In the second stage, the inverse-Mills ratios are then included as right hand 
variables in the corresponding budget share equations as a way of correcting for the truncation 
effect. However, the main challenge of doing this is that of identifying variables that shift the 
probability but not the level of spending. It is very difficult to obtain relevant identifying variables 
in cross-sectional household data. However, we only employ this method as a robustness check in 
this case here. 
Another important issue to consider is the potential endogeneity of the remittances variable 
itself. This endogeneity may arise due to the presence of variables that affect the receipt of 
remittances by households as well as their expenditure on certain categories. Failure to control for 
the endogeneity of remittances is likely to result in biased estimates for the effects of remittances on 
commodity expenditures. 
Having noted that the dependent variable for commodity expenditure is potentially censored in 
certain circumstances and that remittances are potentially endogenous, the subsequent chapter 
addresses these two issues in more detail for the case of physical investments and durable goods.34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
32 This type of zero expenditure arises when the frequency with which households purchase the goods is such that the 
survey period is not long enough to capture it. 
33 Optimal zero expenditure occurs if households would potentially purchase the good at a different price and income 
level.   
34 Focussing on these two categories is justified by the fact that the budget shares analysis presented and discussed in 
section 6.5 reveals that they are the only two categories for which the receipt of remittances has a positive and significant 
effect on the household budget shares. 
171 
 
 
 
6.5  Empirical results 
6.5.1  Budget share expenditure estimates  
 
We first start by investigating the marginal spending behaviour of the different types of Kenyan 
households. Table 6.5 presents estimates of the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities 
for the seven categories of interest and separately for non-migrant (0) and migrant (1) households. 
These estimates are computed from budget share equation coefficients corresponding to the 
logarithm of total expenditure per capita estimated using OLS on equations (6.1) and (6.3) (see 
Table A6.1 of the Appendix). The table also presents test statistics for t-tests that were conducted 
for the differences in marginal budget shares and elasticities between non-migrant and migrant 
households for each category of commodity. 
The t-tests to determine whether the expenditure elasticities are statistically different between 
migrant and non-migrant households reveal that they are only different for the utilities category. 
Non-migrant households have a more elastic expenditure response to utility purchases than migrant 
households. The classification of utility purchases is as a necessary good for migrant households but 
a luxury one for non-migrant households. There are no differences in the responsiveness of 
expenditure to purchases for the majority of the commodity categories. Food is shown to be a 
necessary good for both migrant and non-migrant households. Non-food, durable goods, physical 
investments, education and health are all shown to be luxury items for both sets of households. 
The t-tests computed to determine whether the marginal budget shares are statistically different 
between migrant and non-migrant households reveal that there are statistically significant 
differences for all the commodity categories. In particular, a one shilling increase in the household 
budget per capita results in a 0.29 of a shilling increase in expenditure on food commodities, on 
average and ceteris paribus, for migrant households, and a 0.32 of a shilling increase for non-migrant 
households. A one shilling increase in the household budget per capita increases expenditure on 
non-food commodities by 0.28 and 0.30 of a shilling for migrant and non-migrant households 
respectively, on average and ceteris paribus, and increases expenditure on utilities by 0.19 and 0.22 of 
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a shilling respectively. These findings reveal that non-migrant households spend more at the margin 
on goods which yield short-term utility and are immediately consumable.  
Table 6.5: Marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities (migrant vs. non-migrant households) 
  MBS (0) MBS (1) t-testϮ  η (0) η (1) t-testϝ  
fd_sh 0.32*** 0.29*** -2.82*** 0.72 *** 0.73*** 0.41 
 
(0.008) (0.007)  (0.018) (0.016)  
nonfd_sh 0.3*** 0.28*** -1.75* 1.31*** 1.25*** -1.22 
 
(0.009) (0.007)   (0.039)  (0.030)  
uti_sh 0.22*** 0.19*** -3*** 1.09*** 0.93 *** -3.25*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006)   (0.039) (0.030)  
dur_sh 0.03*** 0.04*** 2.36*** 1.42*** 1.49 *** 0.36 
 
(0.003) (0.003)  (0.157) (0.119) 
 
phy_sh 0.03*** 0.04*** 1.77* 2.11*** 1.97*** -0.39 
 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.287) (0.203)  
educ_sh 0.08*** 0.11*** 3.84*** 1.14*** 1.25*** 1.12 
 
(0.006) (0.005)  (0.084)  (0.051)  
heal_sh 0.03*** 0.06*** 6.71*** 1.16*** 1.27 *** 0.97 
 
(0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.075) (0.085)  
    
  
 
   
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) The marginal budget shares and the elasticities were derived from the OLS estimates presented in Table A6.1 
(see section 6.4.1. for the formulas). The same sets of variables were used in both regressions, with the 
exception of remittance dummy variables which appear only in the regression for migrant households. 
(iii) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The null hypothesis under test is H0: MBS1 – MBS0 = 0. 
(v) ϝ  The null hypothesis under test is H0: η1 – η0 = 0. 
(vi) t-tests for unitary expenditure elasticity for migrant households gave the following test statistics: -16.59; 8.25; -
2.2; 4.14; 4.8; 4.91; 3.21, respectively. 
(vii) t-tests for unitary expenditure elasticity for migrant households gave the following test statistics: -15.5; 7.9; 2.2; 
2.66; 3.87; 1.69; 2.15, respectively. 
 
The table also reveals that Kenyan migrant households spend more at the margin than non-
migrant households on productive and human capital investments. In particular, the effect induced 
by a one shilling increase in the household budget per capita is at least 0.01 of a shilling higher for 
expenditure on durable goods, physical investments, education and health for migrant compared to 
non-migrant households, on average and ceteris paribus. Migrant households therefore spend more 
on investments that yield long-term utility. Thus, there are significant differentials in the marginal 
spending behaviour of households according to their migrant status.  
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Adams (1991) also found evidence that Egyptian migrant households did not spend a 
disproportionate share of their income on consumption goods but rather on durable and 
investment goods. However, we note that Adam’s study is not directly comparable to ours due to 
differences in expenditure classifications. For example, Adams classifies housing under durable 
goods while we classify it here under physical investments. However, the study’s broad findings are 
in comport with ours. Another comparable study is that of Taylor and Mora (2006) who find that 
as total expenditures in Mexican households with migrants increase, the share of income used for 
investments also increases, while the share spent on consumption falls compared to non-migrant 
households. 
The use of per capita household expenditure without adjusting expenditure using adult 
equivalence scales may raise concerns about measurement error here. To assess the impact of this 
possible bias, we adjust the per capita expenditure measure such that each child (below seven years) 
counts as half an adult and re-estimate the OLS models. Table A6.2 of the Appendix reveals the 
OLS estimates using the adjusted expenditure variable separately for migrant and non-migrant 
households. We see that the per capita expenditure and the adjusted expenditure coefficients are 
comparable in terms of their signs, magnitudes and statistical significance. Table A6.3 of the 
Appendix reports estimates of the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities computed 
using the adult equivalent expenditure and the t-tests for differences between migrant and non-
migrant households. We see that the same differences between the marginal budget shares and the 
expenditure elasticities obtained using the non-adjusted total expenditure per capita variable are 
revealed when adult equivalent expenditure is used for all categories of expenditure. In addition, the 
classification of commodities remains unchanged. Thus, the results are invariant to the use of adult 
equivalence scales. 
We now restrict the analysis of the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities to those 
households that have migrants. We limit the sample to migrant households only in order to account 
for selection in terms of the migration decision. It could be argued that there are systematic 
differences in unobservable characteristics between migrant and non-migrant households. For 
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example, migrant households could have access to certain resources that are not available to non-
migrant ones.35 One way of addressing this selection bias would be to employ an instrumental 
variables approach. However, a lack of adequate instruments prevents us from exploring this 
approach in a meaningful way.36 We therefore conduct the analysis conditional on migration. 
Table 6.6 contains estimates of the marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities for the 
seven categories of interest for remittance receiving and non-receiving migrant households (see 
Table A6.4 of the Appendix for the corresponding OLS estimates).  
Table 6.6: Marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities (remittance vs. non-remittance receiving migrant 
households) 
 MBS (0) MBS(1) t-test Ϯ η (0) η (1) t-test ϝ 
fd_sh 0.29*** 0.29*** 0 0.73*** 0.73***  0 
 
(0.010) (0.009)  (0.024) (0.022)  
nonfd_sh 0.29*** 0.28*** -0.70 1.28*** 1.24*** -0.64 
 
(0.011) (0.009)  (0.049)  (0.039)  
uti_sh 0.2*** 0.18*** -1.60 0.96*** 0.91 *** -0.81 
 
(0.011) (0.006)  (0.052) (0.033)  
dur_sh 0.03*** 0.04*** 1.77* 1.49*** 1.49*** 0 
 
(0.004) (0.004)  (0.191) (0.159)  
phy_sh 0.03*** 0.04*** 1.41 1.85*** 2.02*** 0.42 
 
(0.005) (0.005)  (0.302) (0.262)  
educ_sh 0.11*** 0.11*** 0 1.27*** 1.23*** 0.35 
 
(0.009) (0.005)  (0.102) (0.055)  
heal_sh 0.05*** 0.06*** 1.39 1.17*** 1.32*** 0.80 
 
(0.006) (0.004)  (0.162) (0.093)  
   
 
  
 
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) The marginal budget shares and the elasticities were derived from the OLS estimates reported in Table A6.4 in 
the Appendix (see section 6.4.1. for the formulas). The same sets of variables were used in both regressions. 
(iii) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The null hypothesis under test is H0: MBS1 – MBS0 = 0. 
(v) ϝ  The null hypothesis under test is H0: η1 – η0 = 0. 
(vi) t-tests for unitary expenditure elasticity for remittance receiving households gave the following test statistics: -
12.13; 6.25; -2.68; 3.07; 3.89; 4.12; 3.39, respectively. 
(vii) t-tests for unitary expenditure elasticity for non-remittance receiving households gave the following test 
statistics: -11.24; 5.59; -0.82; 2.56; 2.8; 2.64; 1.03, respectively. 
                                                          
35 For instance, migrants could pass on knowledge acquired in the destination to households and this may affect their 
expenditure decisions. 
36 For example, we consider using historical rainfall shocks. The argument is that rainfall is correlated with agricultural 
production and income, and so too little rainfall in one year may cause people to migrate out of rural areas (see Adams 
and Cuecuecha 2010). Rainfall from previous time periods should however not be correlated with current expenditure 
patterns. However, variables measuring rainfall from various historical time periods yield statistically insignificant effects 
for the migrant status of the household thus failing to provide relevant instruments. This may be due to a lack of adequate 
variation in the rainfall variables as we can only access rainfall data at the level of the enumeration area. Because the 
dataset does not contain any geographic coordinates, we cannot determine the exact location of households and use more 
disaggregated rainfall measures. 
175 
 
 
 
The elasticity estimates reveal that food and utilities are necessary goods for both remittance 
and non-remittance receiving migrant households. The remaining commodities are shown to be 
luxury goods for both sets of households. The t-tests for the differences in elasticity estimates 
between the two sets of migrant households reveal that there are no statistically significant 
differences in elasticities for these households across any of the commodities. Therefore, we see 
that the responsiveness of expenditure to purchases of commodities is similar for migrant 
households whether or not they receive remittances. In the literature, Zarate-Hoyos (2008) finds 
that remittance receiving households have lower income elasticities for current consumption and 
durable consumer goods than non-receiving households. However, the study does not report 
separate elasticities for each component of current consumption (i.e., food, non-food, and utilities 
expenditure). It is therefore not possible to make a more elaborate comparison of the elasticity 
estimates between our study and that of Zarate-Hoyos. 
The t-tests for differences in the marginal budget shares between the two groups of households 
reveal that the marginal budget share for durable goods is higher for remittance receiving 
households at the 10% level of significance. In particular, a one shilling increase in the household 
budget per capita increases expenditure on durable goods by 0.04 and 0.03 of a shilling for 
remittance receiving and non-receiving migrant households respectively, on average and ceteris 
paribus. There are no statistically significant differences in marginal budget shares between these two 
household types for the other categories. Thus, the findings reveal that migrant households 
receiving remittances are spending more at the margin towards durable goods than those not 
receiving remittances.  
  In the literature, the findings of Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) differ from ours in a number of 
key respects. They find that Guatemalan households receiving international remittances spend less 
at the margin on food compared to what they would have spent on this good without remittances. 
In addition, households receiving either internal or international remittances spend more at the 
margin on education and housing compared to what they would have spent on these goods without 
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remittances. However, it is quite challenging to compare our findings with those obtained by similar 
studies in the literature due to differences in commodity classifications. 
Overall, we see that the findings reveal little differences in the expenditure behaviour of 
migrant households that receive remittances and those that do not. However, given the finding that 
the marginal budget shares for durable goods are larger for remittance receiving than non-receiving 
households, we anticipate that there may be some differential allocation of income towards 
expenditure according to the source of income (i.e., remittance versus general income). We now 
therefore undertake an analysis that enables us to determine whether or not households pool their 
general and remittance income together when allocating the budget towards different expenditure 
categories. In other words, do remittance and general income exert different household expenditure 
behavioural impacts? The ensuing analysis enables us to test the unitary model which posits that 
households pool their income together when allocating it to expenditure such that it is total income, 
and not the composition of income that matters.  
A standard approach used in the literature to test the unitary model is to include separate 
variables for general and other income in the budget share equations and determine whether other 
income has a significant effect on the budget shares (see, e.g., Maitra and Ray 2003, Case and 
Deaton 1998). Thus, a modified version of equation (6.1) is re-estimated to include a dummy 
variable capturing whether or not a household received remittances. We also estimate another 
model where the actual amount of cash remittances received by households is the variable of 
interest rather than using a remittance receipt dummy variable. A central motivation in using the 
actual amount of remittances is that a dummy variable aggregates remittances received into one 
category. For example, the receipt of 100 shillings is treated the same as the receipt of 10,000 
shillings. In addition, a dummy variable may reflect other things besides the effect of remittance 
income on household expenditure. For instance, there could be a transfer of knowledge or 
information by the remitter that influences the way the household allocates its budget. The use of 
the actual amount of remittances received by households allows us to further explore the effect of 
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remittances while taking into account the actual variation in the amount of remittances received by 
households.  
Table 6.7 reports OLS budget share estimates for the seven categories of commodities. The top 
panel of the table reports the effect for the dummy variable measuring whether or not a household 
received remittances and the bottom panel reports the effect for the total amount of cash 
remittances received. In the bottom part of the table, the estimates for the non-food share category 
suggest that a 10,000 shilling increase in annual remittances reduces the non-food expenditure share 
by 0.09 of one percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. The sample mean of remittances for 
migrant households is 110,238 shillings. Hence, a 10,000 shilling increase represents an increase of 
about 10% relative to the sample mean.  
Table 6.7: OLS estimates for budget share equations with remittances variables (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        ln_perK_totexp -0.108*** 0.0566*** -0.0129** 0.0120*** 0.0182*** 0.0225*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00649) (0.00683) (0.00585) (0.00293) (0.00376) (0.00459) (0.00366) 
rec_rem -0.0104 0.00240 -0.00466 0.00781** 0.00359 0.00442 -0.00312 
 
(0.0121) (0.0119) (0.00995) (0.00395) (0.00454) (0.00841) (0.00572) 
        Regional dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.376 0.138 0.169 0.068 0.068 0.136 0.095 
                
        ln_perK_totexp -0.109*** 0.0573*** -0.0125** 0.0119*** 0.0176*** 0.0224*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00653) (0.00684) (0.00582) (0.00296) (0.00365) (0.00464) (0.00366) 
tot_rem -2.11e-09 -8.92e-09** -8.72e-09** 5.69e-09*** 1.11e-08 3.57e-09 -5.65e-10 
 
(5.27e-09) (4.31e-09) (4.29e-09) (2.09e-09) (7.65e-09) (9.46e-09) (1.74e-09) 
        Regional dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Other variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.375 0.139 0.170 0.069 0.075 0.137 0.094 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
178 
 
 
 
The estimates for the utilities category suggest that a 10,000 shilling increase in annual 
remittances reduces the utilities expenditure share by 0.09 of one percentage point, on average and 
ceteris paribus.37 
We see that the receipt of remittances increases the share of the budget allocated to the durable 
goods category by 0.78 of one percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. The estimates for the 
durable goods category suggest that a 10,000 shilling increase in annual remittances increases the 
durable goods expenditure share by 0.06 of one percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. This 
finding mirrors the earlier finding that remittance receiving households spend more at the margin 
on durable goods compared to non-receiving households.   
The explanation for these findings may be that the remittance sender or receiver has specific 
preferences for what remittances should be used for. If this is the case, the preference is for 
remittances not to be spent towards consumable goods but rather towards goods that yield utility 
over time. The uses of remittances according to their source are the subject of more detailed 
investigation in the subsequent analysis. Thus, for durable goods the evidence we obtain here 
suggests a rejection of the unitary model in support of non-unitary models where different types of 
income appear to be allocated to expenditure differentially. Studies such as Edwards and Ureta 
(2003) and Cattaneo (2012) have also obtained evidence against the unitary model in the uses of 
remittances by households.  
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model discussed above using expenditure figures for 
six months (as opposed to aggregating expenditure to the yearly level). Given that the remittances 
reported are at the yearly level (see section 6.3.1), we proxy their value for the six months 
corresponding to that reported for expenditure by halving them. The estimates we obtain are 
reported in Table A6.5 of the Appendix. There are no major differences in the findings obtained in 
terms of the signs and significance of the coefficients, though, as expected, the magnitudes are 
different. 
                                                          
37 The finding of significant effects in the non-food and utility categories may be due to the receipt of in-kind remittances 
that fall within these categories (see the explanation provided in relation to Table 6.8 below).  
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We also include, in addition to the variable measuring the total amount of cash remittances 
received, a variable capturing the total value of in-kind remittances received by the household.38 
Table 6.8 reveals that a 1,000 shilling increase in such remittances increases the food expenditure 
share by 0.0001 of one percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. The sample mean value of 
in-kind remittances is 7,499 shillings. Therefore, a 1,000 shilling increase represents an increase of 
13% relative to the sample mean. The finding of a positive effect for in-kind remittances on the 
food category appears reasonable because households reported imputed values for their food 
expenditures. It also potentially reveals that in-kind remittances complement food expenditure 
shares. A 1,000 shilling increase in in-kind remittances decreases the utilities and education 
expenditure shares by 0.00001 and 0.00008 of a percentage point respectively, and increases the 
durables expenditure share by 0.00003 of a percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. These 
represent fairly modest effects in all cases. The receipt of in-kind remittances has a negative effect 
on the utilities and education categories possibly because households in the survey do not report 
imputed values of expenditure for these two categories of commodity.39 Therefore, any in-kind 
remittances received by the household that fall into these categories are not captured in the 
expenditure figures but would have a negative effect on expenditure, and thus present as a negative 
coefficient for the in-kind remittances variable. The negative effect also suggests that in-kind 
remittances substitute utilities and education expenditure shares. On the other hand, the positive 
effect on durable goods could potentially be explained by the fact that the receipt of in-kind 
remittances frees up income that is then re-allocated to durable goods expenditure. This finding is 
consistent with the reported estimate for the cash remittances variable.40 Thus, in-kind remittances 
complement the share of expenditure allocated to durable goods. 
 
                                                          
38 It could be argued that in-kind remittances should be treated as part of the dependent variable. However, it is difficult 
to neatly separate in-kind remittances into the dependent variable expenditure categories as their value is aggregated in 
some cases. 
39 In the utilities category, only rent is imputed.  
40 A similar analysis is conducted for the sample of remittance receiving households only. The findings are consistent with 
those discussed above. 
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Table 6.8: OLS estimates for budget share equations with cash and in-kind remittances (migrant households 
only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
 
       
ln_perK_totexp -0.109*** 0.0573*** -0.0121** 0.0117*** 0.0177*** 0.0229*** 0.0117*** 
 
(0.00656) (0.00685) (0.00582) (0.00298) (0.00367) (0.00465) (0.00366) 
tot_rem -2.94E-09 -8.80e-09** -8.25e-09* 5.46e-09** 1.11E-08 4.17E-09 -7.68E-10 
 
(4.82E-09) (4.33E-09) (4.29E-09) (2.12E-09) (7.72E-09) (9.10E-09) (1.74E-09) 
inkind_rem 1.08e-07*** -1.59E-08 -6.18e-08*** 3.01e-08** -8.92E-09 -7.77e-08*** 2.64E-08 
 
(2.25E-08) (2.37E-08) (2.13E-08) (1.39E-08) (1.64E-08) (2.50E-08) (4.16E-08) 
 
       
Other variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional 
dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.376 0.139 0.17 0.07 0.075 0.138 0.095 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
We now proceed to investigate the impact of the relationship of the remitter to the household 
on the budget shares of households. The key research question here is whether different types of 
remitters exert differential impact on the allocations of remittances to expenditure. Thus, we 
ascertain how the relationship of the remitter to the household impacts household budget 
allocations. Table 6.9 provides OLS budget share estimates for migrant households only and 
includes dummy variables for the relationship of the remitter to the household as the variables of 
primary interest (see equation (6.3)). The estimates reveal that there are only two cases where there 
are differences in the allocation of the budget shares according to the identity of the remitter. We 
see that the receipt of remittances from sibling migrants increases the share of the budget allocated 
to the durable goods category by 1.23 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, compared to 
not receiving any remittances. The sample average budget share of expenditure on durable goods is 
0.023. The impact effect of the budget share increase of household expenditures on items within 
this category corresponds to a 54% increase relative to the mean. Thus sibling remitters have a 
significant say in the use of the remittances they send towards durable goods. 
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 The receipt of spouse remittances increases the budget share allocated to physical investments 
by 2.1 percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus, relative to not receiving any remittances. The 
sample average budget share of expenditure on physical investments is 0.017. Hence, the impact 
effect here suggests that the budget shares of physical investments are about 124% higher, on 
average and ceteris paribus, for migrant households that receive spouse remittances compared to 
those that receive no remittances at all.  
Table 6.9: OLS estimates for budget share equations with remitter dummy variables (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        
ln_perK_totexp -0.108*** 0.0564*** -0.0129** 0.0123*** 0.0179*** 0.0226*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00651) (0.00684) (0.00587) (0.00297) (0.00373) (0.00460) (0.00371) 
sib_rem -0.0157 0.00772 -0.00367 0.0123** 0.00141 0.00405 -0.00610 
 
(0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.00524) (0.00592) (0.0112) (0.00771) 
spo_rem -0.00492 -0.000806 -0.0195 -0.000481 0.0205* 0.00577 -0.000486 
 
(0.0213) (0.0207) (0.0160) (0.00569) (0.0111) (0.0131) (0.00865) 
sig_rem -0.00245 -0.00617 0.000364 0.00803 -0.000893 -0.000886 0.00201 
 
(0.0172) (0.0163) (0.0129) (0.00587) (0.00449) (0.0111) (0.00733) 
com_rem -0.0355 0.0184 0.0209 0.000499 0.00120 -0.000839 -0.00469 
 
(0.0227) (0.0256) (0.0223) (0.00460) (0.00993) (0.0177) (0.0126) 
no_rem base group 
        
Other variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.139 0.171 0.072 0.072 0.137 0.095 
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
The foregoing effects demonstrate fairly sizeable increases in the durable goods and physical 
investments budget shares attributable to the receipt of sibling and spouse remittances respectively. 
There a number of possible explanations for these findings. The findings could be explained within 
a principal-agent framework where the remitter has specific preferences for how remittances should 
be spent but the household actually allocates the remittances. The closeness of the relationship of 
the remitter to the household may affect the extent to which the remitter can enforce his/her 
contract upon the receiving household as well as the ability of the remitter to monitor and/or 
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control the use of remittances. Since sibling and spouse remitters are closely related to the 
household of origin, they are likely to be in a better position to monitor or enforce the uses of the 
remittances they send. Thus, instead of the household pooling remittances by siblings and spouses 
together with general income41, we see that these remittances are allocated differently to household 
expenditure than remittances from other remitters who are less able to monitor or enforce how 
their remittances are spent. As such, we see that the preference of remitters closely related to the 
household is for the use of remittances towards goods that yield utility over time rather than those 
that are expended immediately. Thus, under the reasonable assumption that sibling and spouse 
remitters have a significant say as to the uses of the remittances they send, we see a preference for 
the uses of remittances towards physical investments and durable goods.  
Also, the greater ability of spouses and siblings to monitor the uses of remittances (e.g. during 
visits or communications with other members of the household) suggests that the uses of 
remittances by the household are more likely to comply with the desires of the remitter. There is 
evidence in the literature suggesting that to prevent remittances from being diverted towards uses 
they do not approve of, Kenyan spouse migrants actively monitor the uses of remittances sent to 
the household in a number of ways, including through relatives and during personal visits (see, e.g., 
de Laat 2014).42 It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the uses of remittances by Kenyan 
households for the acquisition of physical investments and durable goods are uses that are 
approved by the remitters.  
Several reasons may account for why spouses and siblings prefer remittances to be allocated 
towards these commodities. For example, physical investments and durable goods are more visible 
                                                          
41 This is the case for remittances from other remitters as no statistically significant effect is obtained on the remitter 
variables.   
42 Unfortunately in our dataset we do not have variables that could be used to proxy the extent to which the use of 
remittances can be monitored by migrants. For example, there is no information about the number of visits by migrants 
to the household over the past year. We attempt to use the number of remittance transfers to the household as a proxy 
under the assumption that migrants who transfer remittances frequently have regular contact with the household and may 
be better able to control the uses of remittances. However, the variable yields a statistically insignificant effect for all 
categories of commodities. We also use variables capturing the channel of remittance transfer. The use of remittances 
brought by the migrant in person may be easier to monitor compared to those transmitted through channels such as 
Western Union or M-PESA. However, we find no significant effect for the variable capturing the transmission of 
remittances in person. This may be due to the fact that they are only a few households (94 households) who report to 
have received remittances from migrants in person.  
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and last longer than, say, consumable goods. As such, it is easier to monitor whether remittances 
have been used to acquire such commodities. Also, since these commodities yield utility over time, 
remitters may be in a position to derive utility from them during visits, or upon eventual return to 
the household. It is plausible to assume that spouse migrants will eventually return to the 
household. The acquisition of physical investments would enable them to utilize such investments 
through, for instance, engaging in some form of productive activity, or in the case of housing, 
residing in the house. By investing in durable goods, siblings may be able to utilize them during 
visits (e.g. a car can provide transportation during a visit) or upon eventual return to the household. 
Unfortunately our data lack information relating to the return plans of migrants and therefore we 
are unable to test these suggestions.  
Another explanation for the allocation of remittances towards physical investments and durable 
goods may be found in the permanent income hypothesis. This hypothesis asserts that households 
are likely to spend transitory income (like remittances) towards investments while permanent 
income is likely to be spent on consumption goods (see Adams 1998). Thus, the impact of sibling 
and spouse remittances on durable goods and physical investments which are not immediately 
consumable may reflect that the household views remittances as transitory as opposed to 
permanent income. As already suggested, it can be plausibly assumed that at some point a spouse 
migrant will return to the household of origin and therefore not remit anymore. For sibling 
remittances, in chapter 5 we found evidence of the remittance decay hypothesis as sibling migrants 
are more likely to remit in the initial years of their migration, compared to later years. There is also 
extensive evidence in the literature in support of the remittance decay hypothesis (e.g. Johnson and 
Whitelaw 1974, Banerjee 1984, Funkhouser 1995). Thus, the view that remittances are not 
permanent income may induce households to spend them towards goods that have longer utility. 
Or, the remitters themselves may perceive the remittances they send to be transitory in nature and 
therefore prefer them to be spent on more durable goods and investments. The fact that the impact 
is only significant for the case of sibling and spouse remitters, and not for other remitters, seems to 
favour the idea that it is the remitters influencing the allocation of remittances towards specific 
commodity categories, rather than the receiving household itself. Hence, the more plausible 
184 
 
 
 
explanation seems to be one where the relative bargaining powers of sibling and spouse remitters 
influence the uses of remittances towards physical investments and durable goods. The possible 
reasons for these preferences have been discussed above. 
Alternatively, there is evidence in the literature suggesting that remitters may be concerned 
about their prestige or social status within the community or among household members (see, e.g., 
Naiditch and Vranceanu 2011). Since durable goods and physical investments are conspicuous 
commodities, their acquisition may be a way of signalling success in the destination and thus 
increasing social status. 
Overall the findings reveal little evidence that remitter identities matter in influencing budget 
share allocations except in the case of physical investments and durable goods. Those remitters that 
have the closest relationship with the household (i.e., siblings and spouses) have a significant say 
over how remittances are spent and prefer remittances to be allocated to physical investments and 
durable goods. These two categories of expenditure will be the subject of detailed investigation in 
the subsequent chapter. In contrast, other types of remitters do not, or are unable to, enforce or 
specify the uses of the remittances they send. 
Our findings are in contrast with those of Guzman et al. (2008) who examine the effect of the 
relationship of the remitter to the household. They find that if the remitter is a child of the head 
(defined as sibling in the current chapter), this increases the share of the budget allocated to health 
and decreases the share to education. If the remitter is a sibling of the head (this falls under the 
significant remitter category in this chapter), the share of the budget allocated towards consumer 
and durable goods is reduced.  
In order to further clarify how the remitter identities affect the consumption behaviour of 
Kenyan households, we use interactive terms to enable us to determine whether the receipt of 
remittances from the various remitters also affects the household marginal propensity to consume 
out of each type of commodity. This enables us to identify other potential differences in the 
expenditure behaviour of those households that receive remittances from spouses, siblings, 
significant relatives, or a combination of remitters, and those that do not. A modified version of the 
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model just discussed, and reported in Table A6.6 of the Appendix, is now re-estimated to include 
four interactive variables defined as the product of the logarithm of total household expenditure 
per capita and the four variables capturing the identities of the remitters. The estimates reveal that 
both the marginal budget shares and the expenditure elasticity of demand for households receiving 
sibling remittances are higher than those for households not receiving any remittances for the non-
food and utilities categories. In addition the marginal budget shares and expenditure per capita 
elasticity of demand for households receiving remittances from combined remitters are lower than 
those for households not receiving any remittances for the durable goods category. In particular, 
for a one shilling increase in the household per capita budget, on average and ceteris paribus, 
households in receipt of sibling remittances spend respectively about 0.01 and 0.18 of a shilling 
more on non-food and utilities than those households that do not receive any remittances. 
Households in receipt of combined remittances spend about 0.01 of a shilling less on durable goods 
than households that do not receive any remittances. Thus, we infer from this that households 
exhibit a couple of differences in expenditure behaviour according to the type of remittances they 
receive defined in terms of the identity of the remitter.  
To ensure that the findings we obtain are robust, we undertake a couple of robustness checks. 
Firstly, a concern that was raised in section 6.3.1 relates to the aggregation of expenditure to yearly 
values given that expenditure is reported for the period relating to the previous six months for 
some commodities. We adjust total expenditure as well as the different categories of budget shares 
to the equivalent six month figures and re-estimate the OLS equations discussed above. Table A6.7 
of the Appendix reveals the estimates we obtain when we do this. We see that aggregating at the six 
month instead of yearly level results in only minor differences in the estimated coefficients. 
Secondly, it may be argued that the use of OLS for the budget share analysis is inadequate as it 
does not take into account the correlation of the errors across the budget share equations. As a 
robustness check, we undertake the same analysis using the seemingly unrelated regression 
estimator (SURE) (see Greene 2003). The SURE estimates are reported in Table A6.8 of the 
Appendix. Overall, the SURE estimates are consistent with our core findings and confirm that 
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remittances exert a positive and significant effect on the expenditures on durable goods and 
physical investments. 
It may be argued that the results obtained could be driven by the higher volume of sibling and 
spouse remittances compared to others. In particular, the finding of positive and significant sibling 
and spouse remittance effects on the share of the budget allocated to durable goods and physical 
investments may be an artefact of the volumes of remittances rather than the preferences of 
remitters per se. In order to interrogate this claim, we re-estimate the budget share equations and 
include the total amount of remittances received by the household in addition to the remitter 
identity variables. Table A6.9 in the appendix reveals the results obtained. We see that controlling 
for the volume of remittances received, the receipt of sibling remittances has a positive and 
significant effect on the share of the budget allocated to durable goods. This is entirely consistent 
with our main findings. We also find a positive effect on the budget share of physical investments 
of the receipt of spouse remittances. However, this time the effect is statistically insignificant. One 
view is that this may be driven by the very small proportion of spouse remitters in the sample.43 
Another concern is that because total expenditure is jointly determined with the budget shares 
of the specific commodities in the demand model, it is potentially endogenous. This potential 
endogeneity problem may be addressed by using a two-step procedure (see Blundell and Robin 
1999). Total expenditure is first regressed on a set of exogenous variables comprising identifying 
instruments and variables which directly influence budget shares. The residuals from this reduced-
form regression are included as an explanatory variable in the budget share equations together with 
total expenditure. The t-test for the significance of the coefficient for the residuals in the 
augmented regression serves as a test for the exogeneity of total expenditure in the budget share 
equations (Blundell and Robin 1999). This approach has been used by other authors in the 
literature (e.g., Tafere et al. 2010). In the current chapter, the residuals are found to be insignificant 
in the augmented budget share regressions for durable goods, education and health. Thus, it is not 
imperative to employ an IV strategy for these commodities. We estimate IV models for the food, 
                                                          
43 The number of spouse remitters is only half of that or sibling remitters.  
187 
 
 
 
non-food, utilities and physical investments budget shares as total expenditure is found to be 
endogenous in these equations.  
Table A6.10 of the Appendix reports the IV estimates in conjunction with the OLS estimates 
where total expenditure is treated exogenously for these four categories of commodity. The 
instrumental variables used are selected for their statistical relevance and are listed in the table for 
each category. We see that the standard errors are larger in the IV model and the total expenditure 
variable is now statistically insignificant in three of the four IV models. For the non-food category 
where the expenditure effect is still significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is lower than that 
generated by the OLS model. However, our major findings regarding the statistical significance of 
the receipt of spouse remittances on the budget share allocated to physical investments are 
invariant to the use of an IV procedure. In fact, the coefficient for the spouse remitter variable is 
better determined in the IV model. 
As discussed previously, an additional issue concerns the censorship of some of the categories 
of expenditure. In particular, the durable goods, physical investments, education and health 
categories are censored owing to the presence of zero expenditures on these categories for some 
households in the survey. In order to correct for this censorship, the Heckman two-step estimation 
procedure can be applied (see Heckman 1979). In the first stage, a probit model is estimated for 
purchasing in each of the four censored expenditure categories. Inverse-Mills ratios terms are 
computed from these probit models and then included as right-hand side variables in equation (6.3) 
under the corresponding budget share equations as a way of correcting for selection into positive 
spending. Studies such as Taylor and Mora (2006) have employed similar techniques to address this 
kind of censorship problem in budget share models. The major problem with this type of selection 
correction, and as alluded to earlier, relates to the identification of the model parameters. In order 
to ensure identification, at least one explanatory variable in the first stage comprising the reduced 
form should not be included in the second stage model (see Maddala 1986, Amemiya 1985). This is 
not a simple task as it is quite challenging to obtain variables that have a statistically significant 
effect in the first stage but are insignificant in the second. For example, we are unable to obtain 
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suitable identifying variables for the physical investments model. Therefore, we cannot compute the 
inverse-Mills ratio for this category and are unable to implement the second stage for the analysis. 
However, we are able to obtain identifying variables that are suitable for use based on their 
joint significance in the probit equations and statistical insignificance in the budget share equations 
for the durable goods, education and health categories. Dummy variables for whether or not the 
household was interviewed in December and whether or not bricks/stones are the major 
construction material of the exterior walls of the household dwelling provide suitable identifying 
variables for the durable goods category. Living in a house made of bricks/stones appears to be a 
reasonable proxy for the safety and security of the dwelling, which may provide the household 
more confidence to invest in durable goods. In addition, it seems reasonable to expect households 
to be less likely to spend on durable goods in December and more on items associated with the 
holiday season (e.g., food and travel costs). However, the level of spending depends on the market 
prices of durable goods, and is not a direct feature of the dwelling material itself, or the month of 
the year. A dummy for whether or not the household was interviewed in December is found to be a 
suitable identifying variable for the education model. It is unlikely that households would be 
spending towards education in December given that the academic calendar in Kenya ends in 
December. However, it could be argued that if a household does spend on education, how much it 
spends depends on the cost of education and the related expenses and not directly on the month of 
the year. Finally, we find a dummy variable for whether or not the household has electricity44 and 
the size of the household to provide appropriate identifying variables for the health model. Because 
households that do not have electricity are likely to use alternative sources of fuel and lighting that 
are less healthy (e.g., charcoal or wood) they may be more likely to be affected by respiratory, eye, 
and other diseases compared to households that use electricity. This increases the probability of 
such households spending part of their budgets on health care. In addition, larger households are 
more likely to have at least a member needing medical attention by virtue of their size. However, 
                                                          
44 In the sample, 55% of households have electricity. 
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how much households spend may depend more on the market costs of health services and 
medicines and not directly on the household size or type of fuel used.45 
Table A6.11 in the Appendix reports the estimates for the Heckman two-step procedure 
discussed here under three specifications. In the first specification, we report the probit model 
estimates for the three categories of expenditure, including tests for the joint statistical significance 
of the identifying variables used. In the second specification, estimates for the budget share models 
and the inverse-Mills terms are reported. These models incorporate the identifying variables and 
tests are reported showing their joint statistical insignificance. The third specification provides 
estimates for the budget shares models which include the inverse-Mills terms as one of the 
explanatory variables (but do not include the identifying variables). We see that the estimated effect 
for the inverse-Mills ratio is statistically insignificant in the durable goods and health expenditure 
models and only significant in the education model. The insignificance of the inverse-Mills ratio in 
the former expenditure categories suggests that the variables included in the regression models fully 
capture the selection of households into spending on these particular categories. Thus, a correction 
for selection bias is not required in these two models. Comparing the non-corrected to the 
corrected estimates in the education model, we find that the standard errors are larger for the latter, 
which is not surprising.  
Overall, the various robustness checks we conduct confirm that spouse and sibling remitters 
have a positive and significant effect on the allocation of the budget towards physical investments 
and durable goods, respectively. 
6.5.2  Comparing household remittance versus general income budget shares 
 
In this final part of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether households accurately report 
the uses of remittances received. We estimate remittance budget shares46 using information 
reported by households about how they spent remittances they received, and compare these to 
                                                          
45 We acknowledge that these identifying variables may be subject to criticism. However, these were found to be the most 
suitable based on their statistical (in)significance in the probit and OLS models and the narrative provided. 
46 This refers to the share of remittances, out of total cash remittances received by the household, allocated to a specific 
category of commodity. 
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household allocations from general income (i.e., their reported household expenditure budget 
shares).47 A study close in spirit to the analysis undertaken here is Case and Deaton (1998). This 
latter study uses a 1993 nationally representative survey to examine the effects of cash receipts in 
the form of pension income on the allocation of expenditure to food, schooling, transfers, and 
savings for South Africa. Their dependent variables include household expenditure on food, 
clothing, housing, alcohol and tobacco, schooling, and health, among other things. Their 
independent variables of interest are non-pension and pension income. The results they obtain are 
consistent with the view that pension income is spent in much the same way as non-pension 
income. 
We exploit questions concerning how much of the remittances received by Kenyan households 
were spent on specific expenditure items to estimate remittance expenditure shares using household 
characteristics, including variables capturing the identity of the remitter. We also estimate 
expenditure budget shares out of general income for the same set of households using a similar set 
of explanatory variables. Even though household expenditures out of general income are also 
obtained from self-reported data, they are less likely to be influenced by the same biases that 
influence self-reported remittance uses. For example, it seems likely that respondents may 
rationalize how remittances should have been used, or report what they perceive to be the right 
uses of remittances, whether they were used in that manner or not. However, this bias is unlikely to 
be similar to biases relating to how expenditures out of general income were reported especially as 
questions about how remittances were used were asked after those questions relating to the amount 
of money the household spent on different commodities. Hence, because respondents did not 
anticipate the question concerning how remittances were used, they would not have adjusted their 
responses to how much they had spent on different commodities out of general income to cohere 
with what they reported regarding remittance uses. In addition, as discussed in section 6.3.4, the 
remittance data exhibit the presence of spikes at specific points of the remittances shares 
                                                          
47 This is defined as the share of expenditure, out of the household’s total expenditure, allocated to a specific category of 
commodity. 
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distribution. On the other hand, the data relating to expenditure shares do not exhibit these spikes. 
Thus there may be potential measurement error in the remittances variable.  
Nonetheless, the presence of data relating to the expenditure of households out of general 
income as well as responses about what the households reported spending out of remittances 
provides a unique opportunity to compare budget allocations with respect to remittance income 
and general income. This enables us to draw inferences about the remittance expenditure behaviour 
of households against their behaviour when spending out of general income. The analysis also 
enables us to compare our previous findings on the uses of remittances to their self-reported uses. 
This may provide insights into the veracity of household self-reported uses of remittances. 
Table 6.10 reports the results of OLS estimates for remittance budget shares against general 
income budget shares for the following categories of commodities: food, non-food, education, 
health, and physical investments.48 Under each category, specification one presents the estimates for 
the remittance income budget share model and specification two those for the general income 
budget share model.  
As can be seen from the table, the sample sizes are considerably reduced in each category 
compared to the earlier analysis reported in section 6.5.1. This is because for each category, we 
confine the estimation of both regression models to the sample of households that reported 
positive remittance expenditure in that particular category. This is done to ensure comparability of 
the estimates across the two budget share models. The logarithm of total remittances per capita 
variable reports the effect for remittance income on the remittance budget shares of households 
while the logarithm of total expenditure per capita variable measures the effect for general income 
on the expenditure budget shares. 
We see that the receipt of spouse (compared to sibling) remittances decreases the share of 
general income allocated to the non-food and education categories by 10 and 4.5 percentage points 
respectively, on average and ceteris paribus. This corresponds to a decrease of 37% and 32%, relative 
                                                          
48 Due to the very small samples of households that reported positive remittance expenditures for durable goods and 
utilities, we exclude these categories from the analysis. 
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to the mean. Further, the receipt of remittances from significant relatives (compared to siblings) 
decreases the share of general income allocated to the physical investments category by 3.4 
percentage points, on average and ceteris paribus. This corresponds to a decrease of 113% relative to 
the sample mean. The findings for the non-food and education categories contrast sharply with 
those obtained in the main empirical analysis given remitter identities are shown not to have any 
effect on these categories. This perhaps is due to the selective nature of the sample here. However, 
the finding for the physical investments category is broadly consistent with that obtained in section 
6.5.1.49 On the other hand, the identity of the remitter exhibits no differential effect on the share of 
remittances allocated to any of the aforementioned categories. This reveals that the reported uses of 
remittances received are inconsistent with their actual impact on household expenditure.  
The receipt of combined (compared to sibling) remittances decreases the share of remittances 
allocated to the food and health categories by 6.54 and 7.37 percentage points respectively, on 
average and ceteris paribus. The sample average budget shares for remittance expenditure on food 
and health are 0.45 and 0.21, respectively. The impact effects for the budget share of household 
expenditures on items within these categories correspond to a decrease relative to the mean of 
14.5% and 35.1% respectively. Converse to this, there is no differential effect for remitter identity 
on the share of general income allocated to these categories. In addition, these effects are not 
consistent with the findings reported in the main empirical analysis. Therefore, the veracity of the 
reported remittance uses appears questionable. In general, these findings reveal that there are 
differences in how households claim to apportion general versus remittance income to particular 
expenditure categories. 
 
                                                          
49 We note that the reference groups differ given the restricted sample in this section. In the main analysis, spouse 
remittances were found to have a significant effect on the budget share of physical investments, relative to not receiving 
any remittances. 
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Table 6.10: OLS remittance versus general income budget share estimates with remitter dummy variables (select remittance receiving households) 
 
Food Non-food Education Health Physical investments 
VARIABLES 
I 
fdrem_sh 
II 
fd_sh 
I 
nonfdrem_sh 
II 
nonfd_sh 
I 
edurem_sh 
II 
educ_sh 
I 
healrem_sh 
II 
heal_sh 
I 
phyrem_sh 
II 
phy_sh 
           lntotremperK -0.107*** 
 
-0.0621*** 
 
-0.0574*** 
 
-0.0464*** 
 
0.0279** 
 
 
(0.00672) 
 
(0.0154) 
 
(0.0101) 
 
(0.00928) 
 
(0.0141) 
 ln_perK_totexp -0.112*** 
 
0.0244 
 
0.0113 
 
0.0253*** 
 
0.0362*** 
  
(0.00993) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.00909) 
 
(0.00947) 
 
(0.0111) 
spo_rem -0.0557 0.0282 -0.0686 -0.100** -0.0337 -0.0445* -0.0187 0.0211 -0.000219 0.0178 
 
(0.0350) (0.0280) (0.0714) (0.0479) (0.0476) (0.0240) (0.0363) (0.0241) (0.0650) (0.0272) 
sig_rem -0.0194 0.00362 0.0354 -0.0658 -6.93e-05 -0.0397 -0.00104 0.0255 0.0709 -0.0340** 
 
(0.0350) (0.0279) (0.0837) (0.0470) (0.0519) (0.0296) (0.0399) (0.0291) (0.0650) (0.0164) 
com_rem -0.0654* -0.0246 -0.0399 0.0264 -0.0674 -0.0530 -0.0737** 0.00267 -0.0687 0.00152 
 
(0.0348) (0.0272) (0.0677) (0.0519) (0.0455) (0.0328) (0.0373) (0.0201) (0.0548) (0.0282) 
sib_rem base category 
           Other 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 572 572 197 197 329 329 331 331 271 271 
R-squared 0.382 0.343 0.256 0.185 0.249 0.149 0.274 0.163 0.200 0.180 
                      
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression models also include other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for details). 
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A possible explanation for the differences that we see between the reported uses of remittances 
and their actual uses may be due to self-reported remittances failing to take into account the 
fungibility of remittances. For example, when households receive remittances, overall household 
income can be reallocated such that even though the household claims to be using remittances on 
certain commodities, expenditure on other commodities could change in a manner that is not 
obvious to the household. 
Table 6.11 reports the marginal budget shares and elasticity estimates corresponding to Table 
6.10. Again, specification one presents estimates for the remittance share model and specification 
two for the general income budget share model for each category. Matched pair t-tests between the 
average remittance and general income budget shares reveal a rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the two for all the categories (see Table A6.12 of the Appendix). In Table 6.11 
we see that food is considered a necessity under both remittance and general income. This is 
consistent with what we find in the preceding analysis in section 6.5.1. Non-food commodities, 
education and health are considered necessities under remittance income but luxury commodities 
under general income. In our earlier analysis, we found that these categories were considered to be 
luxuries. Thus, the classifications of these commodities under the general income specifications are 
consistent with those in the earlier analysis. On the other hand, the classifications obtained from 
the remittance income specifications are inconsistent with those reported in the earlier analysis. 
This seems to indicate that the way households report their uses of remittances is not entirely 
accurate as it does not appear to conform to what is revealed in the actual uses of their remittances. 
However, we see that physical investments are considered luxuries under both remittance and 
general income. This is consistent with the findings for the earlier analysis. It therefore indicates a 
more accurate reporting of the use of remittances for this category of commodities. This thus 
strengthens our earlier findings of remittances being specifically sent for the acquisition of physical 
investments and also proves a more accurate reporting by households for this category. 
Unfortunately, due to a small sample size, we are unable to conduct analysis for the durable goods 
category and therefore cannot compare our earlier findings here. 
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The t-tests to determine whether there is a statistical difference between the remittance and 
general income elasticities reveal statistically significant differences at the 1% level of significance 
for all categories with the exception of food. The t-tests to determine whether remittance income 
marginal budget shares are different from general income budget shares yield statistically significant 
differences for all categories. The marginal budget shares are larger for remittances than general 
income for the food, education, health and physical investments categories. The converse holds 
only for the non-food category. This further supports the inconsistencies between reported 
expenditure out of remittance income and from general income. This seems to indicate that it is 
quite difficult for households to identify the allocation of remittances to specific uses. As 
mentioned earlier, a possible explanation for this is the fact that it is difficult for the household to 
differentiate the uses of remittances from those of any other sources of cash income as remittances 
are fungible. Besides the fungibility of remittances, other biases may also contribute towards the 
inaccurate reporting of remittance uses.  
For example, Ratha et al. (2011) suggest that recipients may recall more recent expenses, 
especially on infrequent bulky purchases and underestimate the amounts spent on day-to-day 
expenses. Households may also be reluctant to divulge details of remittances if they were used for 
purposes that the remitter may not have intended or approved of. 
There are some issues that merit caution in interpreting the results obtained in this section. As 
discussed at the beginning of the section, there is potential measurement error relating to the way 
households reported their remittance uses. The use of OLS in the presence of such measurement 
error may lead to inflated standard errors thus making it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis 
in any particular case (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2010 p. 79-82). Thus, in cases where we obtain an 
insignificant effect for the remittance variable, we cannot tell whether the effect would have been 
significant in the absence of such measurement error. However, given the effect of measurement 
error in the dependent variable is to inflate the standard errors when using OLS, we do have 
confidence that the significant effects obtained on the remittance variable are valid.  
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Table 6.11: Marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities for self-reported and budget share estimates 
 
Food Non-food Education Health Physical investments 
  
I 
fdrem_sh 
II 
fd_sh 
I 
nonfdrem_sh 
II 
nonfd_sh 
I 
edurem_sh 
II 
educ_sh 
I 
healrem_sh 
II 
heal_sh 
I 
phyrem_sh 
II 
phy_sh 
 
Marginal budget share 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 0.52*** 0.07*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) 
Elasticity 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.81*** 1.09*** 0.84*** 1.08*** 0.78*** 1.38*** 1.06*** 2.06*** 
 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.047) (0.068) (0.028) (0.065) (0.044) (0.135) (0.029) (0.37) 
                      
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests. 
(ii) The corresponding remittances per capita and total expenditure per capita coefficients are shown in Table 6.10 above. 
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We also should exercise some caution in interpreting the results obtained given the modest 
sizes of the samples used and their highly selective nature. This follows from the fact that the 
samples comprise only those households that reported positive spending of remittances for 
commodities. Thus, there could be selection bias due to systematic differences in the unobservables 
between households that report using remittances for specific commodities and those that do not. 
However, the coefficients we obtain on the total expenditure per capita variable in Table 6.10 are 
not very different from those obtained in the earlier analysis, which employed the full set of migrant 
households. This acts to ease our concerns in regard to this particular issue. Nevertheless, given we 
remain unclear as to what extent these results are driven by measurement error and other biases in 
household responses concerning their uses of remittances, caution in interpreting the results 
reported in this section is warranted. However, in general we find that there are large differences 
between the reported uses of remittance versus general income by Kenyan households. The 
evidence indicates that the way households report how remittances are spent is quite different from 
the way they actually use such remittances.  
6.6 Summary and conclusions  
 
This chapter employed a variant of the AIDS model to estimate the allocation of household 
budget expenditures by a sample of Kenyan households. The main findings of the chapter reveal 
that migrant households spend more at the margin on productive and human capital investments, 
compared to non-migrant households. On the other hand, non-migrant (relative to migrant) 
households spend more at the margin on consumption goods. After conditioning the analysis on 
migration, we find that at the margin remittance receiving households allocate a larger proportion 
of their budget shares to durable goods compared to non-receiving households.  
In addition, the evidence we provide supports non-unitary household budget models as we find 
that households do not pool remittance and general income together when allocating them to 
durable goods.   
The interrogation of remittance uses on the basis of remitter identities enables us to analyse 
household-remitter bargaining power relationships. Our findings reveal that the receipts of sibling 
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and spouse remittances induce fairly sizeable increases in the durable goods and physical 
investments budget shares. Thus, the bargaining powers of spouse and sibling migrants, relative to 
other types of remitters, are shown to be higher for these categories of goods. This evidence seems 
to offer support for the collective bargaining model where the composition of household income is 
a relevant factor in explaining expenditure decisions (Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992, Browning 
et al. 1994). In general, the significance of spouse and sibling remittances in the physical investments 
and durable goods budget share equations is invariant to a host of robustness checks. These include 
correcting for the correlation of the errors between the budget share equations, correcting for the 
potential endogeneity of total expenditure, as well as controlling in certain cases for the censorship 
of the budget shares. 
Contrary to findings reported in other Kenyan studies in the literature, our estimates reveal that 
migrant households that receive remittances do not spend them on consumption goods. The use of 
remittances for the purchase of durable goods and for the acquisition of physical investments 
indicates that remittances may potentially contribute towards poverty reduction at the household 
level and enhance local economic development. For example, physical investments could be used to 
generate income thus contributing towards income source diversification and perhaps generating 
employment for household members. Alternatively, durable goods and physical investments could 
be sourced locally thus boosting local businesses.  
Finally, our analysis also compared what Kenyan households report to have spent their 
remittances on to the way in which they apportion their general income on expenditure. We find 
that there are large differences between the reported uses of remittance as opposed to general 
income by Kenyan households. This casts doubt on the veracity of the uses of remittances as 
reported by households.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 6.1: Sample of survey questionnaire for questions relating to household expenditure  
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Table A6.1: OLS estimates for budget share equations  
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
Migrant households 
        
ln_perK_totexp -0.108*** 0.0564*** -0.0129** 0.0123*** 0.0179*** 0.0226*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00651) (0.00684) (0.00587) (0.00297) (0.00373) (0.00460) (0.00371) 
        
Other variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.139 0.171 0.072 0.072 0.137 0.095 
        
Non-migrant households 
        ln_perK_totexp -0.124*** 0.0701*** 0.0173** 0.00805*** 0.0154*** 0.00934* 0.00402** 
 
(0.00800) (0.00887) (0.00786) (0.00303) (0.00398) (0.00552) (0.00187) 
        Other variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.409 0.238 0.191 0.068 0.071 0.131 0.096 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A6.2: OLS estimates for budget share equations (adult equivalent expenditure) 
Migrant households 
Variables fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        
ln_perK_totexp (adjusted) -0.108*** 0.0568*** -0.0133** 0.0124*** 0.0179*** 0.0228*** 0.0119*** 
 (0.00654) (0.00686) (0.00587) (0.00297) (0.00373) (0.00460) (0.00374) 
        
Other variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.139 0.171 0.072 0.072 0.137 0.095 
        
Non-migrant households 
        
ln_perK_totexp (adjusted) -0.125*** 0.0700*** 0.0177** 0.00814*** 0.0155*** 0.00948* 0.00426** 
 (0.00805) (0.00896) (0.00792) (0.00306) (0.00402) (0.00554) (0.00188) 
        
Other variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Regional dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 657 657 657 657 657 657 657 
R-squared 0.410 0.237 0.191 0.069 0.072 0.131 0.096 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A6.3: Marginal budget shares and expenditure elasticities: migrant vs. non-migrant households (adult 
equivalent expenditure) 
  MBS(0) MBS(1) t-testϮ η (0) η (1) t-testϝ 
fd_sh 0.32 0.29 -2.82*** 0.72 0.73 0.42 
 (0.008) (0.007)  (0.018) (0.016)  
nonfd_sh 0.30 0.28 -1.75* 1.31 1.25 -1.20 
 (0.009) (0.007)  (0.04) (0.03)  
uti_sh 0.22 0.18 -4.00*** 1.09 0.93 -3.25*** 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.039) (0.03)  
dur_sh 0.03 0.04 2.36*** 1.43 1.50 0.35 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.161) (0.119)  
phy_sh 0.03 0.04 1.77* 2.11 1.99 -0.34 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.287) (0.207)  
educ_sh 0.08 0.11 3.84*** 1.14 1.26 1.21 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.084) (0.052)  
heal_sh 0.03 0.05 4.47*** 1.17 1.28 0.96 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.075) (0.087)  
              
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) The marginal budget shares and the elasticities were derived from the OLS estimates presented in Table A6.2 
above (see section 6.4.1 for the formulas). The same sets of variables were used in both regressions, with the 
exception of remittance dummy variables which appear only in the regression for migrant households. 
(iii) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iv) Ϯ The null hypothesis under test is H0: MBS1 – MBS0 = 0. 
(v) ϝ  The null hypothesis under test is H0: η1 – η0 = 0. 
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Table A6.4: OLS estimates for budget share equations (remittance receiving and non-receiving migrant 
households) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
 
Remittance receiving households 
 
ln_perK_totexp 
-0.106*** 0.0555*** -0.0173*** 0.0127*** 0.0206*** 0.0204*** 0.0145*** 
 
(0.00874) (0.00888) (0.00646) (0.00414) (0.00529) (0.00495) (0.00428) 
        Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
772 772 772 772 772 772 772 
R-squared 
0.346 0.150 0.202 0.079 0.081 0.122 0.102 
        Non-remittance receiving households
 
ln_perK_totexp 
-0.109*** 0.0637*** -0.00878 0.0111** 0.0129*** 0.0238*** 0.00649 
 
(0.00970) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.00434) (0.00461) (0.00903) (0.00630) 
        Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
442 442 442 442 442 442 442 
R-squared 
0.456 0.177 0.167 0.091 0.076 0.192 0.108 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
 
 
Table A6.5: OLS estimates for budget share equations with total remittances variable - expenditure and 
remittances adjusted to six months (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        
ln_perK_totex
p 
-0.111*** 0.0552*** -0.0187*** 0.0201*** 0.0282*** 0.0165*** 0.00952*** 
 (0.00612) (0.00684) (0.00525) (0.00421) (0.00493) (0.00424) (0.00333) 
tot_rem -2.57e-09 -2.37e-08** -1.67e-08** 1.60e-08** 2.70e-08 1.44e-09 -1.42e-09 
 (1.04e-08) (9.28e-09) (8.32e-09) (6.45e-09) (1.67e-08) (1.66e-08) (3.44e-09) 
        
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.393 0.130 0.174 0.092 0.105 0.123 0.084 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A6.6: OLS estimates for budget share equations with remitter interactive terms 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        ln_perK_totexp -0.110*** 0.0490*** -0.00503 0.0103*** 0.0160*** 0.0293*** 0.0107** 
 
(0.00766) (0.00901) (0.00845) (0.00348) (0.00426) (0.00763) (0.00489) 
sib_rem 0.116 -0.262** 0.215* -0.0823 -0.0851 0.133 -0.0352 
 
(0.126) (0.129) (0.112) (0.0780) (0.0864) (0.102) (0.0639) 
spo_rem -0.328 0.0982 0.113 0.0165 -0.0544 0.159 -0.00440 
 
(0.202) (0.156) (0.157) (0.0663) (0.0853) (0.105) (0.0525) 
sig_rem -0.0508 -0.157 0.109 -0.0181 0.0683 0.0658 -0.0170 
 
(0.147) (0.146) (0.118) (0.0714) (0.0516) (0.118) (0.102) 
com_rem -0.231 -0.0774 -0.0402 0.0914** 0.0506 0.275 -0.0687 
 
(0.252) (0.285) (0.241) (0.0432) (0.0633) (0.207) (0.104) 
sibrem_expϮ -0.0121 0.0245** -0.0198* 0.00860 0.00787 -0.0116 0.00262 
 
(0.0113) (0.0121) (0.0102) (0.00741) (0.00823) (0.00931) (0.00607) 
sporem_expϮ 0.0291 -0.00899 -0.0119 -0.00154 0.00668 -0.0137 0.000336 
 
(0.0182) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.00623) (0.00808) (0.00966) (0.00492) 
sigrem_expϮ 0.00440 0.0137 -0.00978 0.00235 -0.00643 -0.00594 0.00172 
 
(0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0109) (0.00692) (0.00490) (0.0111) (0.00952) 
comrem_expϮ 0.0177 0.00859 0.00571 -0.00831** -0.00454 -0.0250 0.00580 
 
(0.0232) (0.0269) (0.0224) (0.00402) (0.00610) (0.0190) (0.00975) 
        Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.381 0.144 0.175 0.078 0.077 0.140 0.096 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
(iv) Ϯ represents the interacted variables.  
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Table A6.7: OLS estimates for budget share equations with remitter dummy variables - expenditure figures 
adjusted to six months (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        
ln_perK_totexp -0.111*** 0.0544*** -0.0191*** 0.0208*** 0.0286*** 0.0164*** 0.00952*** 
 (0.00609) (0.00686) (0.00529) (0.00421) (0.00502) (0.00419) (0.00338) 
sib_remdum -0.0140 0.00196 -0.00303 0.0169** 0.000298 0.00338 -0.00551 
 (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0120) (0.00701) (0.00735) (0.0109) (0.00740) 
spo_remdum -0.00505 -0.00656 -0.0179 -0.00239 0.0255* 0.00589 0.000517 
 (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0158) (0.00853) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.00832) 
sig_remdum -0.00382 -0.0111 -0.000447 0.0117 0.00176 -0.000794 0.00268 
 (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0125) (0.00819) (0.00643) (0.0109) (0.00718) 
com_remdum -0.0326 0.0102 0.0204 0.00182 0.00157 0.00193 -0.00336 
 (0.0224) (0.0260) (0.0216) (0.00723) (0.0130) (0.0174) (0.0122) 
        
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.394 0.129 0.175 0.095 0.103 0.123 0.085 
                
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
 
 
Table A6.8: SURE estimates for budget share equations with remitter dummy variables (migrant households 
only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
       ln_perK_totexp -0.108*** -0.0129*** 0.0123*** 0.0179*** 0.0226*** 0.0119*** 
 
(0.00579) (0.00467) (0.00198) (0.00249) (0.00413) (0.00277) 
sib_remdum -0.0157 -0.00367 0.0123** 0.00141 0.00405 -0.00610 
 
(0.0148) (0.0119) (0.00504) (0.00635) (0.0105) (0.00706) 
spo_remdum -0.00492 -0.0195 -0.000481 0.0205** 0.00577 -0.000486 
 
(0.0206) (0.0166) (0.00702) (0.00885) (0.0147) (0.00983) 
sig_remdum -0.00245 0.000364 0.00803 -0.000893 -0.000886 0.00201 
 
(0.0172) (0.0139) (0.00588) (0.00740) (0.0123) (0.00823) 
com_remdum -0.0355 0.0209 0.000499 0.00120 -0.000839 -0.00469 
 
(0.0238) (0.0192) (0.00811) (0.0102) (0.0170) (0.0114) 
no_rem base category 
       Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.171 0.072 0.072 0.137 0.095 
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
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Table A6.9: OLS estimates for budget share equations with both remitter dummy variables and total amount of 
remittances received (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh nonfd_sh uti_sh dur_sh phy_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
        sib_rem -0.0156 0.00949 -0.00216 0.0113** -0.000465 0.00345 -0.00605 
 
(0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.00525) (0.00566) (0.0113) (0.00770) 
spo_rem -0.00461 0.00290 -0.0164 -0.00258 0.0165 0.00452 -0.000376 
 
(0.0216) (0.0209) (0.0162) (0.00567) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.00879) 
sig_rem -0.00232 -0.00473 0.00159 0.00721 -0.00242 -0.00137 0.00205 
 
(0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0129) (0.00586) (0.00451) (0.0112) (0.00732) 
com_rem -0.0353 0.0211 0.0232 -0.00103 -0.00166 -0.00175 -0.00461 
 
(0.0228) (0.0257) (0.0223) (0.00463) (0.0102) (0.0179) (0.0127) 
tot_rem -8.14e-10 -9.70e-09** -8.21e-09* 5.49e-09*** 1.03e-08 3.27e-09 -2.88e-10 
 
(6.05e-09) (4.20e-09) (4.27e-09) (2.12e-09) (7.75e-09) (9.76e-09) (1.76e-09) 
        Other variables 
included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummy 
variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.140 0.172 0.074 0.079 0.137 0.095 
                
Notes to the table:  
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests.  
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space 
(see text for details).  
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Table A6.10: OLS versus IV estimates for budget share equations (migrant households only) 
VARIABLES fd_sh: OLS fd_sh: IV 
nonfd_sh:                 
OLS nonfd_sh: IV uti_sh: OLS uti_sh: IV 
phy_sh: 
OLS phy_sh: IV 
         ln_perK_totexp -0.108*** 0.0183 0.0564*** 0.0281** -0.0129** 0.0208 0.0179*** -0.00606 
 
(0.00651) (0.0223) (0.00684) (0.0137) (0.00587) (0.0161) (0.00373) (0.00842) 
no_rem base group 
sib_rem -0.0157 -0.0230 0.00772 0.0114 -0.00367 -0.00620 0.00141 0.00285 
 
(0.0151) (0.0170) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.00592) (0.00640) 
spo_rem -0.00492 -0.0414* -0.000806 0.00828 -0.0195 -0.0292* 0.0205* 0.0235*** 
 
(0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0207) (0.0206) (0.0160) (0.0175) (0.0111) (0.00823) 
sig_rem -0.00245 -0.00908 -0.00617 -0.00409 0.000364 -0.00115 -0.000893 -0.000373 
 
(0.0172) (0.0200) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0129) (0.0142) (0.00449) (0.00754) 
com_rem -0.0355 -0.0687** 0.0184 0.0276 0.0209 0.0103 0.00120 0.00644 
 
(0.0227) (0.0282) (0.0256) (0.0238) (0.0223) (0.0201) (0.00993) (0.0107) 
         F-tests of instruments 
 
F(6,1189) = 16.76 
 
F(3, 1182) =   65.55 
 
F(3, 1189) = 29.01 
 
F(6, 1189) = 16.76 
Sargan test 
 
p-value =  0.465 
 
p-value =  0.503 
 
p-value =  0.374 
 
p-value = 0.821 
Wu-Hausman 
exogeneity test 
 
p-value = 0.000 
 
p-value = 0.073 
 
p-value = 0.043 
 
p-value: 0.005 
         Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,208 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 
R-squared 0.377 0.129 0.139 0.120 0.171 0.134 0.072 Ϯ 
                  
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-tailed tests. (ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. (iii) The regression 
model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for details). (iv) In the non-food IV model, six observations are lost due to missing values on 
the radio ownership instrumental variable. (v) The following variables are used as instruments for the food category: dummy variables capturing the age and gender of the household head and a variable 
measuring the size of the household. (vi) The following instrumental variables are used for the non-food category: a dummy variable measuring whether the household owns a radio, the number of 
children in the household and the household size. (vii) The following instrumental variables are used for the utilities model: the number of children in the household and the educational status of the 
household head. (viii) The following instrumental variables are used for the physical investments model: dummy variables measuring the gender and age of the household head and a variable capturing 
the household size. (ix) Ϯ this regression is has a negative centred R-squared (-0.0001).  
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Table A6.11: Two-step procedure: correcting for censorship of budget shares 
  I: Probit models  III: Budget share OLS models III: Budget share OLS model 
Variables 
dur_prob 
=1 
educ_prob 
= 1 
heal_prob 
= 1 dur_sh educ_sh heal_sh dur_sh educ_sh heal_sh 
   
  
  
  
   
ln_perK_totexp 0.328*** 0.255*** 0.222*** 0.0225 0.00976 0.00505 0.0106** 0.0109* 0.0109*** 
 
(0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0443) (0.0147) (0.00612) (0.00682) (0.00529) (0.00606) (0.00401) 
sib_rem 0.0349 0.00667 -0.0198 0.0132** 0.00108 -0.00585 0.0120** 0.00149 -0.00595 
 
(0.104) (0.110) (0.109) (0.00534) (0.0112) (0.00768) (0.00536) (0.0111) (0.00769) 
spo_rem 0.116 0.193 -0.0467 0.00354 -0.00563 0.000683 -0.00107 -0.00424 -0.000237 
 
(0.143) (0.147) (0.149) (0.00747) (0.0140) (0.00877) (0.00581) (0.0136) (0.00868) 
sig_rem 0.125 0.0120 -0.107 0.0116 -0.00171 0.00454 0.00742 -0.00184 0.00258 
 
(0.117) (0.130) (0.122) (0.00902) (0.0111) (0.00810) (0.00617) (0.0111) (0.00754) 
com_rem 0.113 0.0299 0.133 0.00497 -0.00546 -0.00752 -4.16e-05 -0.00467 -0.00516 
 
(0.167) (0.178) (0.190) (0.00628) (0.0177) (0.0128) (0.00458) (0.0177) (0.0125) 
bricks/stones 0.259*** 
 
  0.0151 
 
  
   
 
(0.0935) 
 
  (0.0112) 
 
  
   
december -0.336*** -0.326***   -0.0136 0.00757   
   
 
(0.110) (0.118)   (0.0166) (0.0137)   
   
hh_size 
  
0.102*** 
  
-0.00236 
   
   
(0.0251) 
  
(0.00305) 
   
electricity 
  
-0.193* 
  
0.0110 
   
   
(0.104) 
  
(0.00889) 
   
Inverse-Mills ratio 
  
  0.0564 -0.100*** -0.0567 -0.00756 -0.0916*** -0.00983 
   
  (0.0650) (0.0338) (0.0532) (0.0145) (0.0320) (0.0209) 
          Test for joint 
significance of 
identifying variables  
 
  = 16.11, 
p-val =  
0.0003 
 
  = 14.9, 
p-val =  
0.0006 
 
  = 18.41, 
p-val =  
0.0001 
F(2,1186) =    
1.41, p-val 
= 0.246 
F(2,1186) =   
0.12, p-val 
= 0.90 
F(2,1185) =    
0.77, p-val 
= 0.463 
   
          
   
  
  
  
   
N 1,214 1,214 1,213 1,214 1,214 1,213 1,214 1,214 1,213 
R-squared       0.074 0.143 0.096 0.072 0.143 0.095 
Pseudo R-squared  0.113 0.204 0.128 
      Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) Other variables are included in these models but not shown here in order to conserve space (see text for 
details). 
(iv) One observation is lost for the durable goods category due to a missing observation for the variable measuring 
the availability of electricity.  
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Table A6.12: Remittance and general income average budget shares 
Category Remittances  General expenditure  t-test 
Food 0.45 0.42 -2.4*** 
Non-food 0.33 0.27 -1.97*** 
Education 0.36 0.14 -15.07*** 
Health 0.21 0.07 -13.24*** 
Physical investments 0.49 0.03 -22.39*** 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) The t-test is a matched t-test for differences between the average budget shares of remittances and general 
income. 
(ii) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of the differences at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using 
two-tailed tests. 
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7 Do Remittances Affect Household Purchases of Physical 
Investments and Durable Goods?                     
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter addresses one of the long standing debates in the literature concerning the uses of 
remittances by households. In particular, we ascertain whether Kenyan households utilize 
remittances in a productive manner through investing in physical capital and/or allocating them to 
goods that are not immediately consumed (i.e., durable goods). This is a relatively under-researched 
topic and one that is germane to the current literature.  
In the preceding chapter, we provided evidence showing that households that receive 
remittances allocate more of their budget shares towards physical investments and durable goods. 
Therefore, focussing the analysis on these two categories of expenditure in the current chapter 
enables us to address some of the limitations encountered in the preceding chapter in a more 
detailed manner. Specifically, narrowing down the analysis provides the basis to treat remittances as 
endogenous given obtaining relevant instrumental variables becomes a more feasible task when 
fewer categories of commodity are the subject of investigation. Thus, in this chapter we employ 
empirical techniques that enable us to clarify the effects of remittances on the decisions of Kenyan 
households to purchase physical investments and durable goods.  
7.1.1 Research contributions 
 
A contribution provided by the research here relates to a long standing debate in the literature 
concerning whether or not remittances are used in a productive manner that potentially enhances 
local economic development. There is some evidence in the literature supporting the use of 
remittances for the acquisition of physical investments. For example, Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) 
find that Guatemalan households that receive remittances spend more at the margin on housing. 
Remittances are shown to play a role in financing the capital of microenterprises in urban Mexico 
(Woodruff and Zenteno 2001). In rural Pakistan, remittances have been shown to increase the 
propensity to invest in agricultural land (Adams 1998).  
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However, the evidence on the uses of remittances for investment in the context of Africa is 
quite limited (Ratha et al. 2011). In the case of Kenya, most of the evidence draws from early studies 
and is somewhat mixed. For example, after compiling evidence from various sources, Rempel and 
Lobdell (1978) conclude that remittances from rural-to-urban migrants in Kenya have little impact 
on the development of the region of origin. Rather, they find that remittances are often allocated 
towards consumption, education and better housing. In contrast, Collier and Lal (1984) report for 
rural Kenya that remittances enable the recipient households to hold more productive capital than 
non-recipient ones. In a more recent study, Simiyu (2013) finds that remittances are mainly used for 
immediate consumption needs such as utilities and transportation costs for the Rift Valley and 
Nyanza provinces of Kenya, and not towards investments. However, the study employs a small 
sample of 295 households.  
The allocation of remittances towards physical investments and durable goods is an important 
research topic to explore. For example, physical investments may provide direct benefits to the 
household through improved housing services and also increase the housing stock of the local 
community. Indirect benefits include enabling households to undertake activities that potentially 
generate employment at the household or community level, or improve farming and other 
productivity. Also, the acquisition of durable goods may boost local businesses if their demand is 
met locally. Thus, these types of investment are likely to have multiplier effects in the local 
economy.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides a brief review of the literature relating 
to the uses of remittances with a specific focus on productive investments. Section 7.3 presents and 
briefly discusses the data and summary statistics for the key variables used in the econometric 
analysis. In section 7.4 the econometric methodologies used to undertake the analysis are discussed. 
Section 7.5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Finally, section 7.6 provides some 
concluding remarks.  
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7.2 Literature review 
 
A more extensive review of studies that have investigated the uses of remittances by 
households was undertaken in the preceding chapter. In general, it is acknowledged that the 
evidence for the uses of remittances for investments based on household surveys is somewhat 
limited for Africa (Ratha et al. 2011). It is especially the case that there are few empirical studies that 
explicitly investigate whether remittances are used for the acquisition of physical investments and 
commodities that yield utility over time instead of being consumed immediately.  
Descriptive statistics based on household survey data collected as part of the Africa Migration 
Project reveal that a significant proportion of international remittances1 are spent on land 
purchases, building a house, business, improving a farm, agricultural equipment, and other 
investments.2 For international remittances, investment in these items as a share of total remittances 
represented 36 per cent in Burkina Faso, 55 per cent in Kenya, 57 per cent in Nigeria, 16 per cent 
in Senegal, and 20 per cent in Uganda (see Ratha et al. op. cit.). In addition, a substantial share of 
remittances sent by migrants resident in other African countries was also used for these purposes in 
the case of Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda. However, the study indicates that the share 
of internal remittances allocated towards these investments was much lower in all of the countries 
surveyed, with the exception of Nigeria and Kenya. The statistics in this study are based on what 
the households surveyed reported to have used the remittances they received on. However, as we 
illustrated in the preceding chapter, such estimates are quite unreliable as households tend to report 
the uses of remittances inaccurately. Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature by 
employing empirical techniques that enable us to more accurately identify the uses of remittances to 
purchase physical investments and durable goods. 
Rempel and Lobdell (1978) investigate the uses of remittances sent to rural households in 
Kenya. They find little evidence of urban-rural remittances being a significant means to rural 
economic development. Rather, they find that remittances are often allocated towards 
                                                          
1 The study defines international remittances as remittances sent by migrants resident outside of Africa. 
2 We classify these commodities under “physical investments” in the current thesis. 
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consumption, education and better housing. However, this study has been criticized for failing to 
take into account the fungibility of the financial resources of rural households (see Collier and Lal 
1984). Their evidence is derived from rural households reporting to have used remittances for the 
following purposes: school fees (12 per cent), debt payment (2 per cent), farm maintenance (4 per 
cent), and supporting family and friends (96 per cent). As already mentioned, in the preceding 
chapter of the current thesis we demonstrated that self-reported remittance uses by households are 
quite unreliable and therefore unlikely to portray the true effect of the receipt of remittances on the 
expenditure behaviour of households.  
Adams (1998) investigates the effects of remittances on the accumulation of physical assets 
using a five-year panel dataset on rural households in Pakistan. The study employs tobit models to 
estimate the changes in asset ownership over the period of observation. The findings reveal that 
remittances have a more statistically significant effect on the accumulation of rural assets than total 
labour income (excluding remittances). 
Osili (2004) uses the U.S.-Nigeria survey conducted in 1997 to analyse migrants’ housing 
investments in their communities of origin. The study employs probit and tobit models. In the 
probit model, the dependent variable measures whether or not a migrant initiated housing 
investments in the community of origin. The dependent variable for the tobit model is the share of 
a migrant’s annual income that is devoted to housing investments in the home town. The study 
finds that older migrants are more likely to invest in housing in their hometown and to devote a 
larger share of household income to housing investments. The evidence obtained also suggests that 
migrants invest in order to preserve and maintain membership rights in the home community. In 
addition, the study shows that housing investments play an important role in signalling migrants’ 
resources and support of their home family.  
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7.3 Data and summary statistics 
 
7.3.1 Main variables 
 
In the analysis undertaken here, there are two binary dependent variables of primary interest. 
These binary variables assume a value of one if the household purchased physical investments 
(durable goods) and zero otherwise. The classification of commodities into physical investments or 
durable goods is discussed in detail in chapter 6 (see section 6.3.1). Chapter 6 also discusses the 
construction of the explanatory variables that we use here. These explanatory variables include the 
age, gender, education level, and employment status of the household head. Measures were also 
computed for the total expenditure per capita of the household, the number of children less than 
seven years, the number of elderly people greater than 59 years, and the household size. Additional 
explanatory variables include dummy variables capturing whether a household is located in an 
urban or a rural area, whether or not a household was interviewed in December, and controls for 
the regional location. 
The explanatory variables relating to the receipt of remittances by the household are of primary 
concern for the current analysis. A variable was constructed to measure whether or not the 
household received any cash remittances and the amount of cash remittances in Kenyan shillings 
received by the household in the 12 months prior to the date of interview. 
7.3.2 Constructing a PCA index 
 
A limitation inherent in the data is that there is no information on household income levels and 
thus we use the logarithm of household expenditure per capita as a proxy for the income level of 
the household. An extensive literature exists in support of the theoretical underpinnings of 
consumption expenditures as a measure of current and long-run household welfare (see, e.g., 
Deaton 1997, Deaton and Muellbauer 1986, Deaton and Zaidi 2002). In order to complement the 
expenditure variable, however, we also use an alternative proxy of household income obtained by 
constructing a linear index from asset ownership indicators, using principle component analysis 
(PCA) to derive the weights (see Filmer and Pritchett 2001). The PCA index did not feature in the 
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previous empirical chapters as chapters 4 and 5 are focussed on analysing migration and 
remittances using empirical methods where the individual is the unit of observation. We thus 
introduce this complementary measure of household income in the current chapter due to the 
focus on expenditure behaviour at the household level unit of observation.3 
The Spearman rank correlation between total expenditure per capita and the PCA index is 0.64 
(p-value = 0.000).4 This high positive correlation with the total expenditure per capita variable 
suggests that it is a reasonable indicator of household income as it yields an acceptable correlation 
with a measure that has been validated in the literature. In addition, a correlation of 0.64 compares 
favourably with those obtained by Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The latter authors constructed PCA 
indices for Nepal, Pakistan and Indonesia using respectively data from the 1996 Nepal Living 
Standards Survey, the 1991 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey, and the 1994 Indonesia 
Demographic and Household Survey. In their study, the Spearman rank correlations between total 
expenditure per capita and the PCA indices are found to be 0.64, 0.56 and 0.43 for Nepal, 
Indonesia and Pakistan, respectively. 
Table 7.1 shows the final set of variables used in the PCA analysis after excluding all asset 
variables that have less than a 1% sample average. The table presents the mean, standard deviation 
and scoring coefficients of the variables. Because all the asset variables, except those for the 
number of rooms, take only the values 0 and 1, the weights can be interpreted relatively easily. A 
move from 0 to 1 changes the index by 
                   
                  
  as shown in the fourth column of the 
table (see Filmer and Pritchett 2001). For example, living in a dwelling made of bricks/stones raises 
the asset index by 0.253 and living in one made of mud lowers it by 0.265. 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Chapter 6 is focussed on the budget shares of various commodities and therefore it is not feasible to use the PCA index 
there.   
4 As in Filmer and Pritchett (2001), the asset index is not adjusted for household size because the benefits of many of the 
assets, such as quality of housing materials, are present at the household level. 
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Table 7.1: Summary statistics and scoring factors 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
deviation (SD) 
Scoring 
coefficients 
Scoring 
coefficient/SD 
Dwelling owned = 1 0.663 0.473 -0.162 -0.342 
Dwelling rent free/subsidized from employer = 1 0.036 0.186 0.004 0.020 
Dwelling rented from employer = 1 0.016 0.127 0.028 0.220 
Dwelling rent free/subsidized from relatives = 1 0.013 0.111 -0.019 -0.175 
Dwelling rented privately = 1 0.252 0.434 0.161 0.371 
Dwelling rented from other = 1 0.013 0.111 0.013 0.116 
Live in family house = 1 0.732 0.443 -0.069 -0.156 
Live in apartment = 1 0.062 0.241 0.126 0.523 
Live in single room = 1 0.114 0.318 -0.025 -0.077 
Live in house = 1 0.089 0.284 0.028 0.100 
Dwelling made of bricks/stones = 1 0.631 0.483 0.253 0.523 
Dwelling made of wood = 1 0.036 0.187 -0.044 -0.234 
Dwelling made of mud = 1 0.249 0.433 -0.265 -0.611 
Dwelling made of iron sheets = 1 0.064 0.245 0.009 0.037 
Separate room for cooking = 1 0.659 0.484 0.041 0.084 
Total number of separate rooms in main house 3.209 1.87 0.102 0.054 
Total number of separate rooms (other) 0.783 1.303 0.051 0.039 
Electricity = 1 0.511 0.5 0.320 0.641 
Agricultural land = 1 0.626 0.484 -0.162 -0.335 
Non-agricultural land = 1 0.204 0.403 0.065 0.161 
House = 1 0.643 0.479 -0.100 -0.209 
Other buildings = 1 0.196 0.397 0.037 0.094 
Tuk tuk = 1 0.057 0.232 0.045 0.194 
Radio = 1 0.852 0.356 0.100 0.280 
Television = 1 0.567 0.496 0.300 0.605 
Refrigerator = 1 0.26 0.439 0.320 0.729 
Air conditioner = 1 0.126 0.332 0.240 0.721 
Sound system = 1 0.156 0.363 0.245 0.676 
VCR/DVD = 1 0.369 0.483 0.318 0.659 
Computer = 1 0.197 0.398 0.267 0.671 
Mobile phone = 1 0.802 0.399 0.135 0.338 
Non-mobile phone = 1 0.109 0.311 0.174 0.559 
Bicycle = 1 0.276 0.447 0.032 0.072 
Animal drawn cart = 1 0.058 0.234 0.056 0.237 
Car = 1 0.169 0.374 0.258 0.689 
Motorcycle/scooter = 1 0.047 0.212 0.088 0.416 
Lorry = 1 0.015 0.12 0.090 0.751 
          
 
The index is robust to the type of assets included. For instance, when we exclude variables 
measuring the dwelling characteristics of the household, there is a correlation of 0.94 with the PCA 
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index obtained from the full set of variables listed in the table. In constructing the index we make a 
deliberate effort to exclude community variables such as the household’s source of water as these 
are indicators of welfare at the community rather than household level. As a robustness check, we 
exclude the electricity variable as well. The asset index proves robust to the exclusion of electricity. 
Overall, the index produces very similar classifications when different subsets of the variables listed 
in the table are included. In addition, we believe it innocuous to assume the index is not determined 
by any remittances received in the last 12 months.5 
A possible drawback of the index is that it does not distinguish between urban and rural 
households, or the region in which a household is located. This may not be entirely reasonable as 
we expect the assets which indicate the income levels of households to differ by settlement type. 
This pooling together of urban and rural households may explain why we obtain unexpected signs 
on some of the scoring coefficients. For example, in Table 7.1, we report that owning a dwelling 
lowers a household’s asset index by 0.342, living in a family house lowers it by 0.156, and owning 
agricultural land lowers it by 0.335.6 Kenyan households located in rural rather than urban areas are 
more likely to comply with the aforementioned profile. At the same time, they are less likely to own 
assets such as radios and televisions. It seems that the index gives a positive weight to assets 
typically owned by urban households, and negative weights to those generally owned by rural 
households. Thus, households in urban areas are likely to be classified as having higher income 
levels than rural households. However, we anticipate that this shortcoming may be rectified when 
we undertake the empirical analysis as we pool together both sets of households while controlling 
for their urban/rural and regional location using standard dummy variables. 
 
 
                                                          
5 The proportion of households that report to have used remittances to purchase durable goods and physical investments 
is quite small (0.6 and 14.8 per cent, respectively) 
6 A concern here may be that the PCA index is dominated by smaller but more common assets such as radios and mobile 
phones thus providing perverse weights for less commonly owned assets. We reconstruct the PCA index excluding large 
and less commonly owned assets such as houses and land. A correlation coefficient of 0.98 is obtained between the PCA 
index that includes and excludes large assets. Thus, the PCA index discussed above is robust to the exclusion of large 
and/or less commonly owned assets. 
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7.3.3 Summary statistics 
 
Table 7.2: Summary statistics of main explanatory variables 
  Combined Non-migrant 
(0) 
Migrant (1) t-test/z-
scoreϮ 
Dependent variables:     
= 1 if hh purchased physical investments 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.18 (0.38) -2.55*** 
= 1 if hh purchased durable goods 0.50 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.51 (0.50) -1.83** 
Explanatory variables:     
Log of total household expenditure per capita 10.913 (1.267) 10.606 (1.223) 11.080 (1.259) -7.85*** 
PCA index -0.013 (2.351) -0.409 (2.340) 0.202 (2.330) -5.42*** 
Total cash remittances received 73157 (548631) 4639 (43063) 110238 (677572) -3.99*** 
= 1 if hh received cash remittances 0.450 (0.50) 0.104 (0.305) 0.636 (0.481) -25.70*** 
Head age < 30 0.139 (0.346) 0.209 (0.407) 0.101 (0.302) 6.47*** 
Head age 30 to 40 0.208 (0.406) 0.336 (0.473) 0.139 (0.346) 10.30*** 
Head age 40 to 50 0.203 (0.402) 0.225 (0.418) 0.190 (0.393) 1.80** 
Head age 50 to 60 0.189 (0.391) 0.114 (0.318) 0.229 (0.420) -6.12*** 
Head age > 60 0.259 (0.438) 0.116 (0.320) 0.336 (0.473) -10.70*** 
χ2 test (head age)    226.90*** 
= 1 if head is male 0.687 (0.464) 0.785 (0.411) 0.634 (0.482) 6.81*** 
= 1 if head has primary education 0.345 (0.476) 0.367 (0.482) 0.334 (0.472) 1.44* 
= 1 if head has secondary education 0.383 (0.486) 0.400 (0.490) 0.373 (0.484) 1.15 
= 1 if head has university education 0.115 (0.320) 0.104 (0.305) 0.122 (0.327) -1.19 
χ2 test (head education)    8.23** 
= 1 if head is employed 0.335 (0.472) 0.443 (0.497) 0.276 (0.447) 7.41*** 
= 1 if head is self-employed 0.381 (0.486) 0.393 (0.489) 0.375 (0.484) 0.76 
= 1 if head is unemployed 0.155 (0.362) 0.110 (0.313) 0.180 (0.384) -4.01*** 
χ2 test (head employment)    94.25*** 
No. of children 0.595 (0.870) 0.489 (0.831) 0.791 (0.908) 7.27*** 
Household size 4.258 (2.333) 4.231 (2.287) 4.273 (2.358) -0.37 
= 1 if hh located in urban area 0.487 (0.500) 0.498 (0.500) 0.482 (0.500) 0.65 
= 1 if hh interviewed in December 0.349 (0.477) 0.355 (0.479) 0.346 (0.476) 0.38 
N 1871 657 1214   
Notes to the table: 
(i) Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
(ii) Ϯ The hypothesis under test here is: H0: μ0 = μ1/ H0: π0 = π1. The column provides the t-ratios/z-scores for 
mean/proportion differences between non-migrants and migrants.  
(iii) *, **, *** represent the statistical significance of the differences for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
(iv) The χ2 tests are testing for differences between non-migrant and migrant households for categorical variables. 
 
Table 7.2 presents summary statistics of the variables discussed above. We see that a larger 
proportion of migrant households purchased physical investments and durable goods, compared to 
non-migrant households. We also see that migrant households have higher levels of expenditure 
and also have higher income levels as proxied by the PCA index. The remainder of the variables 
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presented in the table were discussed in detail in the preceding chapter (see section 6.3.3) and are 
not subject to review here again. 
7.4 Empirical methodology 
 
An important issue to consider for the empirical methods employed is the potential 
endogeneity of the remittances variable itself. This endogeneity may arise due to the presence of 
variables that affect the receipt of remittances by households as well as their expenditure on certain 
categories. Failure to control for the endogeneity of remittances is likely to result in biased estimates 
for the effects of remittances on commodity expenditures. In addition, in chapter 6 we noted that 
the dependent variables for the physical investments and durable goods expenditure categories are 
censored. The empirical methods we employ therefore attempt to address both these issues.  
7.4.1  Recursive bivariate probit model 
 
We employ the bivariate probit model to analyse the effect of the receipt of remittances on the 
decision by the household to purchase durable goods and physical investments. Firstly, the bivariate 
probit model accounts for the endogeneity of remittances discussed above by modelling the receipt 
of remittances and the purchase of physical investments (durable goods) simultaneously and also 
including the binary remittance variable in the physical investments (durable goods) model. A 
simultaneous model is suitable because there is good reason to suspect that the decision by a 
household to spend on a certain category and the receipt of remittances are correlated but with no 
natural sequencing of the two processes. For example, migrants may send remittances to spend on 
the purchase of a specific commodity. At the same time, the decision by households to spend on 
that commodity may be influenced by the receipt of remittances. It thus seems appropriate to 
analyse the receipt of remittances and the decision to spend on a certain category as a two-equation 
system. 
It has been established in the literature, both theoretically and empirically, that simultaneous 
likelihood estimation methods are superior to conventional two-stage instrumental variable 
procedures in cases where the researcher is interested in estimating the effect that a binary 
220 
 
 
 
endogenous variable has on a binary outcome in the presence of unobservables (e.g., Wooldridge 
2010, Bhattacharya et al. 2006, Freedman and Sekhon 2010). We employ the simultaneous recursive 
bivariate probit model (Maddala 1986) as it allows us to estimate the effect that a binary 
endogenous remittance variable has on the binary outcome of purchasing physical investments (or 
durable goods), in the presence of unobservables. Moreover, a discrete choice model provides a 
suitable model for this analysis since our interest lies primarily in the discrete choices made by 
households in purchasing physical investments and durables goods, and in receiving remittances. At 
the same time, the use of a discrete outcome model enables us to overcome the censorship problem 
of household expenditures on durable goods and physical investments discussed above as it focuses 
on whether or not a decision was made, and not how much was spent. The bivariate probit model 
therefore provides a suitable approach as it allows us to model the two processes simultaneously 
while taking into account the discrete nature of both, as well as the endogeneity of the remittance 
receipt variable.  
The recursive bivariate probit model can be formally presented as follows: 
   
     
             (7.1)  
   
     
                 (7.2) 
where     and     are assumed to be correlated, such that                 .     
  and    
  are 
latent dependent variables that determine the propensity of a household to receive remittances and 
spend on durable goods or physical investments respectively.    and    are vectors of explanatory 
variables. Two observable binary indicator variables can be defined to represent the latent variables 
   
  and    
  as follows:  
     
        
   
        
   
      (7.3)  
     
        
   
        
   
      (7.4)  
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where     (included in expression (7.2)) and    represent whether or not the household received 
remittances and the actual decision of whether or not to spend on physical investments or durable 
goods, respectively. The empirical focus is   , the parameter of the endogenous variable    . The 
parameters for the latent relationship can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood. Because both     
and     are observed for all  , a bivariate probit model with full observability is thus used here. Four 
possible combinations of observed outcomes exist. From (7.3) and (7.4), the probabilities     for 
        associated with each of the combinations for any set of parameters are: 
            
       
               (7.5) 
           
       
                     (7.6) 
            
      
                  (7.7) 
           
       
                 (7.8) 
where       is the cumulative bivariate normal distribution function operator. 
The maximum likelihood estimation for the bivariate probit is given by: 
                    
               
        
               
                
       (7.9) 
7.4.2 IV probit model  
 
An alternative way to approach this issue is to treat the remittances in their levels form. This is 
informative to us especially as the use of a remittance dummy variable may conflate a number of 
different factors other than remittance income and does not capture the scale of the remittances 
received. 
In order to correct for the potential endogeneity of the remittance levels variable, we employ an 
instrumental variables (IV) approach. The first stage entails estimating a reduced form model of the 
level of remittances received on all the variables included in the main regression as well as a set of 
instrumental variables. Predicted remittances are obtained from this first stage and used as an 
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explanatory variable in the primary regression model of interest in place of the endogenous 
remittances variable. Given the censored nature of the levels of remittances received, it is arguable 
whether a censored tobit model would have been a more appropriate model (Tobin 1958). 
However, we noted in chapter 5 the problems associated with the censored tobit model and the 
fact that it was found to be mis-specified. Therefore, the OLS model is the preferred model for the 
reduced form equation in this case. While the use of OLS in this first stage may seem inappropriate 
due to the censored nature of the remittances variable, the use of the tobit model which is more 
appropriate for use with censored data is unsuitable given it is mis-specified. In any event, the use 
of a mis-specified model in the first stage has implications for the consistency of estimates in the 
second stage model (see Angrist 2001). The use of an OLS model in the first stage followed by a 
probit model in the second stage is equivalent to using an IV probit model (Wooldridge 2010 p. 
591). This is the method we also employ in this part of the empirical analysis. The IV probit model 
has been shown to be appropriate for fitting models with binary dependent variables and 
continuous endogenous regressors (Wooldridge op. cit). It is acknowledged that the endogenous 
regressor is not strictly continuous in this case, but we believe this creates less of a problem in the 
current application than using a mis-specified model like a censored tobit to generate the first stage 
predictions.   
The IV probit model can be formally presented as follows: 
   
            
           (7.10)  
        
        
           (7.11) 
where         households,    
  is a latent dependent variable that captures the  th household’s 
propensity to spend on physical investments (durable goods).     is the endogenous remittance 
variable,     is a vector of exogenous variables,     is a vector of instrumental variables, and the 
equation for     is written in reduced form.    and    are the error terms of the model.    and    
are parameter vectors of the main model and    and    are vectors containing the reduced-form 
223 
 
 
 
parameters. The IV probit model is a recursive model as     appears in the equation for    
 , but 
not vice versa. We do not observe    
  but we do observe its observable counterpart as follows: 
     
        
   
        
   
      (7.12) 
where     represents the actual decision to spend or not on physical investments (or durable 
goods). Thus, the probability of spending on physical investments (or durable goods) for the  th 
household can be represented as follows: 
 
                        
        (7.13) 
 
where     denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function operator.  
7.5 Empirical results  
 
We estimate bivariate and IV probit models respectively for the binary and continuous 
remittance variables. In order to ensure identification of the parameters of the primary models of 
research interest, we include variables in the remittances models that do not feature in the physical 
investments (or durable goods) models and vice-versa. These instrumental variables should be 
relevant in predicting the remittance variable but orthogonal to the error term in the latent model 
for the physical investments (or durable goods) equations. The following dummy variables are 
found to be suitable instruments for both the bivariate and IV probit models: (i) the gender of the 
household head, (ii) whether or not the household possesses an ATM card, and (iii) if the 
household has any migrants that are located externally.7 We check for the relevance of these 
instruments using the ‘rule-of-thumb’ F-value of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1994). A linear 
probability model (LPM) is used in the first stage to conduct the relevance tests. In the case of the 
binary remittance variable, an LPM model is also employed in the second stage. This enables us to 
test for the orthogonality of the instruments using both Sargan and Hansen test statistics. It is 
                                                          
7 In the sample, 63% of household heads are male, 47% of households have an ATM card and 55% of households have 
external migrants. 
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acknowledged that this represents a modelling convenience as the aforementioned tests are only 
strictly appropriate for use when the first and second stage models have continuous dependent 
variables. However, we believe the approach we adopt here provides us with some approximate 
insights on the validity of the instruments used.  
On the basis of the above testing approach, the instrumental variables satisfy the relevance 
criterion as they are highly correlated with the remittance variable in all cases. The variables are also 
found to be orthogonal to the error process in the second stage LPM for purchasing using both the 
Sargan and Hansen test statistics. Thus, the instruments could be interpreted as valid for the current 
application in a statistical sense given the important caveats noted above. The test results are 
provided in Table 7.3. However, we also need a narrative for why these variables are plausible 
identifying instruments in the current application. Firstly, the literature suggests that female headed 
households are often more economically disadvantaged than households headed by males (see, e.g., 
Carling 2008) and thus more likely to receive remittances. However, male/female headship may not 
necessarily affect the decision to purchase physical investments or durable goods in a direct 
manner. Secondly, the ownership of an ATM card can be considered a proxy for access to money 
transfer services and the ease of remittance transmissions by migrants. However, ATM card 
ownership is not expected to have a direct effect on the decision of the household to purchase 
physical investments and/or durable goods. Thirdly, due to the greater wage advantage, external 
migrants are likely to be able to afford to send remittances to the household of origin. There is 
extensive evidence in the literature that points to a strong positive correlation between labour 
market earnings and remittances (see, e.g., Liu and Reilly 2004). However, the location of migrants 
does not necessarily directly affect the decision to purchase physical investments or durable goods. 
 In addition, we use either the log of total per capita expenditure or the PCA index as 
identifying instruments in the durable goods (physical investments) models. It is customary to use 
household assets as instruments for household expenditure (see, e.g., Filmer and Pritchett 2001) so 
in some sense the latter may be viewed as more appropriate. However, we acknowledge that both 
may be weak instruments and their inclusion is more justified on the basis of need for a welfare 
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metric in the purchase equations. Thus, these income proxies appear only in the durable goods 
(physical investments) models but not in the remittance equations.8  
We now test whether or not the remittance variables are exogenous in the purchase equations 
of interest here. Table 7.3 provides a summary of the different tests used to test for the exogeneity 
of the remittance variables in the various models.  
Table 7.3: Testing the exogeneity of the remittances variables  
  Physical 
investments 
Durable goods 
Remittance binary variable:   
F-test for instrument relevance F( 3, 1834) = 112.45 
p-value = 0.000 
F( 3, 1834) = 112.45 
p-value = 0.000 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments)   
  = 2.23 
p-value =   0.328 
  
   = 0.47 
p-value =  0.792 
Hansen statistic (overidentification test of all instruments)   
   = 2.12 
p-value =  0.346 
  
   = 0.47 
p-value =  0.791 
Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity F(1,1834) = 4.063 
p-value = 0.044 
F(1,1834) = 0.055 
p-value = 0.814 
Biprobit likelihood-ratio test (ρ = 0)   
  = 2.71 
p-value =  0.0995 
  
  = 0.391 
p-value = 0.532 
Remittance continuous variable:   
F-test for instrument relevance F( 3, 1834) = 14.34 
p-value = 0.000 
F( 3, 1834) = 14.34 
p-value = 0.000 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments)   
  = 2.23 
p-value =  0.313 
  
   = 0.54 
p-value =  0.765 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments)   
  = 2.25 
p-value =  0.325 
  
   = 0.55 
p-value =  0.761 
Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity F(1,1834) = 0.743 
p-value = 0.389 
F(1,1834) = 0.478 
p-value = 0.489 
IV probit exogeneity test   
  = 0.99 
p-value =  0.320 
  
   = 0.08 
p-value =  0.774 
      
Notes to the table: 
(i) The tests reported here are undertaken for models where the log of total expenditure is used as a measure 
of household welfare. The results are largely invariant to the use of the PCA indicator as an alternative 
measure of welfare. The exception is the biprobit model for the physical investments category where, 
unlike in the table, the exogeneity tests for the remittance binary variable are upheld.  
For the binary remittance variable, the Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity is rejected for the 
physical investments category at the 10% level of significance thus indicating that the variable is 
indeed endogenous. The endogeneity of this variable is also confirmed by the finding of a 
significant   in the physical investments bivariate probit model. This indicates that the bivariate 
probit model represents a suitable model in this case, albeit on the basis of a marginal test result.  
                                                          
8 It makes sense to exclude these variables from the remittance equations as they are obviously endogenous in these 
equations. 
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In the other three cases, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is upheld for the Wu-Hausman test. 
In addition, the exogeneity of the remittance binary variable for the durable goods category is 
confirmed by the insignificance of   in the bivariate probit model. The exogeneity of the total 
amount of remittances received is confirmed by the non-rejection of the Wald test for exogeneity in 
both the physical investments and durable goods IV probit models. This suggests that the 
univariate probit models with exogenous remittances are the preferred models in these three cases.  
Thus, the receipt of remittances is found to be exogenous to the purchase of durable goods. 
The exogeneity of remittances implies that the receipt of remittances influences the decision by the 
household to spend on durable goods but not vice-versa. Thus, it seems that households make the 
choice to purchase durable goods contingent upon the receipt of remittances. In other words, 
households do not purchase durable goods and then in turn receive remittances. Rather, they 
decide to spend on durable goods on receiving remittances. In the previous chapter, we found that 
the receipt of remittances from sibling remitters had a positive effect on the allocation of the 
budget towards durable goods. Thus, the exogeneity of remittances here seems to support the view 
that it is the remitter who influences the spending of the remittances they send by specifying their 
use on durable goods, as opposed to the household itself anticipating or demanding that 
remittances be sent for this purpose. As such, the use of remittances for the acquisition of durable 
goods seems to be dictated by the remitter. Consequently, we could interpret remittances received 
for the purposes of purchasing durable goods as windfall or transitory income as the way in which 
they are sent precludes them from being a part of the permanent income of the household.  
The fact that remittances are spent specifically on durable goods is also supported by findings 
in the preceding chapter which reveal that households do not pool remittance and general income 
together when allocating their budget towards durable goods. The possible reasons for remitters 
sending remittances for durable goods purchases were discussed in chapter 6. For example, the 
remitter may be able to utilize these goods during visits or upon eventual return to the household 
given that they yield utility over time and are not consumed immediately. Alternatively, it may be 
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easier to monitor the uses of remittances spent on durable goods since these are tangible and last 
longer. 
On the other hand, the endogeneity of remittances in the case of physical investments indicates 
that the unobservables determining the receipt of remittances and those determining the 
investment decision are positively correlated. Thus, the decision by the household to purchase 
physical investments is influenced by the receipt of remittances and also the purchase of physical 
investments results in the household receiving remittances. As in the case of durable goods, this 
could be interpreted to imply that remittances are sent with instructions by the remitter to purchase 
physical investments. At the same time the decision by the household to purchase physical 
investments induces a corresponding response by migrants to send remittances. Hence, remittances 
represent transitory income here for the same reasons as discussed above for durable goods. 
However, remittances also represent expected or predictable income since the decision of the 
household to purchase physical investments induces the receipt of remittances. Hence, the 
endogeneity of remittances here seems to imply that there is also a reciprocal supply of remittances 
by migrants when households purchase physical investments. A possible explanation for this may 
be that, unlike durable goods, physical investments require some form of maintenance after their 
acquisition. This may be a reasonable explanation given the composition of physical investments.9 
For example, if the household opens a store they may rely on remittances to replenish the stock of 
goods, especially in the initial stages when the business may not yet be self-sustaining. Alternatively, 
it may be that the financial outlay for the acquisition of physical investments is not a one-off as they 
are likely to be costly. However, this information is not directly available from the dataset and this 
interpretation is therefore merely suggestive.  
Table 7.4 reports marginal/impact effects for the durable goods univariate probit models. In 
specification one, the logarithm of total household expenditure per capita is used as a proxy of 
household income. In specification two, the PCA index is used instead. In the third specification, 
both the total expenditure variable and PCA index are included. However, a caveat associated with 
                                                          
9 Physical investments consist of setting up a business/opening a store, house or land purchase, productive assets such as 
sewing machines or water pumps, farming equipment such as trucks, tractors, and machines. 
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using the PCA index is that many of the goods that comprise the index fall under the durable goods 
(or physical investments) categories. An attempt to exclude those goods that constitute physical 
investments and durable goods from the PCA index produces an index that has far too few assets 
and so we use the PCA index without correcting for this problem. The estimates obtained on the 
PCA index should thus be interpreted with caution. The upper panel of the table reports the effects 
for the case where the binary remittances variable is the variable of main interest. In the bottom 
panel of the table, the estimated marginal effects for the continuous remittances variable are 
reported.  
The estimates in the table reveal that the receipt of remittances, compared to non-receipt, 
increases the probability of purchasing durable goods by at least four percentage points, on average 
and ceteris paribus. 10 Given that the mean is 0.498, this corresponds to an eight per cent increase in 
the probability of purchasing durable goods relative to the mean. In addition, a 10,000 shilling 
increase in annual remittances is shown to increase the probability of purchasing durable goods by 
at least 0.16 of one percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus, which is equivalent to a 0.32 per 
cent increase in the probability of purchasing durable goods relative to the mean. Thus, the findings 
here are in comport with findings from the previous chapter. The receipt of remittances therefore 
induces Kenyan households to spend towards durable goods, though the effect is modest. 
In the first and second specifications, we see that the total expenditure per capita and PCA 
index variables have positive effects on the purchase of durable goods. This illustrates that 
households with higher income levels are more likely to purchase durable goods. Controlling for 
both total expenditure per capita and the PCA index in the third specification, the PCA index 
becomes insignificant because the PCA index and the expenditure variable are correlated.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The results for specification (I) are invariant to the treatment of total expenditure as endogenous through instrumenting 
it using a select set of assets as instrumental variables. 
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Table 7.4: Univariate probit models for durable goods (marginal/impact effects) 
Durable goods probit model with exogenous remittance binary variable 
Variables I II III 
    
Log of total household expenditure per capita 0.134***  0.128*** 
 (0.0115)  (0.0129) 
PCA index  0.0417*** 0.00906 
  (0.00718) (0.00786) 
= 1 if household received cash remittances 0.0439* 0.0583** 0.0402* 
 (0.0229) (0.0236) (0.0231) 
    
Other variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 
        
    
Durable goods probit model with endogenous remittance continuous variable 
Variables I II III 
    
Log of total household expenditure per capita 0.131*** 
 
0.125*** 
 
(0.0116) 
 
(0.0129) 
PCA index 
 
0.0402*** 0.00852 
  
(0.00728) (0.00782) 
Total cash remittances received 1.65e-07*** 2.21e-07*** 1.56e-07*** 
 
(6.14e-08) (7.66e-08) (5.96e-08) 
    Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression models also include other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
Table 7.5 provides marginal/impact effects for the physical investments univariate probit 
models. The table reveals that the receipt of remittances increases the probability of purchasing 
physical investments by at least six percentage points. 11 A 10,000 shilling increase in annual 
remittances increases the probability of purchasing physical investments by at least 0.04 of one 
percentage point, on average and ceteris paribus. This corresponds to an increase of 0.25 per cent 
relative to the mean. In specification three, we see that controlling for household expenditure per 
capita, the PCA index has a negative effect on the purchase of physical investments. This is possibly 
                                                          
11 The results for specification (I) are invariant to the treatment of total expenditure as endogenous. 
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because, to the extent that physical investments provide a source of generating income, households 
with higher income levels have less need for acquiring such commodities. 
Table 7.5: Univariate probit models for physical investments (marginal/impact effects) 
Physical investments probit model with exogenous remittance binary variable 
Variables I II III 
    
Log of total household expenditure per capita 0.0765***  0.0858*** 
 (0.00854)  (0.00962) 
PCA index  0.0105** -0.0122** 
  (0.00533) (0.00566) 
= 1 if household received cash remittances 0.0570*** 0.0715*** 0.0627*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0168) (0.0165) 
    
Other variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 
        
    
Physical investments probit model with exogenous remittance continuous variable 
Variables I II III 
Log of total household expenditure per capita 0.0782*** 
 
0.0858*** 
 
(0.00853) 
 
(0.00963) 
PCA index 
 
0.0127** -0.00978* 
  
(0.00528) (0.00561) 
Total cash remittances received 4.32e-08* 6.86e-08*** 4.62e-08** 
 
(2.26e-08) (2.58e-08) (2.32e-08) 
    Other variables   Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,856 1,856 1,856 
        
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
Given the finding that the remittance binary variable is endogenous in the physical investments 
model, we report the estimates for the bivariate probit model in Table 7.6. Conditional 
marginal/impact effects12 are reported in the table (see Greene 1998 and 2003, Park 2010). These 
effects are the sum of the direct effects for purchasing physical investments and the indirect effects 
for receiving remittances. We see that combining direct and indirect effects, for a one per cent 
increase in total expenditure per capita, the probability of purchasing physical investments 
                                                          
12 However, the impact effect for the remittance receipt binary variable is an unconditional effect since the receipt of 
remittances is already conditioned for in estimating the bivariate probit model. 
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conditional on receiving remittances will increase by 0.14 percentage points holding other variables 
constant at their reference points.13 The receipt of remittances has no statistically significant effect 
on the purchase of physical investments. This is probably because most of the effects are absorbed 
in the correlation of unobservables for the purchase of physical investments and the receipt of 
remittances. In addition, we also note the very marginal result in regard to ρ, which raises questions 
about whether the bivariate model is fully appropriate here.  
Table 7.6: Bivariate probit model for physical investments (conditional marginal/impact effects) 
Variables dy/dx 
(phy_prob=1|rec_rem=1) 
  
Log of total household expenditure per capita 0.1413*** 
 (0.0186) 
= 1 if household received cash remittances -0.0111 
 (0.0753) 
  
ρ 0.205* 
 (0.122) 
Other variables Yes 
Regional dummies Yes 
N 1856 
    
Notes to the table: 
(i) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively using two-
tailed tests. 
(ii) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
(iii) The regression model also includes other explanatory variables that are not shown here in order to conserve 
space (see text for details). 
 
7.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
In this chapter we analysed discrete household decisions in terms of purchasing physical 
investments and durable goods while treating the binary and continuous remittances variables 
endogenously. However, we obtain evidence that both remittance variables are exogenous in the 
case of the durable goods category. For the physical investments category, only the continuous 
remittance variable is found to be exogenous. Thus, we treat remittances exogenously in the 
univariate probit models corresponding to these cases. The findings reveal that the receipt of 
remittances increases the probability of purchasing durable goods and physical investments. The 
                                                          
13 We compute these effects at the mean for continuous variables and at zero for all binary variables expect the variable 
for the receipt of remittances which is set to one. 
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binary remittance variable is found to be endogenous for the physical investments category. No 
statistically significant effect on the purchase of physical investments is obtained in the bivariate 
probit model where remittances are treated endogenously.  
Overall, the empirical findings in this chapter reveal that remittances have a significant effect 
on the purchase of physical investments and durable goods and are in comport with findings 
obtained in the preceding chapter. The permanent income hypothesis postulates that if remittances 
represent permanent income, households are more likely to spend them on commodities requiring 
additional and recurrent purchases in the future (e.g., utilities, food and non-food purchases such as 
clothing). Hence, the evidence obtained here appears to support the view that remittances are not 
considered to be permanent income, and thus are used to acquire those commodities that yield 
utility over time. This may imply that households view remittances as windfall or transitory income. 
This is especially so in the case of durable goods where remittances are found to be exogenous. The 
possible interpretation for the exogeneity of remittances is that migrants specifically channel the 
remittances they send towards the acquisition of durable goods, not that the purchase of durable 
goods induces the receipt of remittances. This explanation seems to be consistent with the findings 
in the preceding chapter where we determined that sibling remitters have more bargaining power 
towards the use of remittances for purchasing durable goods. Thus, it seems to be the case that it is 
the (sibling) remitter who dictates that remittances be spent on purchasing durable goods as 
opposed to the household purchasing durable goods and then having migrants send remittances. If 
this is the case, it seems reasonable that households would not consider remittances to be part of 
their permanent budget, since their receipt is determined by the remitter and not necessarily the 
receiving household itself. The fact that remittances are not viewed as part of the household’s 
permanent income is also revealed in the preceding chapter where we reject the unitary model of 
income pooling for the durable goods category. 
On the other hand, the endogeneity of remittances in the case of physical investments may 
suggest that households view remittances as expected or predictable income for the purposes of 
acquiring physical investments. Thus, remittances are sent for the purpose of acquiring physical 
233 
 
 
 
investments and when households purchase physical investments, they in turn receive remittances. 
However, the endogeneity result here is extremely marginal. 
The use of remittances for the acquisition of durable goods and physical investments is 
suggestive of the fact that remittances may potentially contribute towards poverty reduction at the 
household level and the enhancement of local economic development. For example, physical 
investments could be used to generate income thus contributing towards income source 
diversification and perhaps generating employment for household members. Alternatively, durable 
goods and physical investment goods could be sourced locally thus potentially boosting local 
businesses.  
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8 Conclusions, Policy Recommendations and Agenda for Future 
Research 
 
This thesis conducted empirical analysis on migration and remittances using the 2009 Africa 
Migration Project household survey for Kenya. The survey is a single-round, cross-sectional survey 
that was jointly undertaken by the African Development Bank and World Bank between 24 
October and 22 December 2009. No empirical work of the type reported in this thesis has been 
undertaken with these data to date. 
Four sets of separate, though related, empirical analyses were undertaken in this thesis. In the 
first empirical chapter, the factors that determine the subsequent migration decisions of Kenyan 
siblings are investigated. We estimate a binary logit model to ascertain the effect of a preceding 
sibling migrant on the probability of migrating. A strong negative effect is obtained. This suggests 
that preceding sibling migrants deter subsequent sibling migration. Thus the migration of Kenyan 
siblings appears to be driven by a household income diversification strategy where some siblings 
migrate while others remain at home. We also find that there are no differential effects on the 
migration probability of a sibling according to whether the preceding migrant is a sibling or non-
sibling member of the household. The impression of this finding is that migration is a household 
level decision involving all members, regardless of the type of relationship with the household.  
A major concern we have with our findings is that the variable capturing the presence of a 
preceding sibling migrant is potentially endogenous. Attempts to employ an instrumental variables 
approach proved unsuccessful due to a lack of suitable instruments. The cross-sectional nature of 
the survey used also renders it difficult to obtain any meaningful instrumental variables. However, 
our main findings are invariant to a host of robustness checks that attempt to attenuate the 
potential endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, we defer from interpreting the results obtained as 
detecting pure causal effects of subsequent sibling migration. Rather, the findings explain the 
relationships between the preceding and subsequent migration decisions of Kenyan siblings. 
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We also model the subsequent migration decisions of Kenyan siblings using a discrete failure 
time approach. This allows us to control for any neglected heterogeneity at the household level. 
Findings from both random and fixed effects models reveal that neglected heterogeneity is 
statistically important and induces an upward bias on the coefficient for the preceding sibling 
migrant variable. The neglected heterogeneity possibly captures household common influences. If 
households with a preceding sibling migrant have common influences, this is expected to induce an 
upward bias on the coefficient for the preceding sibling migrant variable. However, it is 
acknowledged that the neglected heterogeneity probably captures other unobserved variables as 
well. Controlling for neglected heterogeneity, no overall effect is detected for the presence of a 
preceding sibling migrant on the probability of migrating. On the other hand, the presence of non-
sibling migrants is found to decrease the probability of migrating externally and internally.   
The second empirical chapter of the thesis investigated the remitting behaviour of Kenyan 
sibling migrants. A Heckman selection model is employed to determine the factors that motivate 
the remittances of sibling migrants. However, no evidence of selection in the decision to remit and 
the amount of remittances sent by migrants is detected. The two processes are therefore modelled 
separately using probability and linear regression models. Being a multiple (compared to a sole) 
sibling migrant is found to have a negative effect on the probability of remitting and no statistically 
significant effect on the amount sent. Thus, unlike previous findings in the literature, our findings 
preclude competition for inheritance purposes, pure altruism, or independent co-insurance as 
motivators of Kenyan sibling remitting behaviour. Rather, the evidence obtained reveals that 
multiple migrants appear to be motivated to remit by other factors that do not feature explicitly in 
the extant remittance literature. We suggest that a strategy involving a sharing of the remittance 
responsibilities could be a possible explanation for the findings we obtained. For the case of 
multiple migrants only, an instrumental variables approach is employed to determine the effect that 
the amount of remittances sent by other sibling migrants exerts on a sibling’s own remittances. We 
find that the remittance levels of other siblings have no effect on the amount of remittances sent by 
a sibling. We suspect that this may be because multiple sibling migrants take turns to remit to the 
household with only a subset of siblings within the group assuming full responsibility for the 
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remittance needs of the household at a given time. Some caution, however, is exercised in 
interpreting these findings because the instruments employed are weak. Nonetheless, the findings 
are robust to tests for weak instrumentation and this somewhat abates our concerns in this regard. 
However, whether or not siblings take turns to remit is not something that can be detected with a 
cross-sectional dataset. This again highlights a limitation of the empirical work reported for this 
chapter.  
In the third empirical chapter, an Almost Ideal Demand Systems (AIDS) model is used to 
determine whether there are differences in the allocation of budget shares according to whether or 
not migrant households receive remittances for seven categories of commodities (viz., food, non-
food, utilities, durable goods, physical investments, education and health). Migrant households that 
receive remittances are found to allocate a larger proportion of their budget shares towards durable 
goods at the margin, compared to non-receiving migrant households. The budget shares of migrant 
households are also found to be sensitive to the source of remittance. Specifically, the receipt of 
sibling and spouse remittances respectively increases the budget shares allocated to durable goods 
and physical investments. Thus, the bargaining powers of spouse and sibling remitters appear to 
impact these two categories of expenditure. Additional tests also reject the unitary model 
proposition with income out of remittances being shown to have a positive and significant effect 
on the budget shares of durable goods and physical investments. These results are invariant to the 
treatment of total expenditure as endogenous and when potential selection bias in the expenditure 
decision is accounted for. 
We also investigate whether the way Kenyan households report remittance uses indicates the 
allocation of remittance income to expenditure categories is similar to the allocation out of general 
income. We find large differences between the reported uses of remittance as opposed to general 
income by Kenyan households. This calls into question the veracity of the reported uses by 
households of remittances. 
In the fourth and final empirical chapter, we narrow the analysis to physical investments and 
durable goods and then explicitly treat the remittances endogenously. The censorship of these two 
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budget shares categories is also addressed, albeit somewhat crudely, through the use of recursive 
bivariate probit and IV probit models. However, remittances are found to be exogenous in the 
durable goods models and in one of the physical investments models. The exogeneity of 
remittances suggests that households interpret them as transitory income. Upon treating 
remittances as exogenous, we find remittances to have a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of purchasing physical investments and durable goods. Conversely, the endogeneity of 
remittances in the physical investments model suggests that remittances are predictable income. 
Thus, the receipt and use of remittances is planned for in the case of physical investment purchases. 
When we treat the remittance variable as endogenous, we obtain no statistically significant effect on 
the purchasing of physical investments. This is possibly because most of the remittance effects are 
absorbed in the correlation in the unobservables between the receipt of remittances and the 
purchase of physical investments. However, we note the very marginal rejection of exogeneity here.  
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the various empirical investigations 
undertaken in this thesis. The evidence assembled indicates that the Kenyan labour market is quite 
flexible and responds to both internal and external opportunities. Individuals with higher levels of 
education are particularly more prone to migrate. The possession of university (compared to 
primary) education is shown to have a stronger effect on internal migration while secondary 
education has a positive effect on both internal and external migration. Thus, we obtain evidence 
that the direct benefit of investing in the higher education of Kenyans not only accrues to other 
countries when people migrate but also benefits Kenya due to the high prevalence of internal 
movements. This may be because some highly skilled individuals opt to remain within Kenya due 
to constraints on the accreditation of their qualifications in countries abroad. The responsiveness of 
highly educated Kenyans to opportunities both at home and abroad lessens the “brain drain” effect 
of migration since some individuals who possess high human capital levels are retained at home. In 
addition, we find that students are more likely to migrate externally. This demand for higher 
education abroad suggests that there is scope to expand the supply of higher education institutions 
in Kenya, though enhancing the quality of such educational provision is also clearly required and 
perhaps represents the bigger challenge.  
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The empirical findings presented in this thesis also reveal that Kenyan migrants have continued 
to maintain contact with and support their households of origin over time. For example, the 
proportion of migrant remitters in the current research is on par with that of Hoddinott (1992) who 
used a rather dated 1982 sample. Thus, remittances by migrants continue to contribute to the 
income sources of origin households. Moreover, the finding that remittances by Kenyan siblings do 
not displace those sent by other migrants is potentially generalizable to other areas such as the 
social transfers literature. One of the key debates in the social transfers literature concerns whether 
government transfers to elderly people displace financial support from family members. To the 
extent that remittances sent by others do not displace the remittances of Kenyan siblings, our 
findings are at odds with this assertion. The suggestion from our findings is that the receipt of 
social transfers may not necessarily displace remittances as remittances are not a direct response to 
the transfers received by the household per se. However, we refrain from deriving any conclusive 
policy recommendations since the analysis undertaken here did not include an explicit focus on 
social transfers given data constraints. 
Our findings also challenge the view that remittances are not sustainable because recipients 
spend them on consumption goods. Instead, the allocation of remittances to physical investments 
and durable goods can potentially contribute towards local economic development through various 
multiplier effects. For instance, it may improve local businesses or create employment if households 
purchase these commodities locally. Policy makers can play a role, for example, by creating an 
enabling environment for the conduct of small businesses and other income generating activities in 
order to boost and sustain the activities that households embark upon when they invest in physical 
investments. They could also support local economies to manufacture commodities and meet the 
demand for durable goods and physical investments locally. 
There has been some criticism of remittance-specific policies that focus on lowering 
transaction fees to enable remitters to transfer small amounts more frequently. The effectiveness of 
regular remittance flows in stimulating households to spend more towards productive investments 
has been questioned (see, e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2014). However, the findings of this 
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thesis suggest that when remittances represent predictable income, they are used to acquire physical 
investments. We also find that even when remittances represent transitory income, they are still 
used to purchase physical investments and durable goods, rather than consumables. We therefore 
find no evidence of a contradiction in the use of remittances depending on whether or not they are 
predictable. Thus, policies that lower transaction costs for smaller amounts are unlikely to cause a 
shift in the uses of remittances by Kenyan households towards consumption goods. This implies 
that policy incentives that encourage small and frequent remittance transfers should be given equal 
precedence as those that promote more irregular or less frequent transfers. 
In addition, the findings we obtain suggest that studies in the literature should be cautious 
when using data reporting the direct uses of remittances by households to draw inferences about 
the impact of remittances. Similar concerns have been raised by previous studies in the literature 
(see, e.g., Castaldo and Reilly 2007, Zarate-Hoyos 2008). The general view from this direct 
remittance use approach is that remittances are mainly used for current consumption rather than 
physical investments (Zarate-Hoyos op. cit.). The current thesis demonstrates empirically the 
inconsistencies between the reported and actual uses of remittances by households. This reveals 
that findings based on the reported direct uses of remittances are potentially misleading. 
A number of issues that could be pursued as part of an agenda for future research arise from 
the investigations undertaken in this thesis. Firstly, the household survey used in the thesis is a huge 
improvement on previous surveys in Africa upon which migration and remittance research has 
been conducted. However, there is still scope for enhancing survey data in order to enable more 
robust empirical analysis to be conducted. In particular, surveys should not only be conducted on 
one end (i.e., the household of origin or migrants in the destination) but at both concurrently. Also, 
there needs to be an emphasis on multiple round surveys as opposed to cross-sectional ones. This 
would make it more feasible to obtain suitable instrumental variables for use in econometric models 
and thus enhance the analysis that can be undertaken. This would also allow for explicit insights 
into whether siblings are taking turns to remit or not. In addition, the panel dimension can be 
exploited in order to obtain instruments that induce random exogenous variation in the 
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endogenous regressors but are unrelated to the other determinants of migration. This will enable 
the estimation of more robust causal effects than was the case in this thesis. 
Further, questions regarding wider migrant networks need to be incorporated in surveys. This 
will enhance the understanding of the role of networks in facilitating migration. As highlighted by 
Palloni et al. (2001), networks based on kinship are not necessarily the most salient in shaping 
migration decisions. Instead, networks based on much weaker ties of friendship or acquaintance 
may be equally or more important than kinship ties in determining migration. Thus, the role played 
by sibling and non-sibling networks in facilitating migration, as demonstrated in the current 
research, represents only one strand in a much broader framework of networks that potentially 
influence migration. 
We also realise, owing to data limitations, that our empirical analysis on the reported uses of 
remittances is somewhat constrained given the small sample sizes used. The investigation of the 
veracity of remittance uses can be enhanced in the future through incorporating more questions on 
remittance uses in household surveys. This should enable greater insights on this important topic. 
The changing patterns of remittance motivations should also be considered. Given the dynamic 
nature of migration, there are likely to have been shifts in the motivations of remittances from 
traditional motivators such as the inheritance or altruistic motives originally proposed by Lucas and 
Stark (1985). Thus, remittance motives that reflect more contemporary migration need to be 
developed. The remittance theory literature should also be expanded in order to account for the 
changing motivations of remittances. The current research has initiated this process by employing 
empirical-based methods to analyse migration and remittances using a recent dataset. We 
acknowledge that there are gaps in the theory relating to subsequent migration and multiple migrant 
remittance behaviour which are not adequately addressed here. The development of theory related 
to the topics discussed in this thesis represents a potential area for future research. For example, 
there is potential to develop remittances sending motives that involve a sharing of responsibilities 
as alluded to in this thesis. This kind of motive could potentially be fashioned after the sharing rule 
which currently features in the bargaining literature where it is modelled within an intra-household 
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framework (see, e.g. Chiappori 1992). An extension of this to incorporate an inter-household 
bargaining structure which incorporates members who are no longer resident in the nuclear family 
may also be feasible. In Kenya non-resident family members are shown to continue playing a 
significant role in contributing towards the welfare of the origin family even after establishing their 
own independent households. This is more so due to the absence of formal social welfare services 
and the existence of a culture where adult children are a source of financial support for their elderly 
parents. To further develop this, more detailed information relating to the relative bargaining 
powers of migrants is required. Specifically, the labour market characteristics of migrants, including 
their earnings, will provide variables that proxy the sharing of remittance responsibilities. The 
absence of these variables from the survey employed in the current thesis inhibits us from further 
distilling the mechanisms through which the sharing of responsibilities potentially operates. In 
addition, and reprising an earlier theme above, it is necessary to have panel data in order to 
investigate the remittance behaviour of multiple migrants more comprehensively. We propose that 
the findings we obtained may suggest that multiple sibling migrants take turns to remit. The 
robustness of the evidence for such a strategy can be enhanced if data from multiple periods are 
available. 
A suggestion as to how the existing remittance theory could be extended to incorporate 
multiple migrants is to introduce altruistic weights relating to other migrants in the altruistic model 
developed by Lucas and Stark (op. cit.). In this model, altruistic weights are attached to various 
household of origin members based on per capita consumption. Information about the transfer of 
remittances between migrants or the per capita consumption of migrant households may inform on 
the amount of weight that is attached to the well-being of fellow migrants and how this relates to 
the remittances sent to the origin household. Given that our findings potentially provide support 
for an inter-household bargaining model, extending the theory to encompass a wider set of 
households can provide more insight into the motivations of remittances. 
Finally, more can be done to investigate alternative drivers of migrant remitting behaviour. The 
theory relating to self-interest remittance motives could be extended by modelling it within a non-
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cooperative framework in a manner akin to the prisoner’s dilemma approach. This can inform, for 
example, on whether the remittance behaviour of multiple migrants exhibits competition or free-
riding. However, for this to be feasible, the timing of remittances sent to the household needs to be 
known. That is, if migrants remit (or do not remit) in response to the remittances sent by others, it 
would be informative to know who remitted first and the timing of subsequent remittances by 
others. Overall, more empirical evidence on multiple migrant remittance behaviour and an 
expansion of the associated theories are necessary to enable more concrete policy conclusions to be 
drawn and recommendations to be made. 
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